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This thesis explores the responses of different groups within the English Catholic 
community to the civil war, interregnum and restoration, with close attention to Catholic 
political theory. The English Catholic community were not mere observers of the 
constitutional and religious changes made during this period but manoeuvred within 
shifting political frameworks, continually adjusting their politics to meet new 
requirements. After the defeat and the execution of Charles I, members of the 
community made a series of compromises with political parties to secure toleration. 
Until the Restoration these were almost all to the exclusion of the Stuarts. Catholic 
political theorists engaged with the pro-sectarian, tolerationist principles of the 
parliamentary Independents during the first part of the Interregnum, but after the failure 
of the Cromwellian Church settlement in 1655 began to interact with anti-sectarian pro-
episcopal groups during the decline of the Protectorate. Further, the community’s 
membership of an international church, their ideological assumptions and patronage 
from, and allegiances to, European courts meant that English Catholics had to be an 
integral part of Cromwellian foreign policy. The 1650s did not signify a break in the 
politics and ambition of the community but instead saw a continuation of the divisions, 
back-biting and intolerance that Catholics had shown during the 1620s and 1630s. Due 
to the factional nature of both the politics of the interregnum and the community itself 
however, English Catholics stood to gain more from the Protectorate than they did from 
the Stuart monarchy. This thesis therefore reintegrates English Catholicism into the 
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Histories of the English civil war tell us as much about the political environment 
in which they were written as they do about the seventeenth century. From the 
Whiggism of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, via the Marxism of the 
1950s and 1960s, to revisionism in the 1970s, 1980s and early 90s and the so-called 
post-revisionism of the late 1990s and early noughties, historians’ focus has shifted from 
the elite to the bourgeoisie and even the lower orders; from state to locality; from 
political to religious to social; and from the English dimension to the British one. Yet the 
English Catholic community has never really been compatible with successive 
historiographic models of what happened between 1640 and 1660. As a result, it has 
hardly figured at all. When English Roman Catholicism has been integrated into a 
narrative of the English civil war, it has been understood in terms of anti-popery rather 
than English Romanism itself.  
 
1.1. The place of English Catholicism within the politics of the Elizabethan, 
Jacobean and Stuart regimes. 
Yet popery and anti-popery were crucial to the political environment which 
generated the conflict. The fear of a particular kind of European Catholicism had been 
ingrained into English consciousness since the death of Edward VI. The persecution of 
Marian Protestants provided one of the narratives available to Elizabethan puritans who 
argued for a particular approach to the evangelisation of the national Church. For some, 
the Elizabethan regime faced the possibility in the 1580s and 1590s of being sucked into 
a full-blown war of religion.  
 
Most of those involved in the English Catholic ‘mission’ of the sixteenth century 
saw it as no more than an attempt to bring true Catholic religion to Elizabeth’s realm.1 
William Allen established the English College at Douai in 1568 in order to train young 
Catholic men as priests to return to England to administer the sacraments and secure the 
continuation of the faith under the radar of the hostile government. Allen actively 
                                                
1 A. Pritchard, Catholic Loyalism in Elizabethan England (London, 1979), pp.8-9. 
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campaigned for several years for the papacy’s permission to begin the mission in 
England. His persistence finally paid off in 1579. Under strict instructions that they were 
not to become involved in politics, two Jesuits, Edmund Campion and Robert Persons, 
were sent to England. Some historians argue that the mission was exclusively concerned 
with religious purposes and that in the face of increasingly severe penal legislation 
Catholicism became something of a seigneurial sect.2 When Campion and Persons (both 
former Oxford dons) first arrived in England they claimed they were there solely for 
spiritual matters.3 Neither priest made direct contact with any member of the Catholic 
faction at court and neither discussed the pope’s deposing power or the legitimacy of the 
queen’s title. Despite the show trials of Campion and some of his associates in 1581 and 
the confrontation and eventual war with Spain, it is still argued by some historians that 
the Catholic community became a small ‘introspective group’, in the sense that their role 
centred around the households of a minority of the gentry and that they played ‘a role in 
English history as only one element in the myth of Catholic danger’.4  
 
Even if the mission had, however, been established on purely religious, non-
political grounds at the beginning, shortly after Campion and Persons entered the 
                                                
2 C. Haigh, ‘Revisionism, the Reformation and the History of English Catholicism’ Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 36, 3 (July, 1985), pp.394-406.  
3 P. Lake and M. Questier, ‘Puritans, Papists, and the “Public Sphere” in Early Modern England: The 
Edmund Campion Affair in Context’, Journal of Modern History, 72, 3 (September, 2000), pp.587-627, 
p.601. The mission’s purpose was undoubtedly a spiritual one but the act of the mission could not help but 
make a political statement (Alexandra Walsham has shown that the mission had a spiritual nature in her 
‘Miracles of the Counter-Reformation Mission to England’, Historical Journal, 46, 4 (2003), pp.779-815, 
at p.812). Thomas McCoog has suggested that both Persons and Campion believed that there were many 
people who did not completely support the Church of England, and so their mission was to confirm the 
faith of those who were wavering (T. McCoog, ‘‘Playing the Champion’: The Role of the Disputation in 
the Jesuit Mission’, T. McCoog (ed.), The reckoned expense: Edmund Campion and the early English 
Jesuits: essays in celebration of the first centenary of Campion Hall, Oxford (1896-1996) (Woodbridge 
and Rochaester, 1996), pp.119-139, at p. 38). John Larocca has argued that the mission was viewed by 
Elizabeth and her Parliament as part of a papal and Spanish militant policy. At the time the mission 
arrived, Larocca argues, the papacy were supporting a rebellion and invasion in Ireland (J.J. Larocca, 
‘Popery and Pounds: The Effect of the Jesuit Mission on penal legislation’, McCoog (ed.), The reckoned 
expense, pp.249-263, at p.253). Michael Carrafiello however, argues that the mission was in fact a 
political venture masked by ‘religion’ (See M.L. Carrafiello, ‘English Catholicism and the Jesuit mission 
of 1580-1581’, Historical Journal, 37, 4 (1994), pp.761-774). His argument seems to have missed the 
subtlety of the connection between spiritual and temporal authority faced by Roman Catholic clergy 
attempting to operate in a hostile country. Arnold Pritchard argued that Allen and Persons were 
‘politicians and political writers by necessity, not by choice’ (Pritchard, Catholic Loyalism, p.37) and the 
mission certainly did change the nature of the relationship between English Roman Catholics and the State 
(Larocca, ‘Popery and Pounds’, p.263). 
4 Haigh, ‘Revisionism’, p.399. 
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country their pastoral duties became a ‘full-frontal public challenge’ to the state and the 
queen.5 The beginning of the mission was not randomly timed; it coincided with the 
Anjou Match negotiations and the chance that the queen might marry a Valois prince. 
Not only would the match perhaps provide room for negotiated toleration of the 
community but it would also enable Catholics to support the queen by pledging their 
allegiance to her in the face of puritan criticism.6 From the mid-Elizabethan period, 
therefore, there was an association between what Catholics actually did and the 
Protestant anti-popish tradition. The former was not simply a myth deployed for the 
construction of the latter. Moreover, the interventions of Catholics in England, Scotland 
and Ireland during the later Elizabethan period came almost invariably at times when 
monarchical authority was under threat from a variety of Protestant and puritan critiques. 
Catholicism therefore became associated, in the anti-popish canon, with the 
inappropriate exercise of monarchical authority.  
 
The Protestant anti-popish tradition was not diminished by the accession of King 
James I. James’s politicking and his determination not to commit himself to the pan-
European Protestant cause allowed critics of the court to phrase their alternative agenda 
with reference to the danger of popery. Briefly in the early 1620s, the collapse of the 
negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish dynastic marriage alliance and the so-called ‘Blessed 
Revolution’, in which Prince Charles and the duke of Buckingham agitated in 
Parliament for a declaration of war against the Habsburgs, made a détente between the 
                                                
5 Lake and Questier, ‘Puritans, Papists, and the “Public Sphere”, p.606. 
6 Ibid. pp.615-618; T. Clancy, Papist Pamphleteers. The Allen-Persons party and the political thought of 
the Counter-Reformation in England 1572-1615 (Chicago, 1964). 
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court and its critics appear possible.7 But the basis for this reorientation in foreign policy 
was the dynastic alliance with France which brought Henrietta Maria to England. After 
Charles’s accession in March 1625, the court was soon regarded by Buckingham’s 
enemies as having been infiltrated by Catholics. The successive failures of the new 
course in foreign policy, the partial collapse of the French alliance and the means used to 
raise revenue for the war all resembled, to some, the product of a conspiracy which 
could as accurately be described as ‘popish’ as anything else.8 Charles’s inclination to 
promote ‘Arminian’ clergy seemed to many the precursor of the reestablishment of some 
                                                
7 Revisionist historians, in particular Conrad Russell, argued that the later part of James’s reign saw a 
‘remarkable lack of religious and political polarisation’ (C. Russell, Parliament and English Politics 1621-
1629 (Oxford, 1979), p.419). The only problems that remained between the crown and Parliament, Russell 
suggested, were purely administrative (Ibid). Yet these arguments have been reworked by post-revisionists 
who have pointed to a growing sense of anti-popery and fear of a ‘disintegrating’ continental ‘Protestant 
position’ (T. Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution. English Politics and the coming of war, 1621-1624 
(Cambridge, 1981), p.4). The Anglo-Spanish alliance proved a, if not the most, divisive act under the reign 
of James I. Not only was Spain, in many Protestant eyes, still aiming for a ‘universal monarchy’ after the 
protracted Anglo-Spanish Elizabethan war, but critics of the prospective marriage feared the impact of a 
Catholic queen on the nation’s faith. They feared the possibility of toleration for Roman Catholicism (if 
not a complete counter-Reformation) as this was the first time that a royal marriage would not follow a 
confessional line. A Protestant king should marry a Protestant queen to safeguard the religion of the 
country (T. Cogswell ‘England and the Spanish Match’, in (eds.), R. Cust and A. Hughes, Conflict in 
Early Stuart England. Studies in Religion and Politics 1603-1642 (London, New York, 1989), pp.107-
133, at pp.111, 112). The collapse of the negotiations saw an ‘unprecedented outburst of popular royalist 
and anti-Spanish sentiment’ (A. Walsham, “The Fatal Vesper’. Providentialism and Anti-Popery in Late 
Jacobean London’, Past and Present, 44 (1994), pp.36-87, at p.38; Cogswell, ‘England and the Spanish 
Match’, pp.107-109). The euphoria of James’s Protestant subjects was not just relief but a reaction to what 
they considered the ‘turn of Christendom’. They expected an Anglo-Spanish war, ‘a counter-blow’, to 
combat Catholic Spanish aggression on the Continent (Ibid. pp.126-127). But, as Cogswell suggests, this 
anti-popish fear of a dynastic match between the Crown and Spain had a different aspect. This time people 
were scared of the king’s intentions. (Ibid. p.129). 
8 The Forced Loan of 1626, for example, caused debates concerning the extent of royal prerogative power. 
The legality of the loan was questioned by the Lord Chief Justice and fifteen leading peers who refused to 
subscribe to it. By January 1627 there was serious opposition to it from the localities and groups of gentry 
refused to pay. The ring-leaders of these groups were arrested, which only served to draw public attention 
to the ‘severity of measures’ used against them. (R. Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626-
1628 (Oxford, 1987), p 4). Uneasiness over the extent and legitimacy of royal prerogative power climaxed 
with the Five Knights case in November 1627, when leading refusers of the loan were tried publicly for 
their failure to cooperate. They had hoped that their trial would test the legality of the loan, but the issue 
was avoided. This seemed to many an abuse of royal authority (Ibid). There had always been in the eyes 
of puritans a link between arbitrary government/absolute monarchical rule and popery, so it did not help 
that the commissioners of the loan included leading Catholic gentry nor that Catholic lords and high-
church clerics enjoyed an increased prominence at Court (R. Cust, ‘Charles I, the Privy Council, and the 
Forced Loan’, Journal of British Studies, 24, 2 (1985), pp.208-235, at pp.224, 235). Charles’s declaration 
of war on France in January 1627 was interpreted even by those who had previously been of a loyal 
disposition towards the king in terms of a popish plot. The Reverend John Rous remarked that he thought 
it was a way ‘to diverte us from helping the protestants in Germany’ (T. Cogswell, ‘The Politics of 
Propaganda: Charles I and the People in the 1620s’, Journal of British Studies, 29, 3 (1990), pp.187-215, 
at p.188). 
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form of Catholicism.9 In the 1630s, the appearance of both priests and the papal nuncio 
at court supported this view.  
 
After the failed Bishop’s War in 1639 (following Charles’s attempts to enforce a 
new prayer book on the Scots) the king’s authority started to crumble. The calling of the 
Short Parliament and the Long Parliament gave chances for Charles’s Protestant critics 
to debate openly all their grievances over Charles’s supposed misgovernment and to set 
limits on the royal prerogative. Then came the outbreak of the rebellion in Ireland in 
October 1641, when Irish Catholics led a pre-emptive strike on Irish Protestants, fearing 
that the Protestants of England, Ireland and Scotland were going to wipe out Catholicism 
altogether. News from Ireland told of Protestants being brutally massacred. There were 
graphic descriptions of rape, hanging and children burned at the stake.10 Worst of all, the 
Catholic rebels claimed that Charles had authorized them to take up arms against their 
Protestant countrymen. This followed rumoured discoveries of Catholic plots in 
England, including one designed to blow up the Thames and drown the City of 
                                                
9 Protestant contemporaries did view Arminianism as the ‘Trojan Horse’ of popery (N. Tyacke, Anti-
Calvinists. The Rise of Arminianism, c. 1590-1640 (Oxford, 1987), p. 135). Anthony Milton’s Catholic 
and Reformed has explored the connection in early modern Protestant thought between Arminian and 
Roman Catholic ideology. For example, Laudians would not condemn the Roman Catholic Church as a 
false church, they preached against predestination, implemented high-church forms of worship and 
regarded anti-Catholicism, or indeed puritanism, as ‘a destabilising force’,  but would not accept papal 
authority. (A. Milton, Catholic and Reformed. The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant 
Thought, 1600-1640 (Cambridge, 1995), pp.529-532, 541). The rising influence of Arminianism did not 
just matter on a spiritual level, but had serious political ramifications too. David Como has shown that 
predestination was becoming an increasingly political issue throughout Charles’s reign. As early as 1629 
Calvinist preaches gave sermons arguing that Arminianism went against established practices of the 
Church of England and therefore threatened rights guaranteed by established law (see D. Como, 
‘Predestination and Political Conflict in Laud’s London’, Historical Journal, 46 (2003), pp.284-292, at 
pp.269-271). Recent historiography has shown that ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ cannot be neatly separated. 
Even though it has been successfully argued that Caroline Arminian/Laudian policies were not new, it was 
more aggressive enforcement (in particular the show trials in the Court of Star Chamber during the 1630s) 
that caused such deep religious divisions and accusations of popery (K. Fincham, ‘Ecclesiastical Policies 
of James I and Charles I’, pp.23-50; P. Lake, ‘The Laudian Style: order, Uniformity and the pursuit of the 
Beauty of Holiness in the 1630s’, pp.161-186; A. Milton, ‘The Church of England, Rome and the True 
Church: The Demise of a Jacobean Consensus’, pp.187-210 all in K. Fincham (ed.), The Early Stuart 
Church, 1603-1642 (London, 1993). 
10 Keith Lindley shows that the extent of the Thomason Tracts published at the beginning of the rebellion 
in 1641 to 1645 suggest that news of, and references to, the rebellion were very ‘prominent’ in reporting 
and would have reached a wide number of people (K. Lindley, ‘The Impact of the 1641 Rebellion upon 
England and Wales, 1641-5’, Irish Historical Studies, 18, 70 (1972), pp.143-176, at pp.144-145. 
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London.11 It was widely feared that the Irish Rebellion was part of a larger plan, in 
which Welsh and English Catholics were fellow conspirators and would start their own 
rebellion with a view to ‘slaughtering’ English Protestants.12 Protestant fear of 
Catholicism generated deep distrust of the seemingly popish king.13 
 
These events from the beginning of the Scots Crisis in 1638 have been identified 
by revisionist historians as the ‘British Problem’, a chain of short-term consequential 
events which caused the civil war.14 Fear of popery was a crucial component in this. The 
evidence of royal willingness to use Irish troops in Scotland (if not actually in England) 
supposedly illustrated the corrosive effects of popery at the heart of court. This, in turn, 
led to fear of an Irish invasion or a popish plot. Jane Ohlmeyer’s study of Randal 
MacDonnell, marquis of Antrim, has strengthened this interpretation.15 Antrim was a 
man who seemed to embody the popish cancer eating away at the Caroline court. A 
Catholic Irishman, Antrim came to prominence by marrying Katherine, the widow of the 
widely despised duke of Buckingham, in 1635, securing him a favoured place at court.16 
When Charles ran into trouble with the Scots in 1638, Antrim offered to rally the 
MacDonnell Irish clan against them. His troops never left Irish soil, as news of the plan 
leaked, causing moderate Scots to join with the Covenanters, as well as increasing 
animosity towards the king in England. Ohlmeyer suggests that Antrim hatched at least 
three further plots to send Irish troops to fight the Covenanters in Scotland between 
spring 1642 and spring 1644, with direct involvement from both Charles and Henrietta 
Maria. Only one of these plans succeeded. In 1644 Antrim managed to send a force of 
                                                
11 R. Castlemaine, Reply to the Answer of the Catholique apology, or a cleere vindication of the 
Catholiques of England from all matter of fact charg’d against them by their enemyes (London, 1668), 
p.64. 
12 Lindley, ‘The impact of the 1641 Rebellion’, p. 152; R. Clifton, ‘The Fear of Catholics in England 1637 
to 1645. Principally from central sources’, (Unpublished DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford, 1976), 
p.190. 
13 Clifton, ‘The Fear of Catholics’, p.126. 
14 For Conrad Russell it was the Irish Rebellion (C, Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War. The 
Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford 1987-1988 (Oxford, 1990), pp.213) and for John 
Morrill it was ‘the struggle for the Covenant [that] led inexorably on to the War of Three Kingdoms, in 
which affairs of each other became inextricably bound up with the affairs of others’ (J. Morrill, ‘The 
Scottish National Covenant of 1638 in its British Context’, in his The Nature of the English Revolution 
(London, New York, 1994), pp.91-117, at p.114). Also see Clifton, ‘Fear of the Catholics’, p.331. 
15 J. Ohlmeyer, Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms. The career of Randal 
MacDonnell, marquis of Antrim, 1609-1683 (Cambridge, 1993). 
16 Ibid. p.29. 
 17 
nearly two thousand men to serve under the marquis of Montrose. In turn, Montrose 
secured several victories, worrying the Covenanters so much that they recalled many of 
their troops then fighting against the king in England.17 To add to the suspicion of a 
popish plot, Antrim was also approached to raise arms and money for the royalist army 
in 1645.18 
 
In response to fears of a popish plot and to evidence of such popish alliances, the 
publication of anti-papist tracts and pamphlets attacking the king’s ‘evil counsellors’ 
increased to astonishing rates as the civil war began.19 One of the best known was 
William Prynne’s The Popish Royall Favourite of 1643, published by permission of 
Parliament.20 This tract listed all the cases where the king had protected Catholic priests 
and gentry from the penal laws being enacted against them, either by letters of grace or 
warrants. Cases went as far back as the 1630s. Most of the information was taken from 
the findings of the ‘House of Commons Committee for Inquiry after Papists’ in 1640. 
Both the inquiry and Prynne’s publication concluded that the fact that Charles was not 
even obeying the laws laid down against Catholicism indicated that he was a tyrant. 
Prynne accused the king and his evil counsellors of having ‘violated, invaded the 
subjects, parliaments indubitable just rights, laws, liberties, privileges, properties all his 
reign … and since his departure from this Parliament, have practised it in a far higher 
degree then ever’.21 Prynne believed the king would use Irish Catholic soldiers, along 
with English and Scottish Catholics to defeat the parliamentarians and ‘extirpate’ the 
Protestant religion. Prynne’s call to arms followed:  
                                                
17 Ibid. pp.14, 135. 
18 Ibid. p.161. 
19 See, the Thomason Collection held in the British Library; T. Watt, Cheap print and popular piety, 1550-
1640 (Cambridge, 1991). 
20 W. Prynne, The Popish royall favourite: or, A full discovery of His Majesties extraordinary favours to, 
and protections of notorious papists, priests, Jesuits, against all prosecutions and penalties of the laws 
enacted against them; notwithstanding his many royall proclamations, declarations, and protestations to 
the contrary. As likewise of a most desperate long prosecuted designe to set up popery, and extirpate the 
Protestant religion by degrees, in this our realme of England, and all His Majesties dominions. 
Manifested by sundry letters of grace, warrants, and other writings under the Kings owne signe-manuall, 
privy-signet, his privy-councels, and Secretary Windebanks hands and seals, by divers orders and 
proceedings in open sessions at Newgate, in the Kings Bench, and elsewhere ... / Collected and published 
by authority of Parliament: by William Prynne, of Lincolns Inne, Esquire. (London, 1643). 
21 Ibid. p.72. 
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That English Protestant who can sit still and patiently suffer such bloody, 
barbarous, popish Irish villains to set foot on English ground for such a purpose, 
and not rise up in arms, siding with the Parliament, and Protestant party, against 
them, to expulse or cut them off, hath lost both the spirit of an English man, and 
the zeal of a real Protestant.22  
This is seen by revisionist historians as no more than propaganda; playing on a threat 
which had been long been established in the general Protestant consciousness to gain 
popular support.23 The decision by the Long Parliament to publish their criticisms of the 
king earlier in November 1641 pays testament to this.24 The Grand Remonstrance had 
been compiled by a parliamentary committee over ten months and detailed ‘all present 
evils and grievances of the kingdom’.25 It provided ‘evidence’, dating back to 1625, of a 
popish plot intended to divide the king from his subjects. Spurred on by the Irish 
Rebellion, those behind the Grand Remonstrance named Jesuits, clergy, counsellors and 
courtiers as playing a part in the plot.26 It is from this perspective that so many narratives 
of the English civil war have been written.  
 
Catholics therefore played an important role in the circumstances leading to the 
English civil war, both as bugbears and as actual participants. Yet as agents of political 
change they are almost entirely absent from the historiography. 
                                                
22 Ibid. p.73. 
23 For instance Michael Perceval-Maxwell cites the pamphlet The True Demands of the Rebells in Ireland. 
Declaring the causes of them taking up arms (1642), which lists one demand as the repeal of all legislation 
against Catholics in Ireland and England. Although Perceval-Maxwell argues that this was just 
propaganda and was not an authentic demand at all, it would have made sense from an Irish point of view 
(M. Perceval-Maxwell, The Outbreak of the Irish Rebellion of 1641 (Montreal and Kingston: London, 
1994), pp.271-272). Also see Clifton, ‘Fear of the Catholics’, pp.301, 328-329. 
24 Yet Ethan Shagan has shown that in particular reference to the Irish Rebellion, pamphlets fuelling 
popish plot fears were not just the product of puritan partisan propaganda. Instead these pamphlets fitted 
into pre-existing ‘conventional modes of analysis’ for understanding politics, the nation and the Protestant 
war against the Anti-Christ (E. Shagan, ‘Constructing Discord: Ideology, Propaganda, and English 
Responses to the Irish Rebellion of 1641’, Journal of British Studies, 36, 1 (1997), pp.4-34, at pp.16, 17, 
33, 34). Shagan suggests the rebellion in Ireland did not ‘catalyse the breakdown’ of consensus in England 
but was ‘injected into an English political discourse that was already polarised’ (Ibid. p.33, emphasis in 
original). David Cressy supports this interpretation by arguing that the Protestation of 1641 and 1642 also 
‘revealed divisions in allegiance and opinion’ (D. Cressy, ‘The Protestation Protested, 1641 and 1642’, 
Historical Journal, 45 (2002), pp.251-279, at p.251). The pledge’s ambiguous statements over politics and 
religion caused many hostile debates during the summer of 1641 between those who would take the 
Protestation and those who would not (Ibid. pp.257, 262). Cressy argues that those who refused to take the 
pledge ‘were not just entering an argument about the constitution or religion. They were making a point 
about changing political relationships’ (Ibid. p.278). 
25 M. Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire. A New History of the English Civil Wars (London, 2009), 
p.169. 
26 Ibid. p.170. 
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1.2. The historiography of English Catholicism. 
There have been several attempts to establish the extent of Catholic participation 
in the fighting, notably by Robin Clifton, Brian Manning and Keith Lindley, but the 
contribution of Catholics to mid-seventeenth-century ideological conflict has hardly 
been charted at all. The extent to which they engaged in Interregnum politics after the 
defeat of the king has also largely been ignored.  
 
This is not to say that nineteenth and twentieth-century historians did not try to 
construct categories with which to analyse mid-seventeenth-century politics. The real 
problem has always been that those categories did not deal with the nuances of 
contemporary religious taxonomy; what historians of early modern Britain now refer to 
as ‘religious identity’.27 For example, Marxist historians of the English civil war tended 
to adopt a ‘worm’s view’ of the conflict.28 Christopher Hill and Brian Manning based 
their narratives on the supposed victory of a bourgeois political class over a decaying 
and increasingly irrelevant feudal elite.29 Here, Catholics were seen as part of the 
collapsing feudal order. In fact Hill’s World turned upside down makes just three 
references to Roman Catholicism, one relegated to the footnotes.30 
 
One might have expected the revisionist scholars of the 1970s and 1980s to have 
dealt more effectively with this issue. There was a tendency to move away from high 
politics and instead look at the localities, and local studies have given us a much better 
understanding of the rivalry, political discontentment and religious divisions found in 
local communities on the eve of the civil war (and encouraged historians to look at 
allegiance, including popular allegiance), but this did not necessarily allow them to deal 
                                                
27 P. Lake and M. Questier, Orthodoxy and Conformity (London, 2000). 
28 C. Hill, The English Revolution, 1640: An Essay, (London, 1966). 
29 C. Hill, The Century of Revolution (London, 2002), pp.102-104; B. Manning, The English People and 
the English Revolution (London, 1991), pp.7, 46. These arguments, however, have been strongly refuted 
by Andy Wood who has shown that miners in Derbyshire were divided in their political allegiances during 
the civil war (A. Wood, ‘Beyond Post-Revisionism? The Civil War Allegiances of the Miners of the 
Derbyshire ‘Peak Country’’, Historical Journal, 40, 1 (1997), pp.23-40). 
30 C. Hill, World turned upside own: Radical ideas during the English revolution (London, 1972), pp.71, 
178n, 276. 
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with the question of Roman Catholicism during the 1640s and 1650s.31 Invariably local 
studies throw up references to Catholic gentry families but, because they were barred 
from office as a result of their religion, they played little part in politics on a local level. 
The emphasis, therefore, is nearly always on their more important Protestant 
neighbours.32 The only two scholarly exceptions here are John Walter’s Understanding 
Popular Violence in the English Revolution, which locates anti-popery at the heart of the 
Stour Valley Riots, and David Cressy’s work on the effects of anti-popery on 
seventeenth century culture and politics.33 The tendency, however, has been to write this 
group out of the narrative altogether. 
 
                                                
31 Alan Everitt and John Morrill were really the pioneers of local studies (A. Everitt, The Community of 
Kent and the Great Rebellion 1640-60 (Leicester, 1966); J. Morrill, Revolt of the Provinces: 
Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630-1650 (London, 1976)). Inevitably the ensuing 
historical debates were drawn towards Everitt’s and Morrill’s emphasis on local rather than national 
political issues. They argued that the majority of the gentry in their studies were either ill-informed of state 
affairs or that their concern for general religious and constitutional issues was ‘largely conditioned by 
local power structures’ (Everitt, Community of Kent, pp.13, 43, 44; Morrill, Revolt of the Provinces, p.13). 
Ann Hughes and Clive Holmes have argued that such a view is misplaced as counties could hardly be 
isolated or the gentry ill-informed because of the ‘highly structured’ administrative, legal and cultural 
nature of England during the seventeenth century which meant that the gentry were well-educated and in 
touch with national politics. Their involvement in local government also meant that they were more aware 
of common law and held deep-seated beliefs on both religious and constitutional issues. (A. Hughes, 
‘Local History and the Origins of the Civil War’, in R. Cust and A. Hughes (ed.), Conflict in Early Stuart 
England: Studies in religion and politics 1603-1642 (London, 1989), pp.224-253, at p. 228; idem, ‘The 
King, the Parliament, and the Localities during the English Civil War’, Journal of British Studies, 24, 2, 
(1985), pp.236-263, at p. 238; C. Holmes, ‘The County Community in Stuart Historiography’, Journal of 
British Studies, 19, 2 (1980), pp.54-73, at pp.55, 59-62), idem; ‘Centre and Locality in Civil War 
England’, in J. Adamson (ed.), The English Civil War. Conflict and Contexts, 1640-49 (Basingstoke, 
2008), pp.153-174. 
32 Everitt, Community of Kent; J. Morrill, Cheshire 1630-1660: County Government and Society During 
the English Revolution (Oxford 1974); A. Fletcher, A County Community in Peace and War: Sussex 1600-
1660 (London, 1975); A. Hughes, Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire 1620-1660 
(Cambridge, 1987); M. Stoyle, Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in Devon during the English 
Civil War (Exeter, 1994); D. Underdown, Somerset in the Civil War and Interregnum (Newton Abbot, 
1973); A.R. Warmington, Civil War, Interregnum and Restoration in Gloucestershire 1640-1672 
(Woodbridge, 1997); A. Wood, Nottinghamshire in the Civil War (Oxford, 1973); P. Tennant, The Civil 
War in Stratford-upon-Avon. Conflict and Community in South Warwickshire, 1642-1646 (Stroud, 1996); 
R.W. Ketton-Gremer, Norfolk in the Civil War. A Portrait of a Society in Conflict (London, 1969); E.A. 
Andriette, Devon and Exeter in the Civil War (Newton Abbot, 1971). For their references to the Roman 
Catholic families presiding in specific counties see Chapter 3. Also see C. Hibbard, ‘Early Stuart 
Catholicism: Revisions and Re-Revisions’, Journal of Modern History, 52 (1980), pp.1-34, at pp.1-4. 
33 J. Walter, Understanding Popular Violence in the English Revolution. The Colchester Plunderers 
(Cambridge, 1999); D. Cressy, Bonfires and Bells. National Memory and the Protestant Calendar in 
Elizabethan and Stuart England (Berkeley, London, 1989), pp.xi-xiii; idem, ‘Lamentable, strange and 
wonderful. Headless monsters in the English Revolution’, in L. Lunger Knoppers and J. B. Landes (ed.), 
Monstrous Bodies/Political Monstrosities in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca and London, 2004), pp.40-63, 
pp.52-53. 
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Who should be defined as a Catholic has proved a problematic issue. The 
assumption has generally been that only separatist Catholics should be recognised as the 
genuine article whereas it is at least arguable that the issue of Catholicism in civil war 
politics extends far beyond the relatively small number of separatists.34 
 
Interpretations of English Catholicism in the early modern period display a fair 
degree of historical schizophrenia. On one hand, the mainstream narratives of the 
Elizabethan period have reproduced contemporary fears of popish conspiracy, for 
example the plots associated with Francis Throckmorton, Anthony Babington and 
others. On the other, historians have also taken contemporary Catholic self-justifications 
at face value. English Catholics continually pledged their loyalty and allegiance to the 
State, and claimed that they distinguished between religion and politics. The uncertainty 
over which version of the Catholic community’s beliefs and practices might be regarded 
as, in some objective sense, ‘true’, has led some scholars to argue that Catholics’ self-
characterisations must, to some degree, be accurate. For Robin Clifton, English 
Catholics during the first half of the seventeenth century were a group remarkable 
‘chiefly for its weaknesses’, a reduced community torn apart by factional disputes and 
‘resigned to defeat’.35 For Christopher Haigh, seventeenth-century popish plot fears 
were similarly misplaced.36 He argues that by the 1630s, ‘the Catholic community had 
become a tiny, introspective group, heavily concentrated around the households of its 
leading gentry and playing a role in English history as only one element in the myth of 
Catholic danger’.37 In fact, he suggests, wealthy Catholic patrons in the 1630s refused to 
allow their chaplains even to cater to the local poor in case they provoked the 
government.38 
 
                                                
34 Alexandra Walsham in her study Church papists: Catholicism, conformity and confessional polemic in 
early modern England (Woodbridge, 1993) does much to reintegrate non-separatist Catholics, or rather 
those Catholics who conformed (to differing extents). Her terminology has been challenged by Lake and 
Questier in their Conformity and Orthodoxy, pp. xiv. For further discussion see chapter 3. 
35 R. Clifton, ‘The Fear of Catholics’, pp.20-32; R. Clifton, ‘The Popular Fear of Catholics during the 
English Revolution’, Past and Present, 52 (1971), pp.23-55, at pp.34-5. 
36 C. Haigh, ‘From Monopoly to Minority: Catholicism in Early Modern England’, Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 31, (1981), pp.129-147, at pp.132-3. 
37 C. Haigh, ‘Revisionism, the Reformation’ p.399. 
38 Haigh, ‘Monopoly to Minority’, p.145. 
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These historians tend to argue that, by the late 1630s and 1640s, articulating the 
fear of a popish conspiracy was simply a way to criticise publicly the king and royal 
policy. Catholics were therefore tolerated at a local level as many Protestants had little 
inclination to persecute them financially or physically.39 For Clifton, the ‘curious laxity’ 
of recusancy law enforcement conveys the unthreatening, apolitical nature of the 
community.40 He argued that policy towards the Catholics had undergone a radical 
change as far back as the last years of Elizabeth I’s reign, when the Privy Council 
decided that the majority of English Catholics posed no real threat to national security as 
they had given up all hopes of the restoration of the Catholic faith, and would therefore 
be open to ‘barter’ their loyalty for religious toleration.41 It was only when political 
tensions really mounted during the Short and Long Parliaments that tension spilled over 
into violence against local Catholics and their property, and those suspected of 
Catholicism too, particularly during the Stour Valley Riots in Essex.42  
 
These ideas have been taken one step further and included in the historical debates on 
military allegiances in the civil war. In other words, the assumptions that Catholicism 
was declining in political significance became linked with arguments that Catholics took 
little part in the fighting after 1642. Historians such as Lindley, David Underdown, John 
Morrill, Derek Hirst, Anthony Fletcher and Austin Woolrych all argue that most 
Catholics were neutral on the grounds that they wanted to avoid antagonising 
parliamentarian forces, or that Charles I had done little for their relief, and so the 
community was not disposed to aid him financially or militarily.43  
 
                                                
39 R. Clifton, ‘Fear of Popery’, in C. Russell (ed.), The origins of the English Civil War, (London, 1973), 
pp.144-167, at p.164. 
40 Ibid; K. Lindley, ‘The Part Played by the Catholics’ in B. Manning (ed.), Politics, Religion and the 
English Civil War (London, 1973), pp.126-176. 
41 Clifton, ‘Fear of Popery’, p.166. 
42 J. Walter, Understanding Popular Violence, pp.201-234. 
43 D. Hirst, England in Conflict 1603-1660: Kingdom, community, commonwealth (London, 1999), p.195; 
pp.89-95; Lindley, ‘Part Played by the Catholics’; Lindley, ‘The Lay Catholics of England in the reign of 
Charles I’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 22 (1971), pp.199-211; D. Underdown, ‘The Problems of 
popular allegiance in the English Civil War’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (1981), Fifth 
series, 31, pp.69-93; Morrill, Revolt in the Provinces; idem, Cheshire; A. Woolrych, Britain in revolution, 
1625-1688 (Oxford, 2002), p.250; P. R. Newman, ‘Catholic Royalists of Northern England 1642-1645’, 
Northern History, 15 (1979), pp. 88-95. 
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This picture of Catholic indifference alters, however, during the Interregnum. 
John Miller’s, Popery and Politics in England 1660-1688 agrees with revisionist 
arguments that the English Catholic community and Rome ‘came to accept’ the 
dominance of Protestantism and that, from Elizabeth I’s reign, Roman Catholicism 
‘relapsed into passivity’ because of its minority status.44 Yet Miller identifies, during the 
Interregnum, a fringe group, the Blackloists, who attempted to begin a dialogue with the 
new political regime after the regicide. Unlike these ‘extremists’, the majority of the 
English Catholic community ‘made no demands on Rome, Rome made no impossible 
demands on them’, and neither did the state if they retreated from the political sphere.45 
The majority of Catholics, Miller asserts, did just that. They unwaveringly held their 
allegiances to the exiled Stuart monarchy throughout the Interregnum and involved 
themselves no further in political discourse, for example after their negotiations with the 
Army in 1647 failed, and the king was executed.46 
 
John Bossy and Hugh Aveling’s attempts to look at the English Catholic 
community in some depth in the 1960s both assumed that Catholics were a community 
largely divorced from mainstream political culture. Aveling’s The Handle and the Axe 
tackles Catholic participation in the English civil war in everything from militant to 
neutralist modes; those who supported the king unquestionably, those who felt unable to 
deny the king financial aid in fear of future persecution, and those who wanted no part in 
the conflict and did not want to antagonise the parliamentarians.47 Though he deals with 
the experiences of the English Catholic community during the Interregnum and after the 
Restoration, he does not discuss the connections between the community and national 
politics. For instance Aveling asserts that a ‘détente’ was reached between the Catholics 
and the Protectorate, but does not explain how this had been achieved.48 Aveling is not 
concerned with placing English Catholicism within a European political context and 
makes little attempt to investigate the divisions within the community itself, nor how 
                                                
44 J. Miller, Popery and Politics in England 1660-1688 (Cambridge, 1978), pp.8, 30. 
45 Ibid. pp.42-3. 
46 Ibid. p.44. 
47 J. Aveling, The Handle and the Axe. The Catholic Recusants in England from Reformation to 
Emancipation (London, 1976), pp.165-170. 
48 Ibid. p.177. 
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these might have encouraged disparate responses to the exiled Stuart court and the 
Commonwealth and Protectorate. The absence of footnotes is infuriating to scholars who 
attempt to trace his research.  
 
Bossy meanwhile, in his in-depth study of the English Catholic community from 
1570-1850, was keen to state that he was not ‘directly concerned’ with the political 
context of the community’s actions during this period nor the relations between England, 
Europe and the papacy, nor the way that these fragile relationships affected the English 
Catholics.49 Bossy only set out to understand early-modern English Catholicism in its 
own terms. Although this study did much to educate historians about the divisions and 
difficulties amongst the English Catholics, in particular concerning the community’s 
organisation, hierarchy, factions and missionary activity, it did nothing to counteract the 
vision of the community as an internalised group operating outside mainstream politics. 
Bossy was criticised by Haigh for using confessionalised Catholic sources too much on 
trust and out of context. Conversely, Haigh has been criticised for using too many 
hostile official or state-generated sources to research English Catholicism during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Haigh does seem to get bogged down in number-
crunching and struggles to establish what members of the community were saying in 
regard to national and mainstream political issues. 
 
More recent research into the English Catholic community, particularly in the 
1620s and 1630s, has addressed some of these criticisms of revisionist and Catholic 
histories mentioned above. Michael Questier’s editions of Catholic newsletters written 
during the 1620s and 1630s have shown the dialogue between the English Catholic 
community and the state.50 The community used the dynastic match negotiations of the 
early 1620s to negotiate with the State for toleration as well as to seek the reform of the 
community itself. Questier argues that the Catholic newsletters held in the Archdiocese 
of Westminster’s archives show how far Catholics sought to intervene in contemporary 
politics. He demonstrates the rivalry between pro-Spanish and pro-French sections of the 
                                                
49 J. Bossy, The English Catholic Community, 1570-1850 (London, 1975), p.6. 
50 M. Questier, Stuart dynastic policy and religious politics, 1621-1625 (Camden Society, 5th Series, 34, 
2009); idem, Newsletters from the Caroline Court 1631-1638 (Camden Society, 5th Series, 26, 2005). 
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community and how this dominated the style and dynamics of their interventions in 
royal policy. Caroline Hibbard, building on Gordon Albion’s study of the connection 
between Catholicism and Charles I, has also sought to describe the extent of Catholic 
interests at court through the 1630s and early 1640s.51  
 
Royal policy during this period seemed to be radically affected by the politicking 
of advantageously placed Catholics around the Queen’s court. Among them were Sir 
Kenelm Digby, Thomas Viscount Savage, Sir John Winter, Sir Toby Mathew and 
clergymen such as George Con or the future Abbé Montagu. The fact that continental-
style Catholic radicalism rapidly became outmoded for English Catholics during the 
1590s did not mean that Catholics played no part in late Elizabethan or Stuart politics.52 
It is clear that all through the early Stuart period Catholics understood and exploited the 
twists and turns of royal policy, especially foreign policy.  
 
The political experiences of the Catholic community during the 1630s, when the 
regime’s anti-puritan tendencies became overt, meant that Catholics inevitably became 
caught up in the collapse of the Caroline regime.53 The politics of the community in the 
civil war to some extent replicated the factional and ideological discussions of the 1620s 
and 1630s. Catholics continued to seek forms of influence and toleration, even after (in 
fact especially after), the king seemed certain to lose. This is something that has been 
largely ignored by historians of civil war politics, who have tended to see the war and 
interregnum as the working out of Protestant reactions to an attempt before 1640 to foist 
conformity on the Elizabethan Church settlement which it could not easily bear. 
 
This is not to say that scholars have been entirely unaware of the political 
activities of the Catholics during the period after the royalist defeat in 1646. Thomas 
Clancy’s 1971 article about the English Catholic community’s negotiations with the 
Independents in 1647, showed the lengths to which parts of the community went to seek 
                                                
51 G. Albion, Charles I and the Court of Rome: a study in 17th century diplomacy (London, 1935), pp.193-
216; C. Hibbard, Charles I and the Popish Plot (North Carolina, 1983). 
52 P. Marshall, Reformation England 1480-1642 (London, 2003), p.192. 
53 J. Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England 1558-1689 (Harlow, 2000). 
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accommodation with the new regime.54 Clancy also argued that divisions in the 
community hindered their chances of negotiating toleration from the State. Albert 
Loomie’s posthumously published ‘Oliver Cromwell’s policy towards the English 
Catholics’ dealt with foreign diplomats living in London and used their reports and 
correspondence to judge the extent of Cromwellian religious tolerance and the 
experience of the English Catholic community during the Protectorate.55  
 
More recently, intellectual historians have published work on the Blackloists, a 
group of Catholic priests led by Thomas White (alias Blacklo), who used Hobbes’s 
‘Leviathan’ as a basis for their political ideology. Stefania Tutino has researched the 
group’s political thought, paying special attention to their relationship with Rome, as 
well as to their connections with the Protectorate. She has argued that the papacy did not 
take action against the Blackloists’ almost heretical ideas about papal power because it 
was only through the Blackloists that the papacy could enter into a dialogue with the 
new regime.56 Tutino has also looked in depth at the philosophical and theoretical 
assumptions of the group in the context of seventeenth-century European intellectual 
debates.57 Beverly Southgate likewise undertook a study of Blacklo’s intellectual 
project. Southgate judges Blacklo to be a ‘creative synthesiser of traditional 
Aristotelanism and Copernicanism and the new mechanical philosophy’.58 He shows 
how the Blackloists’ message ‘articulated the ideals and aspirations’ of the English 
Catholic clergy.59 Jeffrey Collins has similarly dealt with the connection between 
Hobbes and the Blackloists, and the negative effect this relationship had on exiled 
Catholics and the Stuart court.60 Anthony Browne’s 2004 Cambridge doctoral thesis 
‘Anglo-Irish Gallicanism c. 1635-c.1685’ looked in depth at the Blackloists’ model of 
                                                
54 T. Clancy, ‘The Jesuits and Independents: 1647’, Archivum Historiam Societatis Jesu, 40 (1971), pp.67-
90. 
55 A. J. Loomie, ‘Oliver Cromwell’s policy toward the English Catholics: The Appraisal by Diplomats, 
1654-1658’, Catholic Historical Review, 90 (2004), pp.29-44. 
56 S. Tutino, ‘The Catholic Church and the English Civil War: The Case of Thomas White’, Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 58 (April 2007), pp.232-255. 
57 S. Tutino, Thomas White and the Blackloists. Between Politics and Theology during the English Civil 
War (Aldershot, 2008). 
58 B. Southgate, ‘Covetous Truth’. The Life and work of Thomas White, 1593-1676 (London, 1993), p.ix-x. 
59 Ibid. p.39. 
60 J. Collins, ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Blackloist Conspiracy of 1649’, Historical Journal, 45 (2002), 
pp.305-331. 
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Gallicanism, their political theological significance and the importance of the Jacobean 
Oath of Allegiance to the formulation of their ideas.61  
 
The drawback of this recent interest in Blackloism in the 1650s is that it has 
concentrated too exclusively on one minority group of radical clergymen, a famous 
philosopher and Sir Kenelm Digby. There has been little attempt to trace the political 
and religious ideologies of the rest of the English Catholic community (except those held 
by the Blackloists’ most vocal and volatile critic George Leyburn) or to place 
Blackloism and English Catholicism within the political context of the 1650s. As a result 
there is still much to discover about English Catholic ideologies of the 1650s and how 
these should be integrated into our understanding of Catholic royalism during the 
English civil war. This thesis seeks to address these historical absences. 
 
1.3. Outline of the thesis. 
This study explores the relationship between the English Catholics and the State. 
It argues that the English Catholic community’s ideological assumptions and patronage, 
and its European networks meant that Catholics were an integral part of both domestic 
and foreign politics throughout the seventeenth century. This is apparent from Catholic 
published work and repeated Catholic petitioning of the republican regime, the exiled 
Stuart court and the papacy in order to achieve episcopal government and State tolerance 
for English Catholicism. The national and international importance of the English 
Catholic community to politics was not lost on these parties. The exiled royalist 
Marmaduke Langdale wrote to Edward Nicholas, Charles II’s secretary of state, that 
though the English Catholics may not have been considerable in England ‘they are in 
this part of the world [the continent] and if they could be joined in the common interest’ 
it would make the restoration of Charles II ‘less difficult’.62 Indeed, the exiled court did 
much to woo the English Catholics. Equally, the State also attempted to entice the 
English Catholic community and the papacy into aiding its foreign policy and preventing 
any royalist restoration. 
                                                
61 A. Browne, ‘Anglo-Irish Gallicanism c.1635- c.1685’, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cambridge 
University, 2004). 
62 Nicholas Papers, Vol. III, p.54. 
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Peter Marshall has successfully argued that the terms ‘recusant’ and ‘Catholic’ 
are no longer ‘virtually synonymous’ terms. My research is centred on out-and-out 
(separatist) English Catholics.63 In an attempt to address Christopher Haigh’s dismissal 
of the politicisation of the Catholic community, simply because the community 
functioned along seigneurial lines, this research is primarily focused on the Catholic 
gentry and clerics. These are the people who are easiest to identify, who were less likely 
to partially conform and who left paper trails. My research does not seek to answer the 
recurrent question concerning the size of the English Catholic community. I do not 
believe that the number of English Catholics per se is an indicator of their importance in 
domestic and foreign policy during this period. It has been suggested to me by Dr 
Andrew Foster that defining the English Catholics as a ‘community’ is problematic as 
the divisive nature of the English Catholics has meant that a ‘community’ did not 
actually exist. Nevertheless I use this term throughout the thesis on the basis that a group 
does not need to be cohesive to warrant being called a ‘community’. Further, from my 
research (and that undertaken by others) it seems clear that English Catholics identified 
each other as being part of some community even they did not always agree and, at 
times, downright hated each other. This notwithstanding, they viewed themselves 
collectively as operating separately (albeit at varying levels) from their Protestant 
counterparts. 
 
This study concentrates on the sources generated by the contemporary English 
Catholic community, especially those overlooked to a large extent by modern historians. 
I have looked at the newsletters sent to Rome from the English chapter held at the 
archives of the Archdiocese of Westminster along with the material held at the Jesuit 
archive in Mayfair. The Archdiocese of Westminster’s Series A is an archival collection 
of the papers and correspondence of the English secular clergy. The material is mainly 
correspondence with the chapter’s Roman agent but also includes Synod papers, 
correspondence of clergy members from the Western, Midland and Northern Districts as 
well as correspondence with Irish bishops and the English Catholic colleges abroad, 
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particularly with Douai from 1652 onwards. This material was collected, selected and 
bound in forty-nine volumes from 1880 to 1912. I have also used two bound copies, 
books one and two, of Old Brotherhood manuscripts also held at the Archdiocese of 
Westminster archives. These include letters to Bishop Smith, archbishop of Chalcedon, 
from members of the secular clergy and correspondence from the chapter to their agents 
in Rome. The collection also includes correspondence of an official nature from and to 
the chapter from various cardinals and nuncios, as well as Thomas White’s and John 
Sergeant’s correspondence. I have also used the Anglia A collections from the Jesuit 
archives in Mayfair, which include accounts from London to the General of the Society 
of Jesus, accounts of the executions and the last speeches of priests, correspondence 
between the Jesuit colleges on the Continent and copies and accounts of the proceedings 
of Parliament.  
 
It should be recognised that all these collections have been selected by third 
parties and are in no way complete. It also needs to be acknowledged that there were 
many motivations behind the information and opinions conveyed in this correspondence. 
Parts were intended to impart news and to fuel factional disputes. The English Catholic 
clergy were also dependent on the Catholic colleges on the Continent for funding and 
training new priests and therefore both regular and secular correspondents to the 
colleges were mindful of the desires and conflicts within and between these colleges. 
Further, providing information about the levels of persecution and toleration of Roman 
Catholicism, particularly via the secular chapter’s agent in Rome after 1655, was part of 
the secular clergy’s campaign for a bishop and therefore should be treated carefully. 
These methodological problems have made it important to use ‘hostile’ or State 
generated sources alongside selected Catholic archival material. The opinions and 
beliefs of members of the English Catholic clergy and the community found in the 
Series A material, the Old Brotherhood collection and the Anglia A manuscripts used in 
this study have not been accepted at face value but have been corroborated by 
information imparted by Catholic and non-Catholic sources, as laid out below.  
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I have also looked at the Belson family archives held at Berkshire Record Office, 
the Throckmorton papers held at Warwickshire County Record Office, the Constable 
Maxwell family papers held at Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull and the 
Brudenell manuscripts held at Northamptonshire County Record Office. Alongside these 
Catholic archives I have used contemporary English Catholic pamphlets and the 
published collections of the Catholic Record Society, and of Richard Challoner and 
Henry Foley. I have tried to avoid literal readings of confessionalised contemporary and 
modern Catholic accounts of the English civil war, Interregnum and Restoration by 
looking to Protestant and official government primary material to clarify or question 
Catholic accounts. Those Catholic records mentioned above have been complemented 
by the Foreign State Paper collections held at Kew, the published collections of the State 
Papers Domestic and the Committee for Compounding, the Evelyn and Middleton 
Papers held in the British Library, the Rawlinson and Clarendon State Paper manuscripts 
held in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, and the published collections of the 
Thurloe and Nicholas papers. 
 
This thesis sets out an agenda for further research on mid-seventeenth-century 
English Catholicism. The scope of this project has not allowed further dedicated 
research into Catholic patronage networks similar to the methodology used by other 
investigations into the English Catholic community. Michael Questier’s recent book 
Catholicism and Community has traced the patronage networks of the elite Browne 
family in Sussex during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.64 This research 
has contextualised the English Catholic community’s activities and experiences within 
the political framework of the Elizabethan, Jacobean and Caroline reigns. Whilst 
addressing reactions to issues of conformity, succession and allegiance Questier has also 
directed attention towards the internal politics of the community, exploring factional 
disputes over hierarchy, organisation and missionary activity. It might be possible to 
undertake similar work for the period of the 1640s, 1650s and 1660s, but not within the 
confines of space and time in this thesis. 
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Initially I seek to show that Catholic political theory during this period (c.1640-
60) can be traced to pre-civil war Catholic opinion on key political questions. I have 
revisited the question of anti-popery and its significance in the collapse of monarchical 
government. I have also researched the role of events during the 1620s and 1630s in 
establishing English Catholic religious identity, political behaviour and theological 
writing of the 1640s and 1650s. I have sought to show that the 1650s did not represent a 
break in the politics and ambitions of the community, as witnessed in the 1620s and 
1630s, but instead were a continuation of the divisions, back-biting and intolerance that 
had surfaced during the marriage negotiations of the early 1620s and the ‘approbation’ 
crisis of the late 1620s and early 1630s.65 
 
Understanding this requires an appreciation of the different ways in which 
Catholics had responded to the civil war. This thesis does not attempt precisely to 
quantify the extent of Catholic royalism, probably an impossible question to settle given 
problems of measurement, definition and Catholic source material. Instead it 
concentrates on how Catholic actions were represented within and without the English 
Catholic community. Its analysis is not dependent on measuring the precise number of 
Catholics who took part on either side, or who kept their heads down and noses clean. 
Instead it is based on examining how Catholics thought and were thought about. I have 
looked at, in particular, how the defeat of the king affected the longstanding ideological 
divisions within the community. I also examine the origins of attempted Catholic 
compromises with subsequent regimes between 1647 and 1665 and how this affected the 
political assumptions and objectives of the Catholic community in exile. Crucially, I 
have explored the way in which Catholics pursued the possibility of de facto and even 
legal toleration under the republic and Protectorate and their connections with other 
sects, which emerged during this period. I have researched the way in which Catholic 
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political theorists engaged with tolerationist ideas during the first part of the Interregnum 
and how, after the failure of the Cromwellian Church settlement in 1654, the Catholic 
community interacted with anti-sectarian pro-episcopal groups during the decline of the 
Protectorate. 
 
I then look at how Cromwellian foreign policy affected the position of Catholics 
or, rather, the synergy between, on the one hand, long-established patterns of political 
debate and manoeuvre within the English Catholic community (particularly over Church 
governance) and, on the other, the relationship of the community to the Protectorate. I 
have managed to recover the political processes whereby it made sense for Catholic 
interest groups to approach and lobby the Protectorate regime in sync with the twists and 
turns of that regime’s relations with continental European States.  
 
I have, therefore, tried to align my research with the recent advances in 
historians’ understanding of Cromwellian foreign policy. Steven Pincus’s book 
Protestantism and Patriotism has sought to revise the idea that the first Anglo-Dutch 
war, beginning in May 1652, was the first great trade war. Instead Pincus argues that the 
English war with the Dutch ‘arose out of deeply felt ideological conflict’ whereby the 
English were aggrieved by the way they thought the Dutch had tossed aside all 
republican ideals for absolute monarchy.66 Charles had struggled after 1625 to 
accommodate impulses for a ‘Protestant-cause’ foreign policy. Pincus argues that when 
the new political regimes of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate finally took charge 
they became aware of how difficult it was to implement one.67 The Orange Party 
signified all that was wrong with monarchical government and, in launching an attack 
against the Dutch, the English were really defending their own understanding of 
republicanism. Further, the Protectorate’s war with Spain was not, Pincus argues, an 
‘offensive crusade’ but a ‘defensive’ war against the threat of the establishment of a 
                                                
66 S, Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: ideologies and the making of English foreign policy 1650-1668 
(Cambridge, 1996), p.190. 
67 S. Pincus, ‘England and the World in the 1650s’, in J Morrill (ed.), Revolution and Restoration 
(London, 1992), pp.129-147, at p.147. 
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universal monarchy.68 Pincus suggests that the first Dutch war inaugurated ‘a new 
phase’, for English foreign policy, one that saw the relegation of religion as the main 
objective of foreign policy.69 If the Commonwealth and the Protectorate were not 
attempting to implement an anti-Catholic foreign policy during the 1650s this would 
have significant ramifications for the place of Roman Catholics in any narrative of 
European or Cromwellian policy. It would also illuminate Cromwell’s exploration of 
alliances with France and Spain. 
 
The thesis goes on to look at English Catholic pamphleteering during the 
Interregnum. It shows how Roman Catholic controversialists tried to integrate 
themselves into national political and religious debates. The conflict between 
Presbyterians and Independents during the 1650s over the way the national church 
should be governed created a space for Catholics to express their opinions on this matter. 
I argue that, as a result of Cromwell’s foreign policies and the Protectorate’s failure to 
create a national Church structure based on a general consensus, the English Catholics 
stood to gain more from the Commonwealth and Protectorate than they did from the 
monarchy.  
 
The study ends by looking at the position of the community in the early part of 
the Restoration. It then places its findings into the context of recent research concerning 
James II, his style of Catholicism and the effects this had on the English Catholic 
community. The thesis closes by discussing not only the nature of Catholicism during 
the mid-seventeenth century but also how Catholics sought to identify themselves with a 
national and international politico-religious framework. 
 
 This thesis therefore adds to existing interpretations in four ways. First, 
methodologically, I use Catholic-generated sources throughout this thesis to shed light 
on the political discourse occurring inside and outside the English Catholic community. 
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Second, I explore more fully the discourse between the English Catholics and the State 
and chart the subtle changes in their politicking with monarchical and republican 
regimes. Third, I examine the English Catholic community on the eve of the civil war, 
during the republic and then at the Restoration, rather than isolating the English Catholic 
experience in the Interregnum. This allows me to set developments of the community 
into their proper historical context. Fourth and finally, therefore, I emphasise the 
importance of English Catholics to the understanding of seventeenth century history. 
The English Catholics were more than just a sect, and they played a greater part in 
national and international political and religious discourse than existing interpretations 
based on contemporary anti-popery would have us believe. They both exploited their 
position and were exploited by others. 
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2. English Catholics at the centre of the royal prerogative controversy 
 
 
At the heart of anti-popery on the eve of the civil war, were religious issues that 
had become politically controversial during the early Stuart period and particularly 
during the later 1620s and 1630s. Charles’s religious initiatives were seen not as a by-
product, but as a direct consequence, of his misuse of royal prerogative power. The fear 
of Catholicism and the perception that Catholics were disloyal to the State were weapons 
with which to attack the Caroline regime, as they previously had been used on occasion 
to criticise the late Elizabethan regime.70  
 
There is extensive historical debate over the nature and validity of Protestant 
fears of Catholicism during this period, and their influence on the causes and timing of 
the English civil war. Carol Weiner has interpreted the fear of Catholicism as ‘out of 
proportion to’ any real danger, and neither the result of Protestant psychological 
insecurity.71 The English, she argued, over exaggerated Catholic abilities, believing that 
the Church of Rome had the power to launch a successful counter-Reformation and 
destroy the Church of England through foreign invasion or domestic ‘disruption’.72 
Weiner suggests that the source of this fear was Elizabethan English Protestants’ doubts 
about the Church of England’s strength ‘in the face of the enemy’.73 They matched the 
unified church structure of Catholicism against the fragility and divisions of the 
Protestant Church in England and believed their inadequacies would allow their 
powerful enemy to bring about their total defeat.74 Robin Clifton has suggested that the 
stereotype of Catholicism threatening England was the result of two things, ‘popular 
memory’ of Elizabethan history (the very real threat of invasion and the uncovering of 
genuine popish plots against the monarch), and Protestant defeats on the Continent 
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during the 1620s.75 Clifton’s exploration of popish panics reverberating through the 
1630s leads him to highlight their local basis and fundamentally ‘political character.76 In 
other words, at a popular level, national politics were understood in terms of popery. 
Charles’s abuse of the royal prerogative, the acceptance of Catholics at court and his 
refusal to help fight for the Protestant cause abroad were all seen as evidence of popish 
plotting which would forcefully change the Protestant State.77 Yet for Clifton, fear of 
Catholics during the late 1630s and early 1640s was misguided.78 The majority of the 
Catholics were loyal to the king and in fact were tolerated at a local level by their 
Protestant neighbours.79 Caroline Hibbard has argued that popish plot fears were based 
on both ‘fact and fiction’.80 She suggests it was the existence of Catholics and papal 
agents at the Caroline court and the involvement of Catholics in the Scots crisis that 
ignited fears of a popish plot.81 The court Catholics were an ‘unrepresentative minority’ 
within the English Catholic community that had a ‘disproportionate influence’ on the 
national politics of the late 1630s and 1640s.82 Conversely, the English Catholic laity 
posed no threat to the State and were accepted on a local level by their Protestant 
neighbours.83 The Catholic gentry had ‘rejected their political duties advanced by the 
clerical party’, by the end of Elizabeth’s reign and had become an ‘inward looking 
private’ community.84  
 
Historical attention has therefore been focused on ‘popular’ anti-popery, the 
outbreaks of anti-popish protests and riots. Yet there has been no attempt to explore the 
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way in which English Catholics interacted with anti-Catholic rhetoric during the political 
clashes between the king and his critics on the eve of the conflict. This chapter seeks to 
address this absence by tracing, in particular, the clerical response to the political crisis 
and anti-popery of the early 1640s. Quickly, if momentarily, the Catholic clergy found 
themselves at the centre of the debates concerning religious and constitutional issues 
which were dividing the king from a large section of his subjects. The presence of 
(unmolested) Catholic clergy in England was used against Charles by his critics. The 
mission was an obvious target and one that was utilised repeatedly, during the early 
1640s, to gain public support for Pym’s junta. This did not, however, consign the 
Catholic clergy to the margins of politics but instead enabled them to manoeuvre around 
the political debates occurring in parliament and argue their loyalty to the king in a way 
they had not been able to do before. This chapter therefore reintegrates the experiences 
of Catholic priests into the concept of anti-popery in order to address the ideological 
issues raised by specific anti-popish and anti-Catholic criticisms at the centre. 
 
2.1.1. English Catholics and definitions of treason. 
Perhaps the most important issue concerning the mission in the run up to and 
during the civil war was the treason trials of missionary priests. Prosecutions of Catholic 
clergy became an issue between the king and parliament in the struggle to clarify the 
nature and extent of royal prerogative power. They also provided the English Catholic 
community with a potent way to represent themselves as persecuted, loyal subjects of 
Charles I.  
 
Alan Orr has shown how ambiguous the treason laws were in England on the eve of the 
civil war.85 Several statutes of treason existed at the time of the conflict, with new 
statutes introduced to counteract specific political threats. Therefore there was little 
clarity about exactly what treason statues were in force when and, as a result of the 
statutes’ indistinct wording what actually constituted treason could also be unclear. 
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Treason law was based on a statute passed of 25 Edward III, which defined the 
offence as any action taken to violate or harm the king’s person, levy war against the 
king, adhere to the king’s enemies or kill any of the king’s justices whilst the were 
undertaking their duties. The statute was developed further during Elizabeth’s reign 
when a series of measures prohibited the influx and activities of missionary priests.86 
Their treason rested on the papacy’s claims to depose a heretical sovereign. The 
legislative response to Elizabeth’s excommunication and the implications this could 
have on her legitimacy as sovereign, was, in 1571, to define treason not just as regicide 
but as usurpation.87 The classic articulation of this case was set out in Lord Burghley’s 
Execution of Justice of 1583.88 Because the missionary priests had sworn their allegiance 
to the pope, the queen’s enemy, no missionary priest could enter the country without it 
being treason.89 The so-called Jesuit act of 1585 followed the same principles. The 
statute ruled that it was treason for Jesuits or priests to enter the country, all priests had 
to leave the country within forty days, receiving priests was a capital felony and all 
English subjects that were being educated in the Catholic seminaries on the Continent 
were ordered to return home.90 These treason laws stayed in force even during the 
Cromwellian Protectorate, but ambiguities remained. For instance at the time of Edmund 
Campion’s arrest in 1581, he was charged with treason according to the Edwardian act 
rather than the Elizabethan one to seek a conviction on the basis of an actual (alleged) 
conspiracy concocted abroad, rather than for having contravened the new legislation’s 
treason provisions.91 This was also true of Henry Garnet, the Jesuit priest executed for 
treason in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot.92 Orr argues that during James’s reign 
juries continued to expand the legal boundaries of treason ‘based on the exploitation of 
ambiguities’ in the wording of the statute.93 This meant that a clear and fixed definition 
of treason did not exist on the eve of the civil war. This had consequences for those evil 
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counsellors, Stafford and Laud, who were charged for treason against the king by 
Charles’s parliamentary critics.94 At times MPs seemed to argue that ‘treason’ was 
whatever the Commons declared it to be. The ensuing debates concerning the meaning 
and interpretation of treason statutes also had important consequences for English 
Catholics.  
 
Conrad Russell, in his book of essays Unrevolutionary England, argued that the 
case against Strafford enhanced the doctrine of constructive compassing of the king’s 
death.95 This idea had been used in previous legislation against Roman Catholics, but 
had not been used in common law treason before.96 Strafford was accused of attempting 
to alter government by shifting the basis of the king’s authority to the use of force. This 
would make the king odious to his people, which would in turn put the king’s life at 
risk.97 In reality, Russell suggested, the Long Parliament was not concerned with the 
king’s murder by ‘some stray Felton’, but were afraid of losing their legislative and 
taxation powers and the security of liberty and property to which common law entitled 
them.98 Strafford was seen as encroaching on these things by royal prerogative. As 
Russell has it, when there was reason to distrust the royal prerogative there was greater 
need to safeguard against it; a ‘sphere of government in which the prerogative has no 
place’.99 Strafford had attacked key constitutional concepts which would divide the king 
from his people and thus threaten the king’s life by destroying popular allegiance to the 
king. But as Russell illustrates, this idea of compassing the king’s life was a dangerous 
concept, it could make Pym and his junto just as guilty of treason as Strafford. Pym, it 
could be argued, was causing a division between the king and his subjects by proceeding 
against Strafford and altering government. He was therefore endangering the king’s 
life.100 As Russell shows, the pamphlet entitled A Brief Relation quoted Strafford as 
suggesting that Pym ‘might one day be attacked for persuading the House of Commons 
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to commit the same crime that was laid upon him as a charge of treason’.101 This had 
important implications for priests charged with treason on the eve of the civil war.  
 
This chapter suggests that the English Catholic community, and the priests in 
particular, were well aware of these debates and made use of them as best they could. 
The accounts of the priests’ trials it uses are taken from mainly Catholic sources. There 
is no corroboration that these accounts were truthful reports of what had actually 
occurred. It is highly likely that they were part of the Catholic propaganda effort. For the 
purpose of this chapter, however, their truthfulness is not of paramount importance. 
Instead, it is interested in the way these trials were represented within the English 
Catholic community and on the Continent. 
 
It is important to look at the case of the priest John Goodman first as, in many 
ways, the case was a precursor to Stafford’s trial. The significance of this case has long 
been disputed. Historians have cited it as a straightforward issue of treason and have 
considered it one of the two treason trials held between 1640 and the Restoration in 1660 
that were ‘outside the mainstream’ of the feud between crown and parliament.102 Closer 
analysis of this case, however, shows that the reprieve of John Goodman and the 
resulting furore were part of the ever-widening divide between king and parliament. It 
also contributed to the debates surrounding royal prerogative rule and the legality of 
such trials. It became a test case; if parliament managed to succeed against Goodman 
and the priest was executed, then it could launch an attack on both Strafford and Laud 
and impeach them both on charges of treason against the crown, which was punishable 
by death.103 The English Catholic gentry viewed Goodman’s trial with great interest. 
The Catholic gentleman Sir Robert Throckmorton was kept regularly informed with 
events happening in London, specifically of the trials of both Goodman and Strafford.104 
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The Catholic clergy were willing to take advantage of all the contention over the 
changing definition of treason to advance their own position and ultimately that of the 
community. 
 
2.1.2. The trial of John Goodman. 
John Goodman had been converted to Roman Catholicism in 1621, perhaps 
spurred on by the Spanish match negotiations, when he was about twenty-nine years old. 
He had travelled to the English Catholic College in Douai to be trained for the 
priesthood. On his return to England in 1631 he was apprehended and imprisoned in 
Newgate in 1632 but was discharged three years later. In 1637 a warrant was put out for 
his arrest again. The timing of the warrant is interesting. Goodman was the first cousin 
of Godfrey Goodman, the Laudian Bishop of Gloucester who converted to Catholicism 
on his deathbed. Throughout the 1630s Godfrey held well-documented meetings with 
both Gregorio Panzani and George Con, the consecutive papal agents at the royal court 
who were negotiating, among other issues, the possible reunion of the Church of Rome 
and the Church of England.105 During 1637 Godfrey Goodman was also called before 
the high Commission at Lambeth for allowing quarter sessions to be held in the church. 
Strafford had spoken up in favour of Godfrey to the king.106 The familial connection 
between priest and bishop had not gone unnoticed and perhaps explains why a warrant 
was released specifically for the arrest of John Goodman. Godfrey’s dalliances with the 
court of Rome and protection from Strafford would not have recommended him to those, 
such as Alexander Leighton, who considered Strafford one of Charles’s ‘evil 
counsellors’, nor those who took Goodman as a sign that Laudianism was the ‘Trojan 
Horse’ of popery.107 The arrest and condemnation of his cousin would further publicise 
these grievances as well as handing out retribution to Laudians and Catholics.  
 
John Goodman was finally caught at the end of August 1640.108 He was found 
not guilty at his indictment because there was insufficient evidence to prove he was a 
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priest, but subsequently he was betrayed by another priest who remains unidentified in 
existing accounts. This was not as surprising as one might first think. The priest’s 
connection with Goodman, the Laudian bishop, provided an opportunity for members of 
the Catholic clergy who were anti-Spanish or pro-French to portray themselves as 
Catholics loyal to the king by supposedly exposing a Catholic-Arminian plot.109 
Denouncing John Goodman therefore gained them the upper hand in a factional 
dispute.110 He was successfully convicted and on being found guilty of treason was 
condemned to death on 21st January 1641.111 Following the queen’s requests, however, 
Goodman was granted a reprieve.112 Hot on the heels of the House of Commons report 
into reprieved priests heard at the beginning of December 1640, this news caused 
outrage. 
 
The findings of the report were significant. The lawyer and MP John Glynne 
(who would become a prominent critic of the court and would take on a major role in the 
indictment of Laud and the impeachment of Strafford)113 reported back to the House of 
Commons about the findings of the Committee for Inquiry after Papists, on the 1st 
December 1640. The report, grounded in the examination of the keepers of only two 
prisons, Newgate and the Clink, declared that sixty-four priests and Jesuits, ‘some 
indicted; some convicted of high treason’ had been discharged in one year by either the 
privy signet or warrants from the lords of the council. The majority had been discharged 
by warrants written by Secretary Windebank.114 In seven or eight years, it was alleged, 
seventy-four letters of grace had been written, addressed to archbishops, judges and 
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other king’s officers, in order to protect the named priests from harm; Windebank had 
issued verbal warrants too.115 Only one priest, however, named Morse (presumably 
Henry Morse the Jesuit) had been discharged by the king’s hand, Glynne reported, and 
this only because the king had been misinformed that Morse had only been indicted 
rather than convicted of being a priest. The other warrants for discharges, it was alleged, 
had been at the request of foreign ambassadors and the queen mother, Marie de 
Medicis.116 Examples were then given of priests who had been convicted and 
discharged, including Edward Moore, who had been committed by ‘the king’s own 
hand’ but then discharged by Windebank’s warrant, ‘without mention of the king’s 
pleasure’.117 Glynne’s report ends with this statement: 
For these discharges of priests and Jesuits, not one of them standeth with the rule 
of law. When they are indicted and convicted, the king, the fountain of justice 
and mercy (and the law doth allow it) hath power to show mercy, upon any of his 
Subjects: But, in such cases, the king’s prerogative speaketh by his privy seal 
signet, or great seal; and ought to discharge by record: But to send signification 
of pleasure, is against law. For a minister, either verbally, or by warrant under his 
own hand, not only to discharge men condemned, but to command no further 
prosecution, the committee doth conceive he doth not discharge his duty.118 
Interestingly it seems that it was Windebank, not the king, who was considered to be at 
fault here. Glynne specifically said that Charles was acting within the boundaries of the 
law when he sought to discharge one of his subjects by prerogative power. It was this 
power, however, that would be questioned throughout Goodman’s case and the other 
trials of apprehended priests and Jesuits that followed. 
 
Goodman’s third discharge, secured by the queen after he had been convicted of 
being a priest and thus guilty of treason, seemed so ‘infinitely distasting’ to the citizens 
of the City of London that they had made a complaint to parliament declaring that until 
Goodman was executed, they would pay no more taxes.119 The king’s army, which had 
been used in the Bishop’s Wars with Scotland, was still unpaid. Without the City’s 
money it was feared that the army, already disaffected towards the crown, would 
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dissolve and leave the way open for the Scots to ‘come and take without asking 
recompense as they call it of the parliament’.120 This put the House of Commons in a 
quandary. It did not want to be subject to such demands, nor did it want to put itself at 
the mercy of the Scots or witness public disorder. The citizens of London were told that 
the matter would be considered were quickly dismissed. A newsletter reporting 
Goodman’s case stated that the House lamented his reprieve saying it would ‘make their 
sessions fruitless if the execution of the cases were so depending on the kings 
prerogative that he might suspend them when he pleased’.121 It was decided that a 
committee should be sent to the House of Lords and a conference should be held 
between the two houses concerning Goodman’s reprieve. The Commons requested ‘a 
conference with your lordships, to crave your assistance, for the discovery of such 
instruments as have dared to intercede for the interruption of the course of justice against 
priests and Jesuits’.122 The Lords, on receiving the request decided to ‘acquaint’ the king 
with the message they had received from the Commons.123 On the same day the king 
was attended upon by both Houses at Whitehall for a banquet. Charles made a speech in 
response to the events that had occurred in the last four months that had challenged the 
royal prerogative, most notably the meeting of the Long Parliament, the imprisonment of 
Strafford, the impeachment of Laud and the Root and Branch petition calling for the 
abolition of episcopacy. In his speech Charles made clear exactly what concessions he 
was prepared to make. He would reform the Church, removing recent Laudian 
innovations and returning it to its Elizabethan roots.124 But he would not remove bishops 
and launched an anti-Puritan attack on the Root and Branch petitioners.125 After the 
members of the House of Commons had withdrawn, Charles told the remaining 
members of the House of Lords that he would return to them his reasons for reprieving 
Goodman in two days’ time. It was now clear that Goodman’s would be a test case to 
determine the strength of royal prerogative power.  
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By Monday 25th January Charles had submitted his answer. He knew of 
Goodman’s conviction, he said, because the Recorder of London had followed the 
established procedure of passing on to him only all the names of those convicted and an 
account of their offences. This was done, Charles alleged, so that he would have all the 
main facts to hand and would not be ‘induced’ in his decisions by interested parties to 
reprieve or not. According to the king’s reply, Goodman was reprieved because he had 
been found guilty only of being a priest and not of trying to seduce the king’s subjects 
into disobedience against the crown. He had not been condemned or banished before.126 
Charles argued that he was only following precedents set in the reigns of both James and 
Elizabeth who had ‘been often merciful’ in ‘matters of blood in cases of this nature’ and 
stated that he would not let a man suffer for his conscience alone.127 Charles’s solution 
to the problem was to agree to either the banishment or imprisonment of Goodman ‘as 
their Lordships shall advise’ to promise that he would take further action immediately to 
evict other priests and Jesuits from the kingdom.128  
 
This solution was understandable on two counts. Charles needed the City’s 
money to help finance his army and so needed to inflict sanctions on the Catholic clergy 
to appease the citizens of London. Equally, however, he intended to protect his 
prerogative power and therefore could not let parliament dictate what he should and 
should not do, especially when he considered that his actions were already upheld by the 
law. If Charles gave in to parliament’s demands it would have dire consequences for the 
imprisoned Strafford. The papal agent, Rossetti, wrote to the Cardinal Secretary, ‘If 
Goodman lives the king holds on to his authority, if he dies, parliament will be freed to 
proceed against anyone with impunity’.129 Goodman’s case would ascertain exactly what 
concessions Charles would make and how far parliament could push him.  
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There was a clear precedent for this. In James I’s reign the 1624 parliament had 
tried the same tactic to see how much power they could to wield over the king. At this 
time, during negotiations for the Anglo-French dynastic match between Prince Charles 
and Henrietta Maria, Catholics were agitating for tolerance. James had been compelled 
to issue a proclamation, on 6th May 1624, ordering all Catholic priests to leave the 
country by 14th June.130 There was much speculation James had done this only in order 
to secure parliamentary subsidies. To test this notion an elderly priest, William Davies, 
was arrested on 17th June and sent to Newgate after being found guilty of not complying 
with the proclamation. Would James allow sentence to be carried out against him? The 
royal reprieve came at the last moment, as Davies arrived at Tyburn for his execution.131 
This was a signal that James would not bow to anti-papal rhetoric. Charles himself had 
been through something similar before in the case of the priest Edmund Arrowsmith, in 
August 1628. When parliament was informed that Richard Smith, bishop of Chalcedon, 
was attempting to encroach on temporal authority, Arrowsmith, a recently arrested Jesuit 
priest was executed.132 At his trial Arrowsmith had produced three letters of favour from 
Buckingham, the queen and the king.133 Each letter was dismissed, as the judge, Sir 
Henry Yelverton, was resolute that the priest should be accountable to the laws in force 
against the Catholic clergy. Arrowsmith was condemned. Yelverton had been a critic of 
Buckingham’s policies and the power he had over both kings. He had spoken out against 
Buckingham in April 1621 to uphold the accusations levelled against him of false arrests 
and giving bad advice to the King James.134 He was arrested after his speech, committed 
to the Tower and later found guilty of slandering Buckingham. He was given a royal 
pardon after he had paid his fine.135 Strongly anti-Catholic, Yelverton used the case of 
Arrowsmith to question the authority of both the queen and Buckingham. His 
condemnation of Arrowsmith was intended to show that Buckingham’s and the queen’s 
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authority should not stretch beyond the law. Yelverton reportedly told Arrowsmith ‘the 
laws and statutes of the kingdom must be… respected or preferred before letters’.136 
 
In 1641 Charles’s decision concerning Goodman would serve as an indication of 
parliament’s ability to proceed against Strafford. Banishment or imprisonment would be 
seen, he hoped, as punishing priests without giving in to parliament’s demands. The 
king’s reply was reported to have been taken well by the Upper House, but did not 
receive the same approbation in the House of Commons.137 As soon as the king’s reply 
was given, the Commons declared that it feared it would not be acceptable to the City, 
who would only settle if the priest were to be executed. Indeed, there were reports of 
people ‘about’ Newgate waiting expectantly for Goodman to be brought out and 
killed.138 The issue was debated hotly in the Commons over the next couple of days. In 
an account of one such debate, one unidentified member of the Commons (most 
probably Glynne) believed that Goodman’s reprieve was a ‘mere plot’ between the king 
and the papists against parliament and that the whole situation was to ‘begin a deep 
foundation of his [Charles’s] prerogative royal by this little hole he had begun to cast 
up’.139 He argued that if parliament allowed the king to use his prerogative power to 
reprieve Goodman whilst it was still sitting, he could not see the purpose of proving 
Strafford, Laud, ‘the judges and other delinquents’ guilty, since the king might use his 
prerogative powers to reprieve them too. Here he echoed Rossetti.140 He demanded that 
the case and all other matters should be set aside and the House concentrate its efforts on 
securing parliament’s privileges from the king’s prerogative grasp. The report of these 
proceedings cites another member’s demand that parliament should either let Goodman 
die or repeal the laws against priests, ‘for if there were reason to make that law it was 
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reason to execute it’. Since the reason for the law was grounded in the Gunpowder Plot, 
and those involved in that plot were punished, he saw no reason why it should still 
stand.141 Another MP argued that the law against priesthood had been necessary in 
Queen Elizabeth’s day but priests were far less dangerous now. Queen Elizabeth had 
been in danger because Mary, Queen of Scots, threatened her throne and Elizabeth had 
been declared illegitimate by the pope and consequently not eligible to claim the Crown. 
Priests had been suspected of treason because they adhered to the pope against the 
queen, ‘but none of these things did concur now in our present king… besides the 
papists did now rather too much adhere to the king then that could be suspected of 
treason against him’.142 Nevertheless, this speaker agreed that banishment for all priests 
was the preferable option. Other speakers protested that the priests were not so obedient 
to the king’s command because although many them had been banished from the 
kingdom previously, they had almost all returned, and that in itself was treason. One MP 
looked closely at the king’s reply and argued that since the king had declared that he had 
reprieved Goodman only because he had not been found guilty of persuasion to Rome, a 
priest named Southworth who had been accused by sixty people of seducing them to 
popery and had been condemned and imprisoned in the Gatehouse should be executed 
instead, as a way to satisfy the populace.143 All agreed that some action did need to be 
taken to reconcile king and subjects. The fear was that with the kingdom in such disarray 
the Scots could operate freely in England and inevitably take control of parliament.  
 
The Commons decided to ask the House of Lords for a further conference about 
Goodman’s case in order to petition the king to execute him and put the extant laws 
against priests, 27 Eliz. Cap. 2 and 1 Jac. Cap. 4, into effect. This motion was intended 
not only to pacify the citizens of London, thereby securing the collection of their 
subsidies, but to react to the perceived influx of priests and Jesuits at this time, and 
specifically the presence of Count Rossetti, the pope’s nuncio, at court, and the Masses 
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celebrated at Denmark House and in ambassadors’ chapels.144 The Upper House debated 
the matter and when it was proposed to join the Commons in requesting the execution of 
the priest, the Catholic Lord Arundell of Wardour stood up and excused himself from 
the motion. He was followed by Viscount Montague, the Marquis of Winchester, and 
Lord Brudenell, who declared that it was not a fit thing of which to be part. After being 
accused of speaking ‘against the laws of the kingdom’ by Lord Saye, Brudenell 
protested that he had been misunderstood; he did not speak against the laws of the 
kingdom, but as a Catholic himself, he could not be party to a priest being executed just 
because he was Catholic. He also argued that there were enough men in the Upper 
House to condemn the priest to death without the Lords needing his vote as well.145 The 
motion was passed. After the session had ended, Saye reportedly told Lord Brudenell 
that he ‘commended his zeal and assured him he disliked not his reply’.146 
 
Both Houses presented their petition to Charles stating that under the Elizabethan 
statute Jesuits and priests who were ordained by the pope and who continued to remain 
in the kingdom were declared traitors and therefore should be punished as such. This 
statute and the supporting Jacobean statute were ‘judged fit and necessary to be put in 
execution’.147 The petition maintained that the result of these particular statutes not 
being put into force had been ‘principal cause of the increase in popery’ including open 
Masses at Denmark House and ambassadors’ chapels.148 The petition stated that ‘some 
Jesuits and priests have been executed in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and King James 
of happy memory; and when any of them have received mercy, it was in such time, and 
upon such circumstances, as that the same might be extended to them without danger.’149 
Parliament argued that if Goodman were not executed, the citizens of London would not 
pay their subsidies which were necessary to supply the army and provide ‘relief’ for the 
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northern counties from the Scottish army which was necessary in order to secure ‘the 
safety of your majesty’s person, and security of the State and government’.150 The 
parliamentary argument was that the Elizabethan and Jacobean statutes had been written 
for the express purpose of defending the monarch and country from this threat. 
 
The king’s answer came on 3rd February when he repeated his decision to 
parliament. He declared that he would stem the alleged increase of popery in the 
kingdom by issuing a royal proclamation commanding ‘papists and Jesuits…to depart 
from the kingdom in one month’ and after the time had lapsed any papist or Jesuit still 
residing in England would be ‘proceeded against according to the laws’.151 Concerning 
the presence of the papal agent, Carlo Rossetti, at court, Charles reminded parliament 
that it was ‘warranted’ by the articles in the treaty which governed his marriage to 
Henrietta Maria, but said that the queen would dispense of him ‘at a convenient time’ to 
satisfy his critics. On Goodman’s execution, Charles maintained that according to the 
precedents set by both Elizabeth and James, no priest should be executed ‘merely’ on 
account of his religion. But, on this occasion, Charles conceded, ‘to avoid the 
inconveniency of giving so great a discontent to my people’ he would pass the final 
judgment on Goodman to both Houses. He warned them of the possible effect their 
judgement would have on Protestants living abroad, especially in Catholic states, an 
argument to which James I had regularly resorted in the 1620s.152  
 
A day later Charles passed Goodman’s petition to the lord keeper so it could be 
read out in parliament. In it Goodman claimed that he would rather be executed than be 
the cause of such great discontent between the king and his subjects ‘…if this storm be 
raised for my sake, I may be cast into the sea, that others may afford the tempest … [this 
is] the petition of him, that should esteem his blood well shed, to cement the breach 
between your majesty and your subjects on this occasion.’153 The wording of 
Goodman’s petition conveyed the idea that the priest was in fact a loyal subject to the 
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king and would graciously accept the ultimate sacrifice if this would end the recent 
hostilities; Goodman could portray himself as not only a martyr to the Catholic cause but 
also a martyr to the king’s. This would become a position which the English Catholic 
community would happily use and exploit, as the conflict between king and parliament 
escalated.  
 
Strafford’s trial and subsequent execution followed, despite allegations of false 
evidence. In his last letter to Charles, Strafford imitated Goodman.154 He declared:  
‘It hath been my greatest grief in all troubles, to be taken as a person 
which should endeavour to be present and set things amiss between your Majesty 
and your peoples, and to give counsel tendering to the disquiet of the three 
kingdoms… Your Majesty and your people could never bee happy, till there 
were a right understanding betwixt you and them; no other means to effect, and 
settle this happiness, but by the counsel, and assent of the parliament; or to 
present their growing wills upon this state but by entirely putting your self in the 
last resort, upon the loyalty, and good affections of your English subjects’.155  
 
2.1.3. Goodman in political context. 
Both Goodman’s and Strafford’s petitions can be read within the rhetoric of the 
campaign in which the king regained lost political ground. As mentioned above, calls for 
the abolition of episcopacy, most notably the Root and Branch petition of December 
1640, had been one of the demands that Charles was unwilling to concede. During the 
Long Parliament nearly twenty petitions were submitted in defence of episcopacy and 
the prayer book.156 The pro-episcopal petitioners, the most famous being the Cheshire 
gentleman Sir Thomas Aston, have, in the past, been regarded as middle-of-the-road 
Church-of-England men who would become the ‘constitutional royalists’ of the king’s 
party at the start of the civil war. These petitioners allegedly wanted Laudian 
innovations, implemented during the Personal Rule, to be thrown out; they championed 
the ceremonial and liturgical history of the Church of England but without Laudian 
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theology and ecclesiology.157 These petitioners did not make the destruction of popery 
the central theme of their campaigns, but, it is argued, they were ‘hardly proto-anglo-
Catholics’ as portrayed in ‘Anglican myth’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.158 
Judith Maltby has described these petitions as a moderate campaign for conformity in a 
time of religious and political unrest. Further research, however, most notably by Peter 
Lake, has focused attention on the petitioners’ anti-puritanism.159 As Lake argues, Aston 
used puritanism and Presbyterianism to create the impression of a threat to social and 
political order.160 In his first petition in February 1641 he argued that those petitioning 
for the abolition of episcopacy were not just aiming for reformation but the ‘absolute 
innovation of government’ which had been approved and established by ‘the common 
and statute laws of their Kingdom’.161 He declared that the anti-episcopal petitioners 
were ‘dangerously exciting a disobedience to the established form of government’ in 
order to ‘introduce an absolute innovation of presbysterial government’.162 The anti-
episcopal petitioners’ ‘arbitrary government of a numerous presbitery’ would, Aston 
claimed, be ‘dangerously conducible to an anarchy’.163 Aston ended with a plea to the 
Long Parliament to ‘stop the torrent of such spirits before they swell beyond the bounds 
of government’.164  
 
These petitions therefore fitted in with Charles I’s assertions, specifically in the 
speech at Whitehall. Lake argues that Charles was attempting to make episcopacy a 
‘wedge issue’ that would divide the Long Parliament and their Scottish allies. His anti-
puritan rhetoric would serve as the ideological basis for the establishment of his own 
political party.165 Aston’s petition (amongst the other thirty pro-episcopal petitions 
handed to the Long Parliament during 1641) was written at the right time, and its style 
meant its contents would appeal to a wider audience. Lake demonstrates that Aston’s 
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petitions should not be seen as ‘simple statements of ‘prayer book Protestantism’…but 
an elaborate coalition-building exercise’; the content was deliberately ambiguous so that 
it could mean different things to different people.166 
 
This is important because it was with this cause that Goodman and Strafford 
aligned themselves. Significantly, a copy of Aston’s petition is in the archives of the 
Westminster Archdiocese, indicating that it was sent to Rome. This seems unlikely to 
have occurred if it was regarded merely as a form of quasi-Anglican Protestantism. This 
anti-puritan, pro-episcopal stance gave at least some Catholics hope, just as the 
implementation of Laudianism had done in the 1620s and 1630s.  
 
Thomas, Lord Brudenell, took part in debates in the House of Lords in defence 
of bishops and the royal prerogative. He along with the Earls of Bath and Bristol 
defended the thirteen bishops sitting in the House of Lords against attacks on them by 
Charles’s critics for their part in passing the ‘popish’ canons of the Convocation of 
1640.167 Included in the Brudenell manuscripts are two sets of notes for speeches he 
made around this time. Although neither is dated, their content suggests that they relate 
to speeches in the House of Lords during the sitting of the Long Parliament. In them, 
Brudenell defended the king’s prerogative by arguing that whoever called parliament 
could dissolve it; ‘Prerogatives once settled’, he wrote, ‘cannot be divested out of the 
crown’.168 Brudenell continued: 
Experience tells us kings and times will come out of revocation, resumption and 
repeals. In the interim it lies with the kingdoms like an infested wound that vexes 
to a frenzy… it were preposterous a parish priest should call a general council or 
the learned minister we have should congregate a provincial synod, let the 
derivate power be what can be imagined.169 
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Constables and peers he stated ‘must be called by a superior’.170 He even quoted from 
the medieval treatise Bracton, stating ‘Let no man presume to dispute of the deeds or 
acts of the king much less to oppose the same’ and that the king had the power to punish 
and restrain men.171 In the other manuscript Brudenell argued ‘for bishops’ by using past 
statutes to argue that bishops came by both ‘tenure’ and ‘writ’; ‘Prophets in the old 
bishops in the new. All summons are the kings’.172 He even spoke out against the Scots 
arguing, ‘This is no war as well was said but a rebellion nor is for religion, for were it so 
no Catholic could offer service’.173 
 
Brudenell also used arguments supporting the concept of divine right arguing 
that the king exercised judgements of God not man. ‘He who provokes the king’, 
Brudenell wrote, ‘sins against his own soul’. He continued: 
Let every soul be subject to higher powers, for none but that God 
Who resists power resists God and inconsequence who rebels against king does 
so against G[od] and purchase damnation and were it not of this necessity we 
know it and do obey for conscience sake.174 
Superiors of the English mission had sent orders to the Catholic clergy in England in 
1639 to urge the Catholic laity to contribute to Charles’s war with the Covenanters in 
Scotland.175 The need to prove themselves loyal subjects of the crown made it of the 
utmost importance ‘to have this business to be a good success’.176 
                                                
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid; P. Brand, ‘Henry of Bratton [Bracton] (d. 1268), justice and supposed author of the legal treatise 
known as Bracton’, ODNB. 
172 Brudenell Mss, I.xiv.83. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Albion, Charles I and the Court of Rome, p.334. 
176 Ibid. Appendix IX. This was an important opportunity to show the king Catholic loyalty in the face of 
Covenant subversion and Puritan sympathisers (Hibbard, Charles I and the Popish Plot, pp. 94-95). 
Caroline Hibbard has shown that Catholic monetary contribution to Charles’s war against the Scots caused 
far more trouble for both the king and the Catholics than its £14000 value justified (C. Hibbard, ‘The 
Contribution of 1639: Court and Country Catholicism’, Recusant History, 16, (1982), pp.42-60 at p.43). 
Hibbard suggests that the amount was much lower than expected because the system for collecting it was 
indirect and ill coordinated, rather than because of Catholic indifference to the king’s cause (Ibid, pp.46, 
50). Hibbard looks to the county of Lancashire which had many Roman Catholic inhabitants. Here, 
organisation was slow and there were no real efforts to collect contributions until late April 1639, almost 
five months after the scheme was launched and only two months before the collection was due (Ibid, 
pp.46, 47, 48). There were no existing communication networks between the county Catholics and 
Catholics at court who were behind the idea, which only added to the slow response (Ibid, p.48). In spite 
of these difficulties (added to which were the difficulties caused by local Puritan agitation) Lancashire still 
managed to raise the sum required (Ibid, p.52). 
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2.1.4. Priests and treason after Goodman. 
Goodman’s case was, however, only the beginning of the involvement of 
members of the English Catholic clergy in the power struggle between Charles I and 
parliament. Goodman’s case had, if anything, made the situation worse. The spectacle 
made Giovanni Giustinian, the Venetian ambassador in England, remark in a letter of 
22nd February 1641 to the Doge and the Senate that the real motive behind the outcry ‘… 
was not religious zeal but a contumacious desire to deprive their prince of the use of his 
authority’.177 John Goodman was never executed and died in prison in 1645.  
 
Rossetti, the papal agent received at court after George Con’s removal, noted to 
Barberini, the Cardinal-Secretary of State, that the Goodman affair ‘has upset 
everything’.178 Indeed, parliament was now more determined to ascertain the exact 
extent of papal influence in England and turned their attention to the papal agent at 
court. Both Walter Montagu and Sir Kenelm Digby were called before parliament to 
answer questions relating to Rossetti. Rossetti was then questioned by Sir Henry Vane, 
the Secretary of State, over rumours that the queen was planning a popish plot.179 The 
nuncio replied he knew nothing of such a plot and there was no real evidence to be 
found against the queen. Parliament was still unhappy and petitioned the House of Lords 
for his removal. Henrietta Maria, realising that Rossetti was no longer safe and 
parliament would not rest until he had departed, wrote to Barbarini in Rome asking him 
to recall the nuncio. He set sail for Dunkirk on 8th July 1641.180 
 
Six months after Goodman’s case had reached its climax, Giustinian was 
personally drawn into the dispute between the king and parliament when his own 
English priest Cuthbert Clopton (alias Green) was arrested in July.181 Giustinian no 
doubt had been singled out by parliament because he had harboured Rossetti in his 
house, protecting him from parliament’s demands to appear before the bar on the day he 
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was due to leave for France. A lengthy account of the incident was given by Giustinian 
in his correspondence with the Doge and Senate. On hearing the proclamation banishing 
all priests from the kingdom earlier in the year, Giustinian had reportedly informed 
parliament of the existence of the priest in his lodgings. The case had gone before 
parliament, and the Venetian was told that his priest was safe because he belonged to the 
ambassador. This was also Clopton’s defence at his trial.182 He refused to answer 
whether he was a priest or not, insisting that this was for Mr Carpenter, the pursuivant 
who had arrested him, to prove.183 He would admit only to being a servant of the 
Venetian ambassador, which meant that he could not ‘be taxed for his religion’.184 
 
Outraged by Clopton’s arrest, Giustinian appealed to the king. After the case 
went before the House of Lords, it was decided between the king and the Upper House 
that it was within Charles’s power to release the priest himself. But when he ordered to 
have Clopton released, the secretary of state, Sir Henry Vane, told him that this could 
not be done without the consent of the House of Commons.185 The process had to 
recommence. Charles submitted papers to the Upper House again relating to Clopton’s 
reprieve. The House of Lords agreed on his release. The House of Commons also 
assented. Vane, however, when directed to let Clopton go, failed to do so. Clopton was 
publicly condemned in the sessions House for being a priest, along with a fellow priest, 
William Ward, and both were sentenced to death even though both Houses had agreed 
that he should be freed.186 Vane made excuses as to why this had happened but 
suspended Clopton’s impending execution by only a single day. According to Guistinian 
the result was a showdown between the king and Vane which culminated in the latter 
expressing his surprise that Charles should permit ambassadors to keep English priests 
as it was a blatant infringement of English law, ‘He asserted boldly that the republic has 
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not the same sentiments towards the Roman court as other princes have and that this 
example would serve as a warning to the other ambassadors as well.’187  
 
Nevertheless, Charles’s doggedness seems to have worked, for Clopton was 
finally released and plans were made by Guistinian to send him abroad. No reprieve 
came for William Ward even though he had argued at his trial that the accusations made 
by the pursuivant Thomas Mayo were false. In Clopton’s account of Ward’s martyrdom, 
the three witnesses had not said anything ‘to any great purpose’.188 In another account of 
Ward’s martyrdom the author commented that it appeared ‘a little strange’ that Ward 
should be singled out to be executed because there were several priests in prison who 
had already been condemned to death a long time before Ward had even been 
apprehended. The author seems to have thought it was due to ‘Mr Ward’s forsaking the 
Protestant Religion’ which had helped to ‘enflame the reckoning and bear some weight 
with the managers to give him the preference of his Senior Brethren’.189 Ward was hung, 
drawn and quartered at Tyburn on 23rd July 1641. 
 
In September of the same year, after Charles had left for Scotland, another priest, 
the Benedictine Edward Barlow, was also executed after being apprehended as he held a 
small service. The congregation asked the Constable on whose authority was he acting 
and demanded to see the warrant for Barlow.190 There was none, so any arrest was 
actually illegal, but apparently Barlow opposed any rescue, preferring to offer himself to 
the constable instead. He was duly arrested. The account of his trial describes how the 
presiding judge attempted to lure Barlow into publicly criticising the king. Barlow was 
asked what he thought of the king and his predecessors who ‘have given the royal 
sanction to those laws’ of the condemnation of priests to death. Barlow refused to be 
ensnared by the judge’s ‘malicious design’ and answered that he forgave ‘the authors of 
such unjust laws, whoever they are’.191 Barlow pleaded not guilty to the charge of being 
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a traitor and condemned the judge for continuing to put to death innocent people.192 
Barlow was, however, found guilty of treason and was executed on 10th September 
1641.193 The priest’s willingness to allow his arrest in the absence of a warrant suggests 
the importance of martyrdom to the political advancement of the mission as a type of 
evangelising action.194 
 
2.1.5. The seven priests: treason and prerogative. 
Not long after the death of Barlow came another high-profile case involving the 
Catholic clergy. Here eight priests were involved, one of whom was released through 
lack of evidence. The trial of the remaining seven began in November 1641 and all were 
condemned to die on 18th December, but their case became as lengthy and as drawn out 
as Goodman’s and was passed between the two Houses for months on end. One of them, 
John Hammond, alias Jackson, was in service to Henrietta Maria. On 8th December 1641 
the French ambassador, following instructions from Henrietta Maria, petitioned the king 
for their immediate reprieve. The king, taking into account the current political climate 
(the outbreak of the Irish Rebellion and his rejection of the Grand Remonstrance), and 
weary of the contention and division Goodman’s case had caused, was adamant that 
further priests should not be reprieved without the consent of parliament. In fact the 
French ambassador had reasoned that the case of the priests ‘may concern the business 
of Ireland’ as a basis of his request.195  
 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords was approached privately concerning the issue 
and duly informed the lower House. The following day the House of Commons decided 
that they should examine the seven priests in question: John Austin, alias Rivers, a 
Benedictine; Edmond Friar and Peter Wilford, both Benedictines; Walter Coleman, a 
Franciscan and Hammond, Edmund Canon and John Wilmot, alias Turner and 
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Windmore, all seculars.196 All had been found guilty of being priests and of seducing the 
king’s subjects to popery. All had obviously not obeyed the last royal proclamation, 
issued on 11th November 1640, commanding priests to leave the country.197 On 
examination all denied the charge of treason against the king, claiming that they had no 
prior knowledge of the rebellion in Ireland nor had taken part in conspiracies against the 
State.198 Edmund Canon, on examination, also professed that he believed it lawful for 
English Roman Catholics to take the oath of allegiance. He argued that he and Peter 
Wilford had been imprisoned at the time the proclamation against priests had been 
issued, so there was no way that either could have left the country in accordance with 
it.199 The results of the examinations were passed back to the Commons.  
 
The next day the king sent a formal message to both Houses asking them 
whether all seven could be reprieved as requested by the French ambassador and urging 
them not to delay as the executions were scheduled two days hence.200 On receiving this 
message the House of Commons began to debate the priests’ future. On the motion that 
they should all be executed, eighty-eight members voted against the motion and seventy-
seven for it. Each priest’s case was therefore discussed and voted upon individually. It 
was decided unanimously that the house should advise Charles that John Hammond, 
John Abbot, Walter Coleman and John Wilmot should be executed. The case was not so 
simple, however, when debate turned to the fate of Edward Canon and Peter Wilford.201 
Both priests had proclaimed in their examinations that they had been imprisoned at the 
time of judgment against them. This was seen by some as unjust. On this basis eighty-
two MPs voted against Edward Canon being executed, against sixty-eight votes in 
favour. Peter Wilford escaped being condemned to death by just a single vote.202 MPs 
were probably more in favour of reprieving Canon because he had taken the 1606 oath 
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of allegiance. A conference was set up between the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords, so the Lower House could relay their judgements to the Lords, on 13th 
December, the day that those priests condemned should have been executed. On that day 
judgment was relayed to the Upper House. The Commons demanded that interventions 
such as that of the French ambassador should never be allowed to occur again.203 Yet 
this was a contentious issue, as some members of parliament were concerned English 
ambassadors should still be able to aid English Protestant men who had been 
apprehended by the Spanish Inquisition.204 
 
Parliament’s decision to spare the lives of two of the priests and the consequent 
delay of the others’ executions did not prove popular. Whilst the Commons were in 
conference with the House of Lords, a large crowd of people gathered outside Newgate 
prison to witness the anticipated executions. On learning that the priests would not be 
executed that day and that the Commons had ‘freed’ two of them, or at least that they 
were ‘in hope of a reprieve’, a riot broke out.205 The other prisoners who had been 
condemned to die with the priests were so angered by the rumoured reprieves, and so 
swept along by the injustice felt amongst the ‘tumult of thousands’ outside, that they 
seized the gaolers’ muskets, powder and prison keys and took over the prison, shooting 
‘to defend themselves against the keepers’.206 Luckily for the gaolers a trained band 
happened to be passing through Newgate that same day and managed to force the rioters 
to surrender. On 14th December the rioters were hanged ‘not without great murmuring of 
the common people’, that the priests were still alive.207 
 
The threat of civil disorder that the incident at Newgate had seemed to indicate 
made an impact on parliament. On the same day that the rioters were executed, 
parliament voted to execute all seven priests instead of just five; Wilford and Canon 
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were no longer safe.208 After much debate the House of Lords agreed with the Lower 
House’s judgement and the lord chamberlain and lord steward presented the joint 
Houses’ petition to the king who said he would consider it and return his answer shortly. 
The royal response did not come for four months, however, despite many inquiries from 
the House of Commons. As time wore on, parliamentary debate concentrated more upon 
the case of the Five Bishops, the trouble in Ireland and the county petitions than upon 
the condemned priests. A letter written by the Venetian ambassador to the Doge and 
Senate back in December 1641 concerning the priests, sheds light on the king’s delay. 
Giustinian recounted about the priests’ initial reprieve, and wrote: 
When his Majesty learned of this he sent orders to the sheriffs to suspend the 
execution of the sentence. Now parliament repents of the concession and claim 
that the priests must die disowning the king’s suspension and promise given to 
the ambassador…But the king stands firmly by his order to the sheriffs and will 
not draw back until parliament, having made up of its full numbers, decides 
otherwise by the majority of votes, which does not increase his popularity among 
the people.209 
Charles expected the balance in the Commons to change, following his proclamation, 
then those who had been absent from parliament returned.210 
 
Charles therefore resisted parliament’s petitions, in line with his earlier responses 
to challenges to his royal prerogative, especially in the case of Goodman, but there was 
also some confusion concerning the meaning of the term ‘reprieve’. The reprieve 
granted by parliament was perhaps more of a ‘stay of execution’, so that both Houses 
could debate the case and come to an adequate judgement. From the outset, from the 
information conveyed in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords journals, 
it seems clear that parliament never intended to release all seven priests, although the 
Lords seemed, during the debates later stages, to favour banishment instead of 
execution.211 Nonetheless, Charles had given an informal reprieve of sorts to the priests 
after the condemnation by parliament. This he defended in April 1642 when the 
Commons finally petitioned the king directly.  
 
                                                
208 JHC II, p.343. 
209 CSP Ven 1640-1642, p.265. 
210 Adamson, The Noble Revolt, pp.464-649. 
211 Coates, The Journal of Sir Simonds D’Ewes, p.288, fn.18. 
 62 
This petition linked two issues connected with Charles’s prerogative power, the 
magazine at Hull and that of the seven priests. It attacked Charles’s prerogative power 
by demanding that he grant leave for the arms, cannons and ammunition held in Hull 
(left there from his war with the Scots) to be returned to the Tower of London.212 
Charles’s fury can be seen in his reply, ‘We rather expected (and have done so long) that 
you should have given us an account why a garrison hath been placed in our town of 
Hull without our consent, and soldiers billeted there against law, and express words of 
the Petition of Right.’213 
 
Charles refused to consent to the relocation of the magazine, although the 
decision was out of his hands anyway. Not only had the Militia Bill been passed the 
month before, which meant that military authority had been transferred from the Crown 
to Lords Lieutenants chosen by parliament, but as he said, parliament had already 
garrisoned Hull and placed the MP Sir John Hotham there to act as governor. Hotham’s 
orders were to give no-one access to the magazine ‘without the king’s authority signified 
unto him by the Lords and Commons House of Parliament’.214 In other words, unless the 
order came from parliament, Charles would not be allowed into the town.  
 
In answer to parliament’s demands about the priests, Charles argued that they 
were reprieved ‘by our warrant, being informed that they were (by some restraint) 
disabled to take the benefit of our former proclamation’. In fact, of course, only two of 
the seven priests had previously stated that they had been imprisoned on the 
proclamation’s publication.215 Charles further said that he had pledged not to reprieve 
any priest without parliament’s consent who had been found guilty by law. Charles then 
attempted to play parliament’s game by referring the case ‘wholly’ back to them ‘if you 
think the execution of these persons so very necessary to the great and pious work of 
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Reformation …and the law to have the course’.216 His unpopularity would only have 
increased if he had been seen to protect the priests any further.  
 
Charles’s answer placed the ball back into parliament’s court, but unwittingly he 
had also managed to strand himself in a corner. Charles’s response was bogged down in 
the legal argument that the power given Hotham to guard the magazine at Hull was 
against ‘the law of the land, or the liberty of the subject’.217 Charles declared such 
actions a ‘violation’ of his right and a breach of his privilege. He also accused 
parliament of hypocrisy: they based all their arguments against Charles on the pretence 
of upholding common law, but here they were flouting it.218 Indeed, parliament had 
moved as early as 12th January 1642 to install Hotham in Hull; two months before the 
Militia Bill had been passed, an action Charles viewed as illegal.219  
 
But this posed its own problems for Charles. He had recently reprieved two 
further priests who had been imprisoned in York. John Lockwood and Edmund Catterick 
had been found guilty at the York Assizes. Now to fulfil the logic of his response to 
parliament, he had to recall the reprieves and sign their death warrants. The king had 
outmanoeuvred himself. Lockwood and Catterick were executed together at York on 
13th April 1642.  
 
Although the seven priests in Newgate were never executed but left to die in 
prison by parliament, other convicted priests would not escape the scaffold. In the year 
after the king’s flight from London on 10th January 1642, following his disastrous 
attempt to arrest five MPs, eight priests were condemned and executed. There had not 
been so many executions of priests in one year since 1590, and the number was not 
exceeded until the Oates Plot of 1679.220 The execution of priests indicated parliament’s 
growing strength against the king. 
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2.1.6. 1642 – Priests’ trials at the onset of civil war. 
One of those priests executed in 1642 was the secular priest Hugh Green (alias 
Ferdinand Brooks, Brown, English and Callard) who was arrested whilst trying to board 
a boat in an attempt to obey the recent royal proclamation ordering all priests to leave 
the country. His apprehenders alleged he fell short of the time limit set out by the 
proclamation; Green argued it was only by a couple of days and was just an innocent 
mistake.221 Green’s case is significant because throughout his trial he directly aligned his 
case with the royalist cause. Green questioned the legality of his trial in the same way 
that Charles and future royalists contested the legality of parliament’s attacks on the 
royal prerogative. He continually argued his innocence against the treason charge 
declaring he was ‘so far from guilt of this kind’ that he protested, with God as his 
witness, that he had never ‘wished any harm to my king and country in my life’.222 He 
even asserted that he had prayed for the king in his memento and had constantly 
recommended Charles’s ‘person and cause’ to God in his Mass.223  
 
It seems over zealous of Green’s apprehenders to have arrested him while he was 
trying to board a boat. Although he had exceeded the allotted time period set out by the 
proclamation, surely the point that he was trying, at best to adhere to it, and at worst 
belatedly to flee the country. Either motivation would still meet the aims of the 
proclamation and parliament’s desire to rid the country of priests. This sort of over 
zealous reaction was also evident elsewhere. A Catholic newsletter from England 
written on 21st June 1641, primarily concerned with prosecutions, had claimed that: ‘The 
pursuivants proceed in such exorbitant ways as never been heard of’.224 The newsletter 
described the incident of a friar who had been arrested along with other suspected 
papists by a group of pursuivants. One of those arrested was asked by the sequestion 
committee the reason why he had been brought before them. He replied that he did not 
know, as he had not seen the warrant for his arrest. The committee told him that he 
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should have asked to have seen the warrant and then ten of its members dismissed the 
pursuivant saying that he had had no warrant. The friar was also released on the same 
grounds whilst the committee ‘expressed their distaste in being importuned’, ‘rated’ the 
pursuivants and ‘sent them packing with a witness’.225 
 
In fact, it appears that Green was a victim of circumstance. Dorchester, the town 
in which he was apprehended, tried and executed, was in the process of becoming the 
main focus of parliament’s war effort in Dorset.226 As early as January 1642 supporters 
of parliament had been preparing for possible hostilities. By July, parliament had given 
the county of Dorset permission to recruit their own militia.227 By mid-summer 
Dorchester was beginning to feel under threat from an armed band of cavaliers who had 
settled just a few miles away from the town. The Marquis of Hertford had been driven 
out of Somerset by a parliamentarian uprising and took refuge at George, Lord Digby’s, 
royalist ‘stronghold’ at Sherborne on the Dorset border.228 Local royalists in Dorchester 
had left to join camp with them. This worried the inhabitants of Dorchester so much that 
the town’s gates were closed at 8p.m. and a watch stood guard throughout each night. 
Local reactions to Green’s arrest were therefore the outcome of very specific anxieties 
about imminent conflict.  
 
Green was subjected to a truly barbaric execution by the local barber-surgeon 
Barfoot, watched by a larger crowd than usual.229 Green was drawn and quartered whilst 
he was still alive. The ‘unskilful fellow’ Barfoot not only pulled forth Green’s liver to 
show to the crowd in mistake for his heart but then continued to draw out Green’s 
insides in search of the vital organ.230 Once the butchery had finished, a ‘Gentlewoman’ 
was given permission by the sheriff to retrieve Green’s body and take it away to bury it. 
The town’s people were outraged by this and stopped the woman by force.231 The 
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sheriff, a royalist, could not intervene because, as David Underdown argues, it would 
have brought him into direct conflict with the town’s people who had been fortifying the 
town in ‘defiance’ of his orders since the beginning of July.232 But Green’s body parts 
would not be exhibited on the town’s gates, in keeping with tradition, for fear that the 
plague might infect the town as retribution for the priest’s death.233 
 
Hugh Green was not alone in declaring his royalism in the course of his trial. 
Thomas Holland (alias Sanderson), who was executed along with Green, also questioned 
the legality of proceedings against him. Three witnesses were called to give evidence 
against Holland but he managed to rebuff each accusation put to him, when given the 
opportunity by the ‘honourable bench’ to answer. According to a Catholic report of the 
trial, Holland had told the Judges ‘… the laws of England did require that evident proof 
should be brought against a delinquent, otherwise he could not be condemned; but as yet 
there was no such thing deposed against him.’234 Holland added that if anyone could 
‘prove where and when’ he had taken Holy Orders or if they knew and could prove that 
he had undertaken any such act that these Orders would allow, he would ‘most willingly 
suffer’.235  
 
The judge at the trial was Alderman Isaac Penington, a sheriff of London who 
would become Lord Mayor of London, a staunch parliamentarian and a puritan. He 
asked Holland directly if he were a priest. Holland, determined not to incriminate 
himself, refused to answer: ‘no man was to accuse himself’.236 The jury returned their 
guilty verdict three days later. Holland was asked to approach the bench again and asked 
if there was any reason he should not be condemned to death. Holland replied that the 
evidence against him was ‘weak, trifling, and illegal’.237 Condemning him would be 
illegal, Holland argued, because no witnesses could point to particular times or places at 
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which he was ordained or had undertaken sacerdotal functions.238 Penington agreed that 
he could not find anything in Holland’s ‘life or morals’ that displeased him, but said that 
in accordance with the laws enacted against priests the jury had found him guilty, ‘upon 
presumption (as they say) which is at least a legitimate and full proof’.239 Holland was 
condemned to death and executed on 19th August 1642. 
 
It was alleged that Penington later declared that if he had been a member of the 
jury he would have found Holland not guilty because of the lack of evidence.240 This 
seems extremely unlikely given Pennington’s own puritan sentiments. Penington led 
attacks against episcopacy and played a leading role in the Root and Branch petition of 
December 1640.241 He also was behind the City’s threat to refuse contributions to fund 
Charles’s war with the Scots if Goodman’s reprieve was not overturned.242 It seems that 
the author of this account was trying to justify the argument that the proceedings against 
priests were counter to the rights given to subjects by established law, by fabricating 
support from a most unlikely candidate. If a man like Penington had viewed the 
proceedings against Holland as unjust then that would provide insurmountable evidence 
that they were.  
 
Just two months later Thomas Bullaker, a Franciscan friar, also argued that the 
case brought against him was false and protested his innocence against the accusation of 
being a traitor. The priest was arrested whilst holding Mass at the house of Margaret 
Powell, the daughter of Lord Montague.243 Bullaker had been arrested before and 
brought to trial but had been discharged on the king’s warrant. It was on this point that 
the priest argued his case when he was later arrested. Bullaker argued that although there 
were laws in force against priests, these laws were put into effect by the same parliament 
which ‘approved likewise the Book of Common Prayer, & the government of the Prot 
Church by archbishops and bishops, both which you have so little regard to at this 
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time’.244 He continued that parliament could not ‘in justice insist after this upon blind 
obedience from others to the ordinances of former parliaments, at a time when you your 
selves do show a manifest contempt of them’.245 Bullaker criticised parliament for being 
unable to prove their constant allegations of popish plots and conspiracies. When the 
parliamentary committee members Bullaker was appearing in front of retaliated by 
calling him a traitor, he retorted that ‘Had the kingdom no other kind of traitor in it’ than 
Bullaker himself, it ‘would be in a far better condition then it is at present’, implying 
that it was in fact MPs who were the ‘betrayers’ of the laws and liberties of the kingdom 
and parliament truly merited the accusation of treachery.246 The jury were instructed to 
find the friar guilty but instead wanted to refer this case to parliament before passing 
judgement. However, the recorder ignored the jury’s wish, found Bullaker guilty 
anyway, and condemned him to death.247 
 
There are two other accounts of Catholic priests who questioned the legality of 
their own trials and condemnation. They were Ralph Corby and Philip Powell. The 
Jesuit priest Corby had been arrested, along with another priest John Duckett, by the 
parliamentarian army in June 1644 and brought before the Sunderland sequestion 
committee.248 On examination it was decided he should be transported to London where 
he would be condemned and executed two months later. In a letter, Corby complained 
that on examination he was asked whether he had been in the king’s army. He had 
denied it but his examiners recorded that he had answered in the affirmative.249 Corby 
had also told the examiners that he had been born in Ireland and therefore could not be 
condemned in accordance with the statute because he was not of English origin. He 
argued that it had not been proved that he and Duckett had violated the laws and stated 
that they had not been so accused.250 His arguing, however, was to no avail. He was told 
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that not only were he and Duckett accused of being Catholic priests, and that in itself 
was enough to condemn him to death, but also that in the exact words of the Elizabethan 
statute against priests it was held that it was high treason for any man born within the 
queen’s dominions (of which Ireland was a part) and ordained abroad to remain within 
the realm.251 Both Duckett and Corby were condemned to death and were executed 
together at Tyburn on 7th September 1644. It may be that the executions of Corby and 
Duckett served as much needed propaganda for the parliamentarians following their 
defeats at Cropredy Bridge on 29th June and at Lostwithiel on 2nd September. It was also 
a chance to capitalise on their success at Marston Moor, a show of strength in the light 
of increasing hostilities between Cromwell and Manchester about how best to continue 
the war. 
 
The second account concerns Philip Powell, alias Morgan, a Benedictine who 
was sent on the English mission in 1622. On his arrival in England he stayed in London 
with the Franciscan Augustine Baker who taught him about English civil law. Powell 
then went to stay with a Roman Catholic family in Derbyshire. At the outbreak of war 
the family dispersed. Powell found himself on a boat travelling from Cornwall to Wales 
and it was during this trip that he was apprehended by Captain Crowder, who boarded 
the boat and accused Powell of being a priest.252 On Powell’s return to London he was 
brought before the King’s Bench, and declared that he was a priest, but was not guilty of 
treason. An account of his trial alleges that when asked his response to the treason 
charge levelled against him, he declared that he doubted whether the judge had ‘any just 
power derived from his majesty’ to try him and argued that legally, because of the civil 
war, all trials where the verdict would determine life or death should cease.253 
 
The jury, however, found Powell guilty and returned him to prison but the 
Benedictine was recalled to the Bench a couple of days later. It was at this second 
meeting with the judge that Powell argued that he could not be charged for treason and 
condemned to death for two reasons. The first was that the nature of the offence had 
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changed and therefore the statute was null and void. The Elizabethan statute, Powell 
argued, came into being at a time when Queen Elizabeth feared both Mary Queen of 
Scots and the Spaniards. But because the king was now absent from proceedings, both 
cause and person were absent from the case. The second point of controversy was that 
Powell had been arrested at sea and therefore was not actually in England, therefore, the 
statute could not be enforced against him.254 After much argument between Powell and 
the judge, the priest was still found guilty of treason and was condemned to die. He was 
hung, drawn and quartered on 30th June 1645 but his head and quartered body were not, 
as was the custom, placed on the gates of the City for all to see but were instead buried 
in an old churchyard in Moorfields on the petition of the Common Council of London 
who feared that Powell’s ‘comportment’ had made an impression on the people.255  
 
It was not just the alleged illegality of trials that the clergy tried to use to their 
political advantage. They also attempted a different tack altogether by arguing for the 
similarities between the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England. 
Particularly this can be seen in the ‘gallows speeches’ of the priests Hugh Green and 
Henry Heath. Hugh Green declared at his execution that ‘Scholars in school points may 
differ but never in points of faith’.256 He declared that there were three things to be 
considered, ‘one God, one Baptism and one Church’ and the ‘marks’ of this Church, 
which were ‘sanctity, unity, antiquity and universality’. In these, he argued, ‘all of us in 
all points do believe’. An account of Henry Heath’s execution on 17th April 1643 deals 
with similar issues. The account included a discourse between a minister and a young 
man concerning the minister’s assertion that Heath died in the faith of Christ ‘but not for 
the faith of Christ’.257 The minister argued that Heath died for his opinions whereat the 
young man interjected that the priest could not die for his opinions because Heath had 
made a public confession of believing in the Church as a whole rather than any 
particular named Church. The minister replied that ‘the name of the Church concerned 
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all’.258 The young man replied that the name of the Church should concern men no more 
than it had St Augustine whom, it was alleged, did not believe in the authority of the 
Church. This was probably a reference to St Augustine of Hippo’s struggles with the 
Donatists in which he stated that heresy should not be punishable by death and that, as 
long as the Church survived, it could tolerate sinners without it being detrimental to its 
holiness.259  
 
Both examples were a markedly different from the gallows speeches made by 
Catholic priests in Elizabethan and Jacobean times, when priests generally rejected the 
ministrations of the Protestant clergy present, arguing that the two faiths were 
completely incompatible. It is possible to read this as another demonstration of Catholic 
loyalism and indeed royalism. By arguing that Catholicism was compatible with the 
national Church the Catholic priests were attempting to show they were loyal subjects 
and therefore their condemnations for treason and their resulting executions were 
needless, immoral or illegal.  
 
2.2. Anti-Catholic discourse concerning English Catholic priests. 
Within Protestant anti-Catholic discourse the priests’ defences unsurprisingly fell 
on deaf ears. In Protestant accounts of trials and executions, authors were concerned to 
show that Roman Catholicism was ‘grounded upon murder and mischiefs’ and that 
priests, by disobeying royal proclamations of banishment, showed disloyalty to the 
king.260 There were also the ‘traditional’ allegations of harming or murdering the 
monarch. The anonymous author of the Black Box claimed that Jesuits (the term used in 
almost all anti-Catholic tracts to describe Catholic priests) ‘profess obedience but 
practice sedition and rebellion’.261 The author claimed that all priests’ pleas of loyalty to 
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the king were made ‘with a mental reservation of Father Campion’s old distinction’, in 
other words, Catholic priests pledged allegiance to the pope first and foremost and 
therefore would murder a heretic king.262  
 
Anti-Catholic pamphleteers also attempted to utilise the ‘compassing the king’ 
concept to perpetuate charges of treason against Catholic priests. In this instance almost 
all conjured the apocalyptic image of a divided kingdom invaded by a foreign Catholic 
force. This is particularly true of the pamphlet entitled The Papists Conspirarcie.263 
Similarly, another pamphlet purported to use the confession of a priest, Arthur Browne, 
to argue that the priests’ treason was purposefully causing ‘these present distempers and 
divisions’.264 The author stated that Browne had argued that priests were using the 
king’s prerogative to do this: ‘They hope to see the king and queen have the same 
privileges and prerogatives as their predecessors before them, a false suggestion of the 
devil, it is rather to root out the Protestant religion and bring in popery’.265 Apparently 
on Browne’s account the Dorchester assizes reprieved him as he gave up the names of 
Catholic gentry who had harboured him whilst he was on his mission.266 
 
Thomas Hayward made similar arguments in his The rattrap or the Jesuits taken 
in their own net. He wrote that Jesuits involved themselves in state matters to ‘the great 
prejudice’ of princes.267 If these princes discovered the priests they would punish them 
as the ‘greatest enemies both to their [princes] own principality and the safety of their 
kingdom’.268 Hayward also considered that the Jesuits was ‘by this incendiary kindled in 
their kingdoms, Ireland may grow tumultuous, Scotland combustous, and take arms, and 
England’s peace be altogether disturbed and disquieted’ in order to bring in foreign 
Catholic forces.269 Hayward saw the Convocation of May 1640 as part of a Catholic 
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plot, ‘It was surely one of their plots to urge our bishops to make new cannons’.270 
Hayward was not the only author to argue that the issues dividing Charles’s three 
kingdoms were part and parcel of Catholic plotting. Thomas Abernethie attacked 
treasonous Catholic priests in his pro-covenanter tract, A Worthy Speech. He argued that 
it was Catholic priest who had ‘hatched’ plots, treasons and ‘bloody mischiefs’.271 In 
order to return Scotland and England to the Church of Rome, Abernethie wrote, the 
priests plotted to ‘pervert’ the Church of England first as it was nearer to Roman 
Catholicism in forms of worship and episcopal government. They wanted then to 
administer popish changes to Scotland on the grounds that it must conform to the 
‘Mother Church’. The Scots, it was considered, would not be able to stop the reforms ‘in 
respect of his Majesty’s supremacy, and of the union of two crowns and kingdom’. 
Abernethie accused the papal agent Panzani of planning the plot. He asked ‘Now non-
covenanter, is thy curiosity satisfied?’, and declared that the laws against Catholics 
should be exercised instead of granting them the ‘pecuniary liberty of conscience’ they 
then enjoyed.272 
 
Similarly a pamphlet printing a letter allegedly written by Cardinal du Perron to 
the French king during James’s reign at the time of the appellant crisis sought to show 
that Laudian bishops secretly favoured Catholicism, as could be seen in ‘their 
unanimous consent to the late diabolical cannons’.273 The author showed the ‘sympathy 
and affinity’ that Catholic priests had to the Laudian bishops 
the bishops have taken all things done against papists as done against themselves, 
and the papists all things done against the bishops, as done against their head the 
pope and them; but this hath been so cunningly performed, as few could hereto 
perceive it, whilst at last the papists seeing both themselves and the mitre of 
bishops wronged (as they thought) by the factious covenanters of Scotland, could 
contain themselves no more, but burst out in rage against those heretics, and 
openly undertook to defend, that our bishops were Iure Divino tales274 
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This must have looked like a convincing argument to Presbyterians or supporters of the 
covenanters in light of speeches in favour of bishops from men such as Thomas, Lord 
Brudenell. 
 
It was not just those who had sympathy with the covenanters who argued that the 
priests committed treason by compassing the king. In 1642 pamphlets emerged that were 
anti-Catholic, anti-tolerationationist and anti-puritan and blamed the division between 
parliament and the king on priests and puritans. In the pamphlet A Discovery of Treason 
against the king, mentioned earlier, the author claimed that the Spanish ambassador 
Gondomar plotted with the puritans, ‘This great man had but one principal means to 
further his great designs, which was, that none but the puritan faction, which plotted 
nothing but an anarchy and this confusion, were averse to this happy nation’.275 The 
author continued, ‘that none but the king’s enemies’ were in parliament and that some 
Catholics pretended to be puritans.276 The pamphlet also, however, suggested that 
Arminianism was also a way to turn people Catholic.277 Another example can be found 
in an anonymous pamphlet entitled Reasons and arguments, which stated the similarities 
between Catholics and puritans ‘for they be taken largely for dangerous wits, that … 
seek the destruction of the Church’.278 
 
2.3. Conclusion. 
Through the in-depth analysis of trials of Catholic priests during the early 1640s, 
this chapter has shown the involvement of the English Catholic clergy in the 
constitutional debates between the king and parliament on the eve of the English civil 
war. Royal dispensation to Catholic priests fuelled discontent among Charles I’s critics 
who thought that they exemplified his abuse of royal prerogative. Some Protestants 
viewing events from outside of Westminster thought the reprieve of priests signalled 
something altogether more sinister, the existence of a popish plot. This would bring 
down monarchy and kingdom and then forcibly re-establish popery. Charles’s 
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parliamentary critics were keen to feed this fear as they thought that displays of public 
discontent would help them limit the king’s power. Equally, Charles could not give up 
too much of that power without rendering himself monarch in name only.  
 
The English clergy played their own part in all of this. Whether or not existing 
accounts of their trials accurately representative what actually occurred, it was still these 
versions that were distributed amongst the English Catholic community. They sought to 
take advantage of the split between monarchy and parliament and demonstrated that 
Catholics were loyal subjects, in the hope that their loyalty would secure toleration for 
their community in the future. Captured priests were shown to have intently questioned 
the legality of their trials to show that parliament was using the illegal measures being 
inflicted on the king. The clergy were represented as arguing that trials and executions 
illustrated parliament’s determination to run rough-shod over the established laws of the 
kingdom in order to curtail Charles’s prerogative power. The Catholic clergy could then 
present themselves as martyrs not just for their religion, but also for the king’s cause. 
 
This chapter has shown the way in which the English Catholic community 
interacted with anti-papal discourse used to criticise the king and limit the extent of his 
royal prerogative, specifically in regards to the discussions of varying definitions of 
treason during this period. My argument, however, is not a causal one but a contextual 
one. There is no smoking gun to show that Strafford’s trial caused or encouraged priests 
to use Pym’s junto’s argument for constructive compassing of the king’s death to plead 
their loyalty in the face of puritan-led ‘illegal’ trials. It is significant, however, that these 
priests’ trials and the debates within (and outside) parliament took place at the same 
time. The fight concerning treason and the extent of the king’s prerogative was not just 
between the king and parliament but instead was a multifarious struggle over authority 
and obedience, which stimulated political engagement in the public sphere.  
 
Russell, in his work, argued that the junto’s constructive compassing the king 
argument was a double-edged sword.279 Just as Charles’s ‘evil counsellors’ could be 
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prosecuted for treason on these terms, so could the king’s parliamentary critics. It was 
no coincidence that this constructive compassing argument fell ‘into the background 
after Strafford’s execution.280 One could also argue a third element; once notions of 
treason were up for debate, even those whom Pym and his party wished to victimise 
could use the same argument for their own ends. The Catholic clergy on the eve of the 
English civil war, therefore, were not on the margins of English polity but immersed in 
it. They were pawns within the struggle between the king and parliament to determine 
the limits of royal prerogative power, but they were also players in their own game. It 
seems likely that instead of withdrawing themselves from the fight, the clergy embraced 
the opportunity to take centre stage and attempted to manipulate events to their own 
advantage, pledging their loyalty to Charles I in defiance of the king’s puritan critics. 
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3. The emergence of an English Catholic royalist tradition 
 
The connection between English Roman Catholicism and royalism during the 
English civil war has always been contentious. After the Restoration there was fierce 
debate over the loyalty of the English Catholic community to Charles I and (during his 
exile) Charles II. Conflicting interpretations of English Roman Catholic royalism have 
continued in histories of the civil war. The subject has inevitably been bound up in 
debates about motivations for allegiance or neutrality during the conflict.281 Yet the 
question of English Catholic loyalism to the Stuart Crown has only really been 
understood either numerically (how many royalist soldiers were Catholic), or by 
Catholic responses to monarchical religious and financial policies during the 1630s. 
There has been little attempt to marry the allegiances of English Catholics to the politics 
of the community and their behaviour during the Interregnum. English Catholic 
loyalism, or the lack thereof, is therefore understood somewhat two dimensionally. This 
chapter interrogates the association between English Catholicism and royalism and the 
historical methods used to research the extent of that connection. It sets out an 
alternative approach to understanding the nature of Catholic loyalism during the civil 
war, looking at key Catholics and their experiences during the conflict. It is divided into 
four sections. The first looks at contemporaries’ accounts of the extent of Catholic 
participation in the civil war, the second explores how Catholic royalism was 
represented during the eighteenth-century, the third section looks at modern 
interpretations of Catholic involvement and the fourth contains case studies of leading 
Catholics’ experiences of the conflict. This chapter is important in the thesis because it 
shows that contemporary debates about Catholic loyalty were not as straightforward as 
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3.1. Contemporary representations 
During the civil war there were few published references to English Catholic 
royalism that were not part of parliamentarian propaganda.282 The works of Edward 
Walsingham were early examples of English Catholics discussing their role in the 
conflict. Walsingham published tracts celebrating the lives and endeavours of two 
Catholic soldiers, Major General Smith, in 1644, and Sir Henry Gage in 1645.283 
Walsingham also wrote a memoir of the well known Catholic royalist Sir John Digby, 
which remained in manuscript form until it was edited and published by the Camden 
Society in 1910. The exact history and date of the manuscript is unknown, but it is 
assumed it was part of Sir Kenelm Digby’s library until his death in 1665.284  
 
Walsingham’s motivations have divided historians. Michael Mullet has argued 
that Walsingham was making a religious point rather than a social one.285 This may be 
so of Digby but seems unlikely for Smith and Gage. Conversely, Peter Newman has 
suggested that Walsingham portrayed Digby, in particular, ‘not as an exemplar of 
Catholic loyalism but as very much the complete Cavalier’.286 Yet close analysis of all 
three works suggests that neither historian’s explanation is completely satisfactory. 
Walsingham’s work has been taken out of context, or accepted at face value, only 
serving to add to conflicting claims of Catholic royalism and neutralism. Walsingham 
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treated Smith and Gage differently to Digby and only by exploring the differences (and 
in some places, similarities) between these epitaphs can the complex history of English 
Catholic attitudes to the English civil war begin to be understood. 
 
 Walsingham portrayed all three men as gallant soldiers and virtuous gentlemen 
loyal to the king’s cause. He used the concepts behind so-called ‘constitutional 
royalism’. He played on the idea that the parliamentarians were attacking established 
social and constitutional hierarchies, in order to portray English Catholics as loyal 
subjects to the king. There are many examples of this throughout the three pieces of 
work.  
 
Walsingham attributed gentlemanly characteristics to all three men placing 
importance on their pedigree, education and military experiences.287 Both of Gage’s 
parents were from ‘generous and noble families’, Digby had ‘ancient and illustrious 
parentage’ and Smith was descended from Sir Michael Carrington, standard bearer to 
Richard I in the holy-land.288 The three men were all educated, at some point, abroad 
and both Gage and Smith had joined the Spanish Army in the Netherlands. Walsingham 
claimed that Smith did so in order to protect the local elite from a civil disturbance ‘in 
some sort resembling ours where the dregs and rude multitude of the City bandy against 
their prince, magistrates and nobility, in such sort that nothing but ruin seemed to hang 
over their heads of the latter’, and that Gage was awarded a regiment by the Prince 
Cardinal ‘not by any sinister means, but merely with the eminence of his virtue, for he 
could not be won to do anything ungrateful to his natural sovereign: or inconsistent with 
the interest and honour of his nation’.289 Digby was celebrated for his ambassadorial 
duties in Venice, France and Savoy, accompanying the ambassador Jerome Weston, son 
of the crypto-Catholic Earl of Portland.290 All three men were considered to be interested 
in military strategy and affairs and were thought to have disciplined their troops to stop 
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them from pillaging and stealing from townsfolk during the civil war. They had all 
distinguished themselves in battle.291  
 
Walsingham’s projection of Smith, Gage and Digby as gentlemen complements 
recent work about the issue of gentlemanly honour during the civil war. In contrast to 
Jerrilyn Greene Marston’s work, Barbara Donagan, in ‘The Web of Honour: Soldiers, 
Christians and Gentlemen in the English Civil War’, argues there was a shared ideal of 
military honour during the conflict, one of professionalism and morality, shared by both 
royalists and parliamentarians in order to secure social stability during the unrest; 
‘professional honour’ Donagan argued, ‘required the soldier should know and observe 
the codes and practices of his metier’.292 The concept of ‘professionalism’ as a mark of 
honour can be seen in Walsingham’s work. His subjects had studied how best to 
organise, command and discipline troops as well as the best ways to fight.293 Henry 
Gage published a detailed account of the siege of Breda, in which he had taken part.294  
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Walsingham even acknowledged men of honour and dishonour in the 
parliamentarian army. After Digby was taken prisoner following his surrender at Grafton 
House, Major Skippon’s conduct was recounted as far from honourable, whereas 
Skippon’s social superior, the earl of Essex, was celebrated for his conduct, ‘[w]hich 
example this noble earl if like a president it had been so justly taxed and charged with 
such outrages, wrongs and injuries committed against their prisoners and others’.295 
Although Donagan argues that blood and nobility were no longer important to the 
concept of honour during the civil war because they were replaced by the growing 
importance of status and seniority, Richard Cust has argued that this was not the case for 
the Catholic community.296 Cust demonstrates that during the sixteenth century ‘gentry 
honour came to be redefined in terms which were appropriate to a Protestant ruling 
class’ thus the ideas of public service and godliness became paramount.297 Roman 
Catholics were largely barred from public office, which meant that ‘some of the 
principal means of securing prestige were severely limited’ and therefore they relied 
more on lineage to prove their honour and nobility.298 The civil war provided an 
opportunity for writers such as Walsingham to recapture honour and gentility for the 
Catholic gentry. 
 
There are however, major differences between the role of each subject’s 
Catholicism within Walsingham’s work. Walsingham makes no overt references to 
either Smith’s or Gage’s Catholicism.299 On the subject of their religion Smith and Gage 
are referred to as a ‘gallant Christian knight’ and ‘a devout Christian’ respectively.300 
Impressions of their Catholicism could be gathered from the knowledge of their 
participation in the Army of Flanders’ campaign against the Protestant Dutch during the 
1620s and from the account of Gage’s dying speech where he requested that his children 
be sent to La Fleche in France, where there was a Jesuit college, ‘to hear some part of 
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their philosophy’ although Gage continued ‘and to learn those other necessary and 
becoming qualities of gentlemen’.301 There is no mention of Gage’s chaplain, the Jesuit 
Peter Wright, who attended Gage at his death. Smith and Gage’s Catholicism was not 
the main focus of Walsingham’s accounts of their lives and participation within the civil 
war. Instead, the emphasis was on portraying both as honourable gentlemen fighting for 
their king.  
 
Conversely, Walsingham’s account of Digby’s life placed its principal emphasis 
on his Catholicism. Recounting Digby’s capture by the Scots during the Bishop’s Wars, 
Walsingham claimed that when Digby was asked whether he was a papist and warned 
‘no quarter’ would be given if he was, Digby had fearlessly replied, ‘Sir I am a Roman 
Catholic and so am resolved to live and die’.302 This, the reader was told, was greeted 
with respect and civility. Further on in his account, Walsingham recounts the moment 
one of Digby’s men, under arrest by the parliamentarians, was asked to change sides but 
refused to do so, stating that he too was a Roman Catholic. Instead of being hung, he 
was commended for his ‘resolute answer’ and urged again to change sides, but he 
refused, stating he would not fight the king.303 Walsingham portrays Digby and his co-
religionist comrades as honourable and loyal Catholics who died ‘a noble death in 
defence of his sovereign’.304  
 
Why was Walsingham’s treatment of Digby different from his treatments of 
Smith and Gage? The absence of a date for Walsingham’s epitaph to Digby impedes any 
cast iron conclusions, but one can suggest that it was written after the execution of 
Charles I (‘our lawful and dread sovereign King Charles who in after ages may worthily 
be entitled Charles the gracious’).305 It seems reasonable to suggest that the tract, 
although never published, may have been a response to moves from factions within the 
English Catholic community to seek toleration from the new political regime in the early 
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1650s.306 Following the failed Three Propositions negotiations of 1647, petitions for 
toleration were made by prominent members of the English Catholic community to 
Parliament in 1651/2 and 1654. By the early 1650s Walsingham had joined the exiled 
court in France and, as secretary to Lord Jermyn, would have been connected to the 
Louvre group, centring around Henrietta Maria.307 It therefore would be of little surprise 
if Walsingham used his account of Digby’s life to speak out against those willing to 
negotiate with the new regime. Walsingham defiantly writes, in conclusion to Digby’s 
life: 
his unstained loyalty towards his king, whose cause he espoused and 
courageously maintained in so many bloody battles wherein he run eminent 
hazard of his life which at last he willingly sacrificed in defence of his sovereign 
King Charles and sealed the writ of his allegiance with his own blood, 
encouraging hereby all good Christians and loyal subjects to suffer the last 
extremities rather than swerve from their faith to God and duty to their king.308 
 
Walsingham was not alone in refuting negotiations with Cromwell and the 
Independents. Included in the Thomason Tracts is a printed list of members of the 
Catholic gentry who fought for the king and died during the civil war, along with those 
who had lost their estates as a result of being charged as delinquent recusants. The list, 
entitled A Catalogue of the Lords, Knights and Gentlemen (of the Catholick religion) 
that were slain in the late Warr, In Defence of their King and Countrey, is just as defiant 
as Digby’s epitaph, unapologetically portraying English Catholics as loyal to the king.309 
The catalogue is headed with a reference to psalm 111 and notes a passage taken from it, 
which forms part of the Daily Mass for the Dead.310 It gives the impression that the men 
he had named had taken the side of the just and the godly. The author bitterly denounces 
the act passed by the Rump on 16th July 1651 which deprived those who had been 
identified as Catholic royalists of their estates for their ‘pretended’ delinquency ‘that is, 
for adhering to their king’.311 The catalogue ends ‘Feci judicium and Justitiam non 
tradas me calumnicantibus me’; ‘I have done judgement and justice and leave me not to 
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my false accusers’, a statement which although not uncommon, is telling when placed in 
the context of contrasting accounts of the extent of Catholic royalism. 
 
It was not just such lists, however, that celebrated Catholic royalism. Individuals 
were also keen to do so. Catholic gentlemen who did not play a military role in the 
king’s forces during the war asserted their loyalty towards Charles I at this time. William 
Sheldon, a Catholic Warwickshire gentleman, who took no active military role in the 
fighting, requested that the following should be written on his monument after his death 
in 1649: ‘William Sheldon, esquire, …faithful to an unhappy king, loyal to the religion 
of his sires…deprived of [his estates] on account of his inviolable loyalty to the king, he 
never mourned for it, but with equanimity bore its loss during his life.’312 
 
Conversely, those Catholics who supported negotiation with the new political 
regime downplayed accounts of Catholic royalism during the civil war.313 For example, 
the Catholic writer John Austin, under the pseudonym William Birchley, refuted claims 
of Catholic royalism throughout his work, most notably in The Christian Moderator, in 
Two Parts. Or Persecution Condemned.314 The Christian Moderator argued for 
tolerance of the Catholic community on the basis that they had never been militarily 
involved in the royalist army and were found in the king’s garrisons only because they 
had fled there for refuge from the parliamentarians.315 Austin celebrated the Three 
Propositions and defended the Engagement to show that the English Catholic 
community could be loyal to the Commonwealth.  
 
Different memories of the existence and extent of Catholic royalism during the 
civil war were bound up, therefore, with competing visions of the community’s future. 
These ensued that the issue of loyalty remained contested inside and outside that 
community. After Charles II’s restoration in May 1660, Catholics unsurprisingly 
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emphasised their royalism during the civil war. Desperate to prove their loyalty to the 
house of Stuart, in the hope that the community might be rewarded with official 
toleration, English Catholics issued a spate of publications celebrating their wartime 
royalism. The suffering of English Catholics during the war were glossed in similar 
terms to Catholic martyrological literature. Further, lists were published of those who 
fought in the royalist armies, including those who had lost their estates as a result of 
their support for Charles I. Notable Catholic names appeared on many of the lists and 
one pamphlet, The Royal Martyrs, published in 1663, listed 150 royalist Catholics, 
alongside over 300 Protestants.316   
 
There were many similar publications. A pamphlet published in 1660 sought to 
refute claims that Roman Catholics were ‘generally reputed enemies’ of the king.317 The 
pamphlet was written as though part of a correspondence between two Protestant 
gentlemen. The writer expressed surprise at the claim, arguing: 
It is notoriously known to the whole nation, that the Catholics generally adhered 
to the late king, and defended the government established by law to their utmost 
power, for which many of them lost their lives, and the rest of their estates318 
The pamphlet stated that hardly any Catholics did not fight for the king or contribute 
financially to his cause, and that they were even noted as being part of Booth’s rising.319 
The pamphlet dismissed any notions of allegiance to, or relationship with, the 
Commonwealth and Protectorate parliaments. The Catholics, it was argued, ‘never 
concurred actively the setting up of any of the new governments that succeeded, but only 
carried themselves passively obedient to them’.320 Moreover, the English Catholics had 
not done anything that could have prejudiced the king’s interest during that time.321 The 
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pamphlet concluded that ‘forged calumnies’ towards English Catholics should be laid 
aside at the restoration of the Stuart monarchy.322 
 
Another anonymous pamphlet published in 1661 argued for religious toleration 
for Roman Catholicism. It reasoned that the Protestants of the country should look upon 
the Roman Catholic community ‘according to what they have experienced of them’.323 
The pamphlet continued:  
to wit, as their fellow soldiers in defence of their kings. I have heard of thirty 
chief officers, as colonels and their immediate officers, at one time bestowed in 
the deceased king’s service; and a challenge made in his presence for any man to 
name a Roman Catholic who had been false unto him. Look upon us, as whose 
fortunes and many of our lives have been employed in the endeavours to restore 
you to that flourishing estate in which you now reign. If his Majesty with your 
consents hath graciously pardoned so many offenders, whose swords and 
firelocks were bent to draw his own sacred blood, can you think it fitting his 
Majesty should allay the revengeful thirst of those very men, with the oppression 
and blood of those who are particularly hated for having maintained his 
Majesties right and your own professions.324 
English Catholics also sought to emphasise their loyalty to the Stuart crown to seek 
toleration after the Restoration. Catholic pamphlets played on the undeniable fact that it 
was Protestant (or rather Presbyterian) hands that were sullied with Charles I’s blood. It 
was the ‘liberty’ of Presbyterianism ‘or rather their restless ambition’ that caused the 
civil war.325 
 
Images of loyalty to the king during the civil war were also projected at times of 
heightened anti-Catholic rhetoric following events construed by Protestants as evidence 
of popish plots. Roger Palmer, the Earl of Castlemaine, motivated by anti-Catholic 
                                                
322 Ibid. p.21. 
323 Anon, Reasons why Roman-Catholicks Should not be Persecuted (London, 1661), p.7. 
324 Ibid. pp.7-8. 
325 Ibid. p.5. A different pamphlet from the one mentioned above; Caron, A Vindication of the Roman 
Catholics, p.9. 
 87 
feeling after the fire of London, published two tracts on Catholic royalism.326 The first 
was entitled the Humble Apology of the English Catholicks, in 1666 and the other A 
Reply to the Answer, published in 1668. In both Castlemaine’s works he argued that the 
Catholic community was still ‘embraced by the Protestant Cavaliers as true partisans’.327 
‘Remember’, he argued, ‘how synonymous …was the word papist and cavalier; for there 
was never a papist that was not deemed a cavalier’.328 Castlemaine argued that no ‘papist 
could ever be suspected for the least defection’ from the king.329 He asked the reader 
whether the Catholics were: 
not where the rest of the royal party were? Some of us were in London, some 
with the king, some about dispatches, some in the Tower, some sold to the 
Islands; and in fine, was there any plot but the Catholics were as numerous in 
proportionately as any other subjects? Was ever man so imprudent to deny 
this?330  
At the end of both of Castlemaine’s publications came a printed catalogue of names of 
Catholics who had ‘died and suffered for their loyalty or who had lost their estates due 
to sequestration’.331 It differs slightly from the list of names printed in Royal Martyrs, 
increasing the number of Catholics who had ‘suffered’. Two hundred and fifty-two 
names made up the list. One hundred and eighty-two were fatalities; sixty-nine had seen 
their estates sequestered and Major General Webb was listed also, who as a result of 
being wounded at Newbury ‘lives a dying life’.332 Emphasising Catholic sacrifice in the 
royalist cause was the surest way to convey Catholic loyalty to the new king. 
 
Contemporary Catholic accounts of loyalism to Charles I spurred on work from 
anti-Catholic writers, most notably William Lloyd, bishop of St Asaph, who wrote The 
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Late Apology In Behalf of the Papists Reprinted and Answered in behalf of the royalists 
in 1667, a reply to Castlemaine’s first publication.333 Although Lloyd conceded there 
were some papists who fought for the king, he argued ‘many more of you were hunted 
into his [the king’s] garrisons, by them that knew you would bring him little help and 
much hatred’.334 He alleged that those Catholics found in the royalist garrisons had been: 
‘necessitated to it for subsistence, and many more of you did not serve him at all, but 
only shrouded your selves under his protection.’335 It was their presence, Lloyd believed, 
that made the king ‘odious’ to his people.336 He accused Castlemaine and other 
apologists of ‘stealing martyrs’.337  
 
The anti-apologists also used material from Catholic tracts that had been 
published during the 1650s. Lloyd seized on previous work concerning the loyalism of 
the Catholic community, most notably Austin’s Christian Moderator. Anti-apologists 
were not, however, occupied only with arguments over neutralism. They also looked to 
acts of disloyalty after the death of Charles I. Lloyd hints at Catholic disloyalty in his 
The Late Apology, writing that the Roman Catholic community ‘compiled and flattered, 
and gave sugared words to the rebels then, as you do to the royalists now.’338 
You addressed your petition to the Supreme Authority of this nation, the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of England. You affirmed that you had 
generally taken, and punctually kept the Engagement. You promised, that if you 
might but enjoy your Religion you would be the most quiet and useful subjects in 
England. You proved it in these words. The Papists of England would be bound 
by their own interest (the strongest obligation against wise men) to live 
peaceably and thankfully in the private exercise of their consciences, and 
becoming gainers by such comparison, they could not so reasonably be 
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distrusted, as the Prelatick party be losers. You proved it more amply by real 
testimonies.339 
 
These accusations were repeated elsewhere. A pamphlet published in 1679, 
written by Sir Christopher Wyvill, entitled A Discourse, Prepared for the Ears of Some 
Romanists, stated that the Roman Catholic community should accept the severity of the 
penal laws enacted against them at this later date in penance for their past disloyalty.340 
Wyvill wrote: 
Tis confessed, some of you gave signal, and very brave assistances to our late 
sovereign Charles the First, in those unhappy wars, (upon what account, or 
motive, let it be decided at the last day;) but, that the whole body of Romanists, 
could have been content to have sat down under a very bramble, instead of the 
t[u]rn oak, was manifest from the addresses pretended to come from them all; 
wherein the Catholic gentleman … tells Oliver, They had generally taken, and 
punctually kept the Engagement.341 
These accusations of Catholic treachery and disloyalty resurfaced all through the 
Restoration and were particularly prominent throughout the Popish Plot crisis of 1679 
when they were used to argue that English Catholics should not be granted toleration. 
This inevitably motivated Catholic pamphleteers to publish work stating their innocence 
and reiterating the community’s allegiance to the monarchy. John Warner’s pamphlet A 
Vindication of the Inglish Catholicks sought to discharge the anti-Catholic feeling 
triggered by the Plot. Again the argument returned to the Catholics’ actions during the 
civil war, ‘the papists in those hardest times complied with their duty to their king and 
country, and Presbyterians failed in all’.342 Warner also criticised the terms set for the 
restoration of Charles II claiming that the Presbyterians: 
entertained no serious thought of restoring his Majesty, till they found the sword, 
which they had wrenched out of his hand, stolen out of their own by their 
younger brother rebel, the Independent, and felt the smart of it on their own 
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shoulders. And when they offered it to its rightful owner, it was on such 
conditions, as should lock it in the scabbard, and keep themselves the key.343 
It was the Presbyterians, Warner argued, who were guilty of treason and it was only due 
to the king’s ‘gracious pardon’ that they were still alive.344 
 
3.2. Eighteenth-Century representations 
Catholic writers in subsequent centuries also sought to reclaim the image of 
English Roman Catholic royalism. The most notable publications were issued in the 
early eighteenth century, no doubt in response to the experiences of the English Catholic 
community during the Oates Plot in 1678/9. The stories told within these publications 
strengthened Catholics’ belief in their loyalty to the Crown during the civil war and 
perhaps more importantly were part of ongoing campaigns for official toleration for 
English Catholics. Reverend John Knaresborough, a chaplain at Burton Constable, 
compiled five volumes of his ‘The Sufferings of the Catholics’, between 1705 and 1720, 
a time when there was a revival of interest in Charles I and the civil wars, especially 
from Tory ministers. Knaresborough assembled material of those Catholic men in the 
royalist army who had been killed during the civil war. He also amassed a 
comprehensive list of the Catholic gentlemen who had had their estates sequestered 
during the 1650s and in which counties they lived.345 A bound volume in the Hull 
University Archives contains the letters sent to Knaresborough from fellow Catholic 
gentlemen informing him of information that they thought he should include. Mr 
Roydon wrote to Knaresborough in November 1706 to outline his hopes for 
Knaresborough’s work:  
I hope you will include in your historical collections those, who have suffered for 
their loyalty, or died in the field for the late King Charles the first, and his 
children … and answer all reproaches of popish treason with experimental 
convictions of unchangeable fidelity. 
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Letters were also sent telling stories of the executions of priests and a Mr Elston sent the 
chaplain a selection of Catholic loyalist pamphlets outlining the royalism and loyalism 
of the Catholic community during the war.346  
 
Knaresborough also received letters from men who wanted the experiences of 
their ancestors to be included. John Yaxley wrote in November 1722 to describe how his 
family’s estates had been plundered and sequestered for recusancy by the 
Parliamentarians. He also recounted his grandfather’s role as Captain of Horse in 
Charles I’s army and how his uncle had been slain at the siege of Basing House because 
he was both a royalist and a Catholic. Yaxley’s father had been in the king’s garrison in 
Oxford when it was besieged by the Parliamentarians but had made a daring escape to 
avoid capture.347 Knaresborough’s correspondence strongly conveys the importance to 
their descendants of Catholic royalism and the sufferings of Catholic gentlemen during 
the war and interregnum.348 This can be of little surprise when one considers the position 
of the English Catholic community after the Glorious Revolution. Penal laws against 
Roman Catholics were reinstated and an additional bill in 1692 meant that, when the 
country was at war, Catholics were liable to a double tax on their land.349 In response to 
rumoured Jacobite activity Lord Stourton and Lord Brudenell were imprisoned ‘without 
judicial process’ and following the Assassination Plot in 1696, Sir Philip Constable 
along with two other gentlemen were also locked up.350 In 1700 an act drawn up to 
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prevent the growth of popery and in 1706 Anglican clergymen were instructed to make 
lists of Catholics in their parishes.351 After the 1715 Jacobite rebellion the English 
Catholics suffered even more.352 It has been argued that the English Catholic community 
had not given up on the idea of the Stuarts reclaiming the throne. It is little wonder that 
the community looked back in ‘veneration’ of the earlier sufferings of their ancestors.353 
The fact that Knaresborough’s work forms a part of the Constable-Maxwell family 
papers speaks volumes. Both were well-known Catholic families who had served 
Charles I during the English civil war. 
 
Knaresborough was not alone in compiling collections of English Catholic 
history. Richard Challoner, a Catholic priest, published two volumes in 1741 and 1742 
of memoirs of missionary priests who had been executed in England from 1577 to 1684. 
Challoner’s second volume concentrated on the stories of those priests killed as a result 
of the conflict between the king and Parliament in the 1640s. Challoner portrayed the 
priests as loyal to the king and thus suffering unjustly at the hands of the Protestant 
rebels.354 Challoner included a list of those who had died and wrote four and half pages 
on the sequestration of Catholic estates during the 1650s.  
 
The motives for Challoner’s publication are debated. It has been suggested that it 
was a response to ‘steadily shrinking’ Catholic congregations.355 Memoirs of Missionary 
Priests was written following his first visitation as vicar apostolic. His seven-week tour 
took him to visit twenty congregations and confirm over eight hundred people yet, it is 
argued, Challoner’s ‘task must have been disheartening’ as he came to face with the fact 
that Catholicism in towns had ‘practically ceased’.356 The two volumes were therefore 
written to offer English Catholics ‘support of the memory of their predecessors’.357 
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Recent analyses have questioned these assumptions. Eammon Duffy has argued that 
Memoirs of Missionary Priests was written to ‘consolidate’ English Catholicism and 
recusant tradition at a time of stability, ‘to take stock, to explain itself to itself’.358 
Further, it has been seen as a way to restore English Catholicism’s ‘national inheritance’ 
and carve out a ‘distinctive’ English Catholic tradition.359 Yet, as has been shown, a 
distinctive English Catholic recusant tradition had already been formed which 
continually emphasised its national importance.  
 
The preface of each volume explored the issue of toleration for the English 
Catholic community. The first preface discusses the violence inflicted on Catholic 
priests throughout Elizabeth I’s reign, but Challoner was keen to state that his work 
would only include those who had died ‘for no other crime but their conscience’ and that 
he did not see his role as author as ‘the apologist, but only the historian’.360 The second 
preface, however, was preoccupied with overt campaigning for official toleration. The 
moderate ways of the ‘present government’ were, Challoner rather whiggishly 
considered, ‘far more agreeable both to reason and religion, more honourable to the 
nation, and more suitable to that claim of liberty and property’ that every Englishman 
regarded as his birthright.361 Challoner challenged the idea that Roman Catholicism was 
inconsistent with civil allegiance, arguing that their principles had been 
‘misrepresented’.362 He hoped that his work would vindicate the moderate attitude of the 
government from ‘the unjust censures of some fiery zealots’ who wished to persecute 
Challoner’s religion. Challoner closed by anticipating a change in legislation towards 
English Roman Catholics and hoping that the government would  
take these matters into consideration, [and] will find many other weighty reasons 
which will demonstrate that a toleration of the private exercises of the Roman 
Catholic religion, will be more agreeable to the common good and tranquillity of 
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the nation, and more advantageous to our trade, then penal laws and 
persecution.363  
What better way to support this hope than to include the tales of the loyalty shown by 
both priests and laymen to the king during a puritan rebellion? The issue of English 
Catholic loyalty and official toleration for the community was the embodiment of the 
English recusant tradition. In other words, Catholic remembrance of civil war royalism 
was shaped by contemporary selective memory.364  
 
Another priest, Charles Dodd, also compiled volumes on the history of the 
English Catholic Church.365 Dodd was eager to demonstrate English Catholic suffering 
at the hands of the parliamentarians because of their loyalty to Charles I. The cost of the 
publication of Dodd’s volumes was largely paid by several prominent Catholic 
gentlemen, Edward, Duke of Norfolk, Sir Robert Throckmorton and Cuthbert Constable, 
all men whose ancestors had been active for the king, or who had suffered on account of 
their religion during the Interregnum.366 
 
3.3. Modern Interpretations 
It is in the light of these seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Catholic 
histories that we should see more modern discussions of Catholic participation and 
loyalty. Historians became increasingly disillusioned with the Whiggish historiography 
of the civil war as a victory for parliamentarian, Protestant modernity and progress over 
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feudal cavalier conservatism.367 Just as did contemporaries, modern historians have 
questioned the identification of English Roman Catholicism with royalism. The 
continuing debate behind these conflicting ideas went beyond the rationalization of the 
consequence of the opposing Revisionist historians, who came to the fore during the 
1970s, who looked again at the allegiances of those fighting in the civil war. Historians 
turned their attentions to the localities to trace individual religious and political 
preferences and located the motivations behind choices of allegiance. This local study 
model casts doubt on the degree to which Catholicism and royalism were inevitable 
bedfellows.  
 
Revisionist historians argued that most men during the English civil war were 
neutral in their allegiances and English Catholic gentlemen particularly so. Keith 
Lindley researched English Catholics and their choice of allegiance in the counties of 
Buckinghamshire, Hampshire, Lancashire, London, Monmouthshire, Northamptonshire, 
Somersetshire, Suffolk and Yorkshire.368 Lindley believed that Catholic militancy during 
the civil war should be understood in terms of the proportion of Catholic participation in 
relation to the size of the English Roman Catholic community in the seventeenth 
century. In London Lindley claimed five per cent of royalists were Catholics, which only 
accounted for twenty-five per cent of the total number of Catholics living there.369 In 
Lancashire twenty-six percent of royalists were Catholics, which was under seventeen 
per cent of the Lancashire Catholic community.370 Eight per cent of royalists were 
Catholics in Northamptonshire, which represented a quarter of the Catholic community 
there. In Suffolk and Buckinghamshire, Catholic militancy during the civil war was 
fleeting or almost non-existent. Only three Catholics from Suffolk joined the king’s 
army and only one Catholic gentleman was a royalist in Buckinghamshire.371 Four per 
cent of royalists in Somerset were Catholics and in Hampshire thirteen per cent of 
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royalists were Catholics.372 Apart from Monmouthshire and Yorkshire, where more than 
a quarter of the Catholic communities were royalist, Lindley concluded that the majority 
of English Catholics residing in the counties he studied had remained neutral during the 
civil war, fighting neither for the king nor for Parliament.373  
 
Lindley believed that English Catholics mostly remained neutral because they 
were ‘not seeking to subvert the government’ in order to promote Catholicism and were 
mostly ‘a loyal group’ towards Parliament.374 Lindley also argued that there was little 
incentive for the English Catholics to support the king. The financial penalties levied on 
the Catholics for their recusancy coupled with Charles’s innovative ways to generate 
revenue throughout his Personal Rule, (Ship Money, Knighthood fines and forestry 
laws) had taken their toll. The English Catholics, Lindley asserted, had begun to feel 
‘increasingly alienated’ from their sovereign and his government at the eve of the civil 
war.375 Neutralism, Lindley believed, was seen by many Catholics as the safest route to 
negotiate their way through the conflict, supporting neither a king who had persecuted 
them nor the radical Parliamentarians whose hostility towards them resulted in violent 
anti-Catholic riots.376 
 
These arguments were restated by the Marxist historian Brian Manning. He 
argued that most English Catholics were neutral because they were disaffected towards 
the monarchy and wanted to ‘avert the wrath’ of anti-Catholic parliamentarian mobs.377 
Catholic royalists did not support the king because they were Catholic, but because they 
sympathised with his situation. The Catholic nobility and gentry in particular understood 
the king’s position because they were worried about the implications of Parliamentarian 
politics for social order. They were royalists because they were constitutionalists, not 
because they were Catholic. Lower class Catholics, in turn, mostly managed to stay out 
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of the conflict, unless they were forced to join the royalist army at the behest of their 
Catholic royalist landlords.378 
 
These arguments have been criticised by other historians. Peter Newman refuted 
claims of Catholic majority neutrality by questioning the focus and methodology of 
Lindley’s work. Newman argued that Catholic royalism should not be understood in 
terms of the proportion of militancy to the size of the community. Instead he believed 
that Catholic royalism should be understood by ascertaining the influence Catholic 
activists had on the course of the war.379 If the numbers of Catholic royalists were 
‘sufficient enough to excite the animosity of the parliamentarian forces’ and, in turn, 
force neutral Catholics to seek shelter in the king’s garrisons, this would indicate a 
significant influential impact of Catholic royalism, out of proportion to the size of the 
English Catholic community at the beginning of the conflict.380  
 
Newman also criticised Lindley for the sources he used, particularly his reliance 
on the Committee for Compounding papers which, Newman argued, opened his analysis 
to ‘significant weaknesses’.381 Newman argued that some senior Catholic officers made 
no attempt to compound for either their recusancy or delinquency.382 This can be seen in 
the detail of several cases listed within the Committee’s records. Walter Fowler, a 
gentleman from Stafford, had his estates sequestered for recusancy in 1649 but was later 
summoned to appear before the Committee because witnesses accused him of 
delinquency, having taken up arms for the king.383 The witnesses accused Fowler of 
abusing and cruelly treating parliamentary supporters. Fowler made no effort to defend 
himself from their allegations and was sequestered as a delinquent recusant.384 It is 
difficult to ascertain whether Fowler was a papist in arms or his witnesses were settling a 
personal score. Similarly Richard Ashton from Lancaster had his estates sequestered for 
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recusancy but stated that he had never acted against Parliament, but had stayed at home 
during the civil wars.385 The Committee initially believed him and discharged his estate 
but later renewed sequestration after they were informed that he had been a papist 
delinquent in the king’s army.386  
 
Newman’s other criticism of Lindley’s use of the Committee’s records was that 
many men, both Catholic and Protestant, failed to qualify for the set property 
requirements for compounding. Many Catholic squires, gentlemen and yeomen were not 
officially recognised as recusants or delinquents.387 Nor was information regarding 
individual cases of delinquency and recusancy particularly detailed about levels of 
individual involvement. Ambiguous terminology was used such as ‘adhered’, ‘assisted’ 
and ‘espoused’.388 Newman was also suspicious of the opportunities available to the 
Committee for corruption because of its operation on a local level. Surely, he argued, 
cases before the Committee would be judged in light of local rivalries, kinship links and 
familial connections?389  
 
Terence Smith, in his study of Staffordshire Catholics during the civil war, 
confirmed Newman’s criticisms by looking at the case of Walter, second Lord Aston.390 
Aston was a Catholic royalist throughout the civil war (a letter from the king in 1646 
illustrated as much) and his estate had already been sequestered under earlier laws 
enforced against recusants, but he was not heavily penalised. He had been further 
sequestered following his surrender at Lichfield in July 1646.391 Only two years later, 
Aston was discharged from sequestration having paid no fine nor compounded for his 
delinquency. Little evidence exists to explain why Aston was let off so lightly but he had 
friends and relatives on the parliamentarian side.392 Subsequently Ann Hughes has 
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argued that many men who came before the Committee for Compounding were charged 
only with recusancy rather than both delinquency and recusancy because the former was 
easier to prove.393 There were also many cases that remained incomplete or unfinished.  
 
Newman’s research utilised a wide range of sources to investigate Catholic 
royalism in the northern counties. Although Newman’s work focused mainly on the 
royalist Earl of Newcastle’s army and Yorkshire, Durham, Northumberland, 
Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire, the Earl of Newcastle was also responsible 
for the royalist effort in Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Norfolk, Suffolk 
and Essex.394 Newman’s research is based on the militancy of the Catholic elite, who 
were given positions within the royalist army reflecting their social status. 125 heads of 
northern England gentry families held field command posts, forty of whom (amounting 
to thirty-three per cent) Newman identified as ‘overtly and covertly’ Catholics.395 Of the 
815 officers in the northern royalist army whose religion could be clearly identified, 
Newman found that 282 men, just under thirty-five per cent, were Catholics or Catholic 
recusants.396 133 royalist officers held the rank of colonel in the northern army and 
Newman could identify the religion of 117 of them. 102 colonels were from the north of 
England, thirty-nine of them Catholic.397 Durham and Lancashire provided more than 
half of Catholic colonels, more than the combined figures of Yorkshire, Northumberland 
and Cumbria. Of the 94 men of the rank of lieutenant colonel in the royalist army, 
Newman identified the religion of 73. Of the 59 originating in the northern counties, 
thirty-one were Catholics. As with colonels, the majority of Catholic lieutenant colonels 
came from Durham and Lancashire. In contrast Newman identified thirty-seven 
Protestant lieutenant colonels and five men whose religion was unknown.398 98 majors 
were known to be in the royalist army but Newman could only identify sixty-seven men, 
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only one of whom could not be religiously identified. Twenty-two majors were Roman 
Catholic.399  
 
Although Newman’s research demonstrates that there were many Roman 
Catholic officers in the royalist northern army, he pointed out that not all northern 
regiments eagerly commissioned Roman Catholics in their ranks. The Earl of 
Cumberland, for example, made a conscious decision to avoid commissioning any 
Catholic officers at all.400 Newman argued that the majority of Catholic gentlemen who 
wanted to fight for the king looked for a commission in regiments that were commanded 
by co-religionists. This was unsurprising considering the hostility felt towards them by 
Protestants. In 1640 two officers, William Mohun and Crompton Evers, were murdered 
by fellow soldiers because they were papists.401 The Yorkshire regiments of Sir Walter 
Vavasour and Sir Robert Clavering had many Catholic officers, as did Sir William 
Lambton and Viscount Molyneux in their Durham and Lancashire regiments 
respectively.402 Newman argued, however, that the northern royalist army’s ability to 
work with both Roman Catholic and Protestant officers ‘contributed a great deal’ to its 
strength and to the earl of Newcastle’s ability to lead with relative success.403  
 
Aside from whether the Catholic gentry were greater or lesser in number than 
their Protestant counterparts in the king’s army, Newman believed that the Roman 
Catholic royalists were at least as committed to the king’s cause: their motivation was an 
overwhelming ‘attachment’ to tradition and the monarchy.404 This can be seen from the 
heads of a petition written in 1646 by the English Catholic community to be presented to 
the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The English Catholics were petitioning 
for toleration, to be treated ‘like Christians, fellow subjects’, and argued that they had 
only sided with the king ‘in point of judgement and knowing duty and allegiance’.405 
They believed that the king’s powers had come ‘immediately from God, and must be 
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obeyed for consciences sake’.406 The petition also seems a plea to Parliament that the 
English Catholic community should only be sequestered for their delinquency rather 
than their recusancy, for they hoped that they were ‘neither less trusted nor more 
punished for professing what they are’.407 The petition was never presented. 
 
Newman’s work is supported by Hugh Aveling’s study of northern Catholics, 
which concluded that the majority of strongly recusant gentry there supported the 
king.408 Approximately 110 northern Catholics were thought to be ‘affected’ by 
Catholicism in 1642. Forty-five of these men were identified as having been delinquents 
in the king’s army during the civil war. Added to this, Aveling believed that a further 
three of four families had experience of fighting for the king during the civil war but 
escaped detection and therefore had not been sequestered.409 
 
The debate surrounding the extent, the importance and reasons behind Roman 
Catholic military involvement stimulated further research into the allegiances and 
religious motivations of men fighting in the civil war. Historians continued to use local 
studies to do this. Martyn Bennett’s thesis studied the royalist war effort in the North 
Midlands, examining the structure of the royalist army in Derbyshire, Leicestershire, 
Nottinghamshire, Rutland and Staffordshire.410 No Roman Catholics held royalist 
administrative posts in these counties at the beginning of the war, although this is 
perhaps unsurprising considering the deep antagonism felt towards ‘popery’ during this 
period.411 Bennett found Roman Catholic officers in these counties; but argued that 
allowing them to join the royalist army was a way to secure their financial support for 
the king’s cause. Fewer Roman Catholic officers were commissioned in the North 
Midlands royalist regiments than in the royalist northern army examined by Newman. 
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Bennett discovered 73 field officers in the North Midland royalist division. Only forty-
two could be religiously identified, eleven of whom were Roman Catholics (over 
twenty-six per cent).412 Bennett could only trace four of these eleven Catholic families, 
however, and so could conclude little concerning the commitment of Catholic families in 
the North Midlands.  
 
Of the 59 regimental officers found in the North Midlands division, thirty-four 
per cent (twenty) were Roman Catholics.413 The highest number of Roman Catholic 
officers found in the North Midlands royalist army were to be found in the Catholic 
Thomas Leveson’s regiments in Staffordshire. Almost all of the officers serving in these 
horse regiments were Roman Catholic. There were two explanations for this: not only 
would Catholics naturally want to serve a Catholic commanding officer, but South 
Staffordshire, in particular, was well known for its thriving Roman Catholic community. 
A recent study of Staffordshire’s Roman Catholics has shown that many of the Catholic 
gentry in the county garrisoned their homes for the king: dowager Lady Stafford, 
Stafford Castle; Sir Robert Fleetwood, Wootton Lodge; Peter Gifford, Chillington; 
Walter Astley, Patshull House; and Philip Draycott, Paynsley.414 Many officers were 
also raised in Derbyshire, joining the regiments of Rowland Eyre or Sir John 
Fitzherbert.415 Although it seems that only Staffordshire and Lancashire regiments had 
high intakes of Roman Catholic officers, Bennett argued that the proportion of Catholic 
royalist activists in the North Midlands were ‘greater than that of Catholics indigenous 
in the counties’.416 Thus Bennett concluded that his research supported Newman’s study.  
 
In contrast, research undertaken into the county of Warwickshire during the civil 
war identified few actively militant Roman Catholic royalists.417 Eighteen Catholic 
families were identified in Ann Hughes’s study of the county and although eleven of 
these families attended the Commission of Array, only eight were later charged with 
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delinquency.418 John Morrill’s study of Cheshire argued that the Roman Catholic 
community were ‘remarkably inactive’ with only the prominent Savage family joining 
the king’s forces.419 Philip Jenkins’ research on the South Wales border, however, found 
that the Roman Catholic community here were far from neutral and he described the 
Catholic Tuberville family, who lived in Glamorgan, ‘as royalist as romantic legend’.420 
Even in Essex there were Roman Catholic gentry families who fought for the king. 
Although the majority of prominent Essex Catholic families (such as the Petres, the 
Waldegraves and the Greens) remained neutral during the war, there were exceptions. 
Lord Morley served as a Colonel of Horse in the king’s army, Robert Danvers fought 
some of the war as a royalist and so did Richard Jennings, the eldest son of the Jennings 
family from Dunmow.421 In Norfolk it is argued that although the Catholics residing in 
the county suffered from the pecuniary measures against Catholics during the Caroline 
period, the majority of them supported the king’s cause.422 Significant members of the 
Catholic gentry in Nottinghamshire also fought for the king.423 
 
J.T. Cliffe’s work concentrated on the Yorkshire gentry from the Reformation to 
the civil war. He was able to identify a number of gentry who joined the king’s army, 
but argued that many Yorkshire Catholics did not commit themselves.424 Of the 242 
royalist families living in the county in 1642, 86 (one third) were Catholic or had 
Catholic sympathies.425 Amongst them were the leading Yorkshire Catholic gentry, 
including Sir Philip Constable, Sir Walter Vavasour and Sir Philip Hungate. Although 
there was unrest and criticism of the king amongst the Catholic Yorkshire gentry during 
Charles I’s Personal Rule, by the time Charles entered the Bishops War in 1639 they had 
                                                
418 A. Hughes, Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire, p.167. Also see P. Tennant, The Civil War 
in Stratford-upon-Avon, p.5. 
419 J. Morrill, Cheshire, p.71. 
420 P. Jenkins, The Making of the Ruling Class. The Glamorgan Gentry 1640-1790 (Cambridge, 1983), 
p.104. 
421 A. Tompkins, ‘Gentry and Aristocratic Allegiances in Essex at the beginning of the English Civil War’, 
(Unpublished MA Thesis, University of London, 2006), pp.46-7. 
422 For example John Paston was found in the king’s garrison and Clement Paston was arrested for being 
‘dangerous among Papists’. Henry Bedingfield and his three sons fought for the king and after the war 
Bedingfield was excluded from pardon by Parliament, imprisoned for treason for two years and had his 
estates sold by the Rump (R.W. Ketton-Gemer, Norfolk in the Civil War, pp. 49, 50, 304-305). 
423 A. Wood, Nottinghamshire in the Civil War. 
424 J.T. Cliffe, The Yorkshire Gentry. From the Reformation to the Civil War (London, 1969). 
425 Ibid. pp.344, 345. 
 104 
rallied behind the Crown.426 Sir Walter Vavasour and Lord Dunbar supervised the 
collection of money from the Catholic community to fund the king’s actions against the 
Scots.427 Cliffe also showed that the high proportion of Catholic Yorkshire gentry had 
remained neutral throughout the conflict. He argued that they had scant links with the 
court and, as a consequence of the Long Parliament’s extreme anti-popery, many 
families were forced into neutralism through fear.428 Cliffe also identified nine Catholic 
families divided in their allegiances or who had changed sides during the civil war, thus 
casting further doubt of the extent of their loyalty to the Stuart cause.429 
 
There is evidence of only two priests fighting personally for the royalist army. 
The first was Robert Pugh, who was dismissed from the order of the Society of Jesuits in 
1645 because he joined the royalist army without permission from his superiors 
(although he would later become an LL.D).430 The second was Henry Starkey who had 
been ordained but dismissed from the English College in Lisbon before apologising and 
being re-admitted. His leg had been shot off by a cannonball whilst he had been fighting 
for the king and he was not allowed back into the English College at Douai because of 
his disability, but he became a Benedictine in 1649.431  
 
There are two other cases of note. William Poulton was at the English College in 
Seville in 1636 but left and became a royalist officer in the civil war. He returned to St 
Omers in 1645 and remained there until 1650. Two years later he went to study at the 
English College in Rome and became a priest. Poulton returned to England to become 
chaplain to Lady Mary Somerset in London.432 John Salkeld was known to have been a 
Catholic priest by 1606 but had conformed in England by 1612. He was vicar of 
Wellington in Somerset in 1613 and rector of Churchstanton, Exeter in 1634. He was 
deprived as a royalist in 1646.433  
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Scant evidence survives to prove unequivocally contemporaries’ accusations that 
many priests acted as chaplains in the royalist army. References to priests are common 
but only three seem to be named, John Huddleston, who helped to shelter Charles II after 
the defeat at Worcester; Peter Wright, who administered the last rites to Colonel John 
Digby; and Robert Pitts, who was present at the siege of Wardour.434 Hugh Aveling’s 
study of York states that the marquis of Newcastle’s regiment contained at least two 
Benedictines who served as army chaplains. Six priests were reported to be have been 
killed during the storming of Basing House.435 These priests could have been domestic 
chaplains or priests who had taken refuge there. Considering the importance of the last 
rites, it seems probable that high-ranking Catholic officers had priests in their regiments 
to tend to their and their soldiers’ consciences. But many priests in the country 
throughout the conflict seem to have turned their attentions to their pastoral duties rather 
than attempting direct intervention.436 
 
A group of royalist soldiers, or men whose families had been attached to the 
royalist army did, however, enter the English College at Rome after the civil war. 
Anthony Pole entered the college in 1645 after his father, a royalist, was killed in the 
war.437 Francis Reade and William Morgan entered the college in 1647, both having 
served in the king’s army. Reade had been a captain for four years and Morgan had been 
captured at Naseby. He was given permission six years later to cross to Flanders to 
become a sergeant in the English regiment fighting for the king of Spain.438 Charles 
Cosin, the son of the famous Essex rector, later Bishop of Durham, John Cosin, joined 
the college in 1652. His father had been a chaplain to the king during the war and both 
father and son escaped into exile in France with Charles II.439 In 1653, Robert Doleman, 
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the son of a Yorkshire Catholic knight, and Thomas Warren, son of a royalist colonel 
entered the college. William Carlos entered the college in 1655. His father had been the 
governor of the Castle of Tong at the outbreak of the civil war but was then banished to 
Germany, William had joined him there. Both father and son travelled to Worcester with 
Charles II’s Scottish army in 1651.440  
 
Local studies show that Roman Catholic participation in the royalist army 
differed geographically. There were high levels of Catholic involvement in areas with 
large and coherent Catholic communities. These areas were often furthest away from the 
attention of central government, for example northern England, Monmouthshire and 
Wales. It can also be easily understood why Catholics in largely parliamentarian areas 
stayed neutral or did not actively fight for the king’s cause. These studies are, however, 
limited in what they tell us about the connection between royalism and the English 
Catholic community or the nature of Catholic loyalty to the Stuart crown. To begin with 
there are methodological problems when comparing data. There has been no agreement 
amongst historians on who exactly should be defined as a Roman Catholic now, or who 
were defined as Roman Catholics by contemporaries then. This distinction is important. 
Religious identification has always been a thorny issue, never more so than for 
historians researching Jacobean and Caroline Roman Catholics. As Newman argued 
parliamentarian propaganda went to great lengths to publish lists of all popish officers 
within the royalist army and Laudians and high-church Anglicans were sometimes 
included as papists.441 The terminology used by both historians and contemporaries also 
causes problems. The word ‘recusant’ actually referred to those who did not attend 
church, rather than just referring to Roman Catholics, a distinction that is not always 
acknowledged. The use of the term ‘church-papist’ has caused much debate amongst 
historians too, but will not be entered into here as it has been adequately discussed 
elsewhere.442  
 
                                                
440 Ibid. pp.544, 551. 
441 Newman, ‘The royalist Army in Northern England’, I, p.10. 
442 Lake and Questier (eds.), Conformity and orthodoxy, p.xiv. 
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A truly accurate measure of the community’s size will therefore always elude the 
historian. Conclusions can be drawn from county studies, particularly that levels of 
Catholic support for the royalist cause varied regionally. But this does not help us fully 
to understand English Catholic loyalty towards the Stuart crown. Uncovering the 
behaviour of the English Catholic community at this time is, however, a necessary 
prelude to exploring the dialogue held between the English Catholics and the State, how 
this altered to accommodate the change from monarchy to republic, and how the English 
Catholics prepared for the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660. To do that, it is 
necessary to look at particular English Roman Catholics, the level of their participation 
in the civil war and their actions during the Interregnum. 
 
3.4. Catholic case studies. 
One way to illustrate the complexities of English Catholic identity and 
experience throughout the civil war and Interregnum is to look at case studies of 
particular members of the Catholic gentry. It is not my intention to retell the stories of 
well-known Catholic royalists such as William Blundell or court Catholics such as John 
Wintour. Instead, I examine leading gentry who were considered significant figures in 
the community during the late 1630s and 1640s and their participation in the conflict. I 
have taken names of those who involved themselves in community politics from the 
‘Protestatio Declaratoria’ of October 1631.443 This was a petition signed by those 
opposing the leadership of Richard Smith, bishop of Chalcedon, during the approbation 
crisis of the early 1630s. Three of these Catholic gentlemen were known to be active 
royalists throughout the civil war; James Touchet, earl of Castlehaven, Henry Somerset, 
earl of Worcester, and Edward Somerset, Lord Herbert. Of those who approved of the 
‘Protestatio Declaratoria’ against Smith, but did not sign it, only one man, Henry Parker, 
baron Morley and Monteagle, was an active royalist. The three gentlemen named in the 
                                                
443 See Questier, Catholicism and Community, p.475-476; P.R. Newman, Royalist Officers in England and 
Wales 1642-1660. A biographical dictionary (New York, 1981), pp.352, 350-351; S. Kelsey, ‘James 
Touchet, third earl of Castlehaven (bap. 1612, d 1684)’, ODNB. Of those signing the ‘Protestatio 
Declaratoria’ three had died: Sir Henry Neville, Baron Abergavenny, Thomas Darcy, Earl Rivers, and 
Lord William Howard of Naworth). Neville’s heir, Sir John, Lord Abergavenny, was not militantly active 
during the civil war, but Thomas Darcy’s grandson John Savage, second Earl Rivers was a colonel of 
horse and foot in the king’s army and Lord Howard’s sons, Francis and Thomas, and brother Philip were 
in the royalist army too (see Newman, Royalist Officers, pp.331, 199, 200, 201). 
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‘Protestatio Declaratoria’ who supported Bishop Smith - Sir Henry Constable, Viscount 
Dunbar, John Paulet, marquis of Winchester and Sir Thomas Arundell, Baron Arundell 
were militant royalists.444 As this suggests, the leading figures of the community had 
very different experiences of the conflict. 
 
We can start by examining those members of the leading Catholic gentry who 
were excluded from pardon in 1648. Thomas, Lord Brudenell, John Paulet, marquis of 
Winchester, Edward, earl of Somerset and Henry, Lord Arundell of Wardour, were all 
condemned on the grounds that they were ‘Papists and Popish recusants, voluntarily in 
arms against Parliament’, although there is no evidence that Brudenell was ever in arms 
for the king.445 
 
Brudenell, a convicted recusant, was the cousin of Sir Basil Brooke and was a 
pro-Spanish member of the English Catholic community. He had been involved in the 
dynastic match negotiations with Spain in 1623 and bought his baronetcy in 1628 with 
the help of the duke of Buckingham.446 At the outbreak of the conflict Brudenell pledged 
his support for Charles I, and although he had already been disarmed and was not young 
enough to fight, sent money to Flanders to raise troops and buy equipment for the king. 
At the Restoration Brudenell claimed he had spent £17,000 on the royalist army.447 He 
claimed to have funded a troop of horse under the command of his brother, John.448 His 
son was also thought to have fought for the king and had been captured by 
Parliamentarian troops at the Battle of Naseby. Brudenell had his estates sequestered for 
delinquency and recusancy. He petitioned the House of Lords for protection against 
further prosecution. He, his wife and his twelve sons were granted a pass to travel to 
                                                
444 Newman, Royalist Officers, pp. 288, 6; J. Binns, ‘Henry Constable, first Viscount Dunbar (1588-1645), 
ODNB. Thomas Lord Arundel died at Stratton in 1643 (Newman, Royalist Officers, p.6) and Henry 
Constable died at the siege of Scarborough Castle in 1645. Constable had been condemned by the House 
of Commons in 1642 for being a dangerous papist for having supplied the king with arms to fight the 
Scots. He had become a colonel in the earl of Newcastle’s army in 1644. All three of Constable’s sons 
were royalists (Binns, ‘Henry Constable’). 
445 CSP Dom, 1648-9, p.304.  
446 J. Wake, The Brudenells of Deane (London, 1954), pp.103-4. 
447 Ibid. p.126. 
448 Ibid. p.130. 
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France.449 Parliament soon heard of Brudenell’s plans and sent a troop of 300 horse to 
arrest him in March 1643. He escaped capture but the parliamentarians plundered his 
house. The parliamentarians arrested him two years later after they found him in one of 
the king’s garrisons in Herefordshire. Brudenell was convicted of treason in January 
1646 and was imprisoned in the Tower of London for ‘levying war against 
Parliament’.450 He was released four years later and spent most of the Interregnum trying 
to free his estates from sequestration. He petitioned Parliament stating that he was 
innocent of ‘least injury to the Parliament … and never furnished the late king’s party 
either with horse, plate money or ammunition to the value of sixpence’.451 He 
successfully released his estates from penalties for delinquency in 1651 after an in-depth 
examination by the commissioners for compounding at Goldsmith’s Hall. Yet Brudenell 
refused to take the Oath of Abjuration and his estates remained sequestered for his 
delinquency.452 Throughout the Interregnum Brudenell continually agitated the Rump 
and the Protectorate for toleration for the English Catholic community.453 
 
John Paulet, the fifth marquis of Winchester, had been a leading member of the 
English Catholic community during the personal rule and was a favourite at the court of 
Charles I.454 At the beginning of the conflict between the king and Parliament, however, 
Paulet tried to remain neutral, keeping to himself in his residence of Basing House in 
Hampshire. By the summer of 1643 it came to the attention of the parliamentarians that 
royalist soldiers had been staying there and so it was proposed to attack and disarm 
Paulet’s residence. News of these plans soon reached the marquis who petitioned 
Charles for troops to defend his estate. A royalist foot regiment was duly sent and 
Basing House became a large royalist garrison. It was besieged twice, first 
unsuccessfully in June 1643, and then in August 1645. Paulet refused to surrender, and 
                                                
449 Ibid. p.131. 
450 CCC, II, p.1079. 
451 Brudenell Mss I.xii.9; I.xii.12a; HMC Portland, I, p.655. 
452 CCC, II, p.1079-1081; Wake, Brudenells of Deane, p.153. It was not until after the Restoration that 
Brudenell was discharged from his status of popish recusant although evidently he still was one! 
453 After the failure of the Three Propositions, Brudenell petitioned Parliament in 1652 and 1654 and was 
asked to intervene again on behalf of the Catholics in 1658 although there is no record of him actually 
doing so. This will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter. 
454 R. Hutton, ‘John Paulet (1598-1675)’, ODNB. 
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he and his troops withstood the siege for two months, but the house was finally stormed 
in October.455 The garrison was massacred. The fall of Basing House was noted by the 
Venetian ambassador who lamented that the parliamentarians had ‘made an important 
capture’.456 Paulet, ‘one of the leading Catholics of his country’ along with his wife, 
children and ‘a good number of religious and other Catholics’ were imprisoned in 
London ‘as well as a notable booty of wealth of all the country round, stored there’. 
After Paulet’s capture and imprisonment for treason he was allowed to attend Charles I, 
after the king’s capture by the Scots in 1646, but was soon returned to the Tower.457 His 
estates were sequestered and he remained imprisoned until the 1650s, although he was 
temporarily released twice because of ill health.458 There was an attempt after the 
Restoration to recompense Paulet for the loss of Basing House, but no compensation 
ever materialised.459 
 
Edward Somerset, sixth earl of Worcester and Lord Herbert of Raglan, joined 
both his father, Henry Somerset, fifth earl and first marquess of Worcester, and his 
brother Charles Somerset, Lord Somerset, in the royalist army. The Somersets were a 
dominant force in South Wales and Monmouthshire on account of their religion and 
wealth.460 Although Henry Somerset’s input into the royalist cause was purely financial 
(his wealth allowed such high contributions to the king’s cause that he was made a 
marquis in 1643), Edward was a colonel of horse, foot and dragoons and became Lord 
General of the royalists in the west along with the marquis of Hertford. His brother 
Charles was a colonel of horse and foot at Raglan Castle, Monmouthshire, the family 
seat.461 Edward fought at Highnam Bridge and Newbury and helped to repair garrisons 
in Monmouthshire. In January 1645 Charles made Edward earl of Glamorgan, although 
the process was never completed. He was then sent to Ireland to take part in the 
                                                
455 T. Holland, Thames Valley Papists, p.91. 
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459 A fair compensation allowance for Paulet was considered to be £19,000 (Holland, Thames Valley 
Papists, p.97. 
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negotiations with the Irish Confederates.462 The king later made Edward a subordinate to 
Ormond, Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, but this did not prevent Somerset from signing his 
own secret treaty on behalf of the king with the Confederates which gave generous 
allowances to the Irish Catholics, including abolishing the penal laws against them and 
freeing them from Protestant clerical jurisdiction.463 When news leaked of the treaty the 
king, fearing that the treaty would lose him valuable support in England, completely 
abandoned Somerset. Somerset was arrested by Ormond and charged with treason. He 
was freed on bail over a month later because the royalist cause in England badly needed 
the support of the Irish troops Somerset had managed to raise, even if he did not manage 
to transfer all the troops across to England.464 By August 1646 Raglan had surrendered 
to the parliamentarians. Four months later, on the death of his father, Somerset was 
made earl of Worcester. He was exempt from pardon, banished and had his estates 
confiscated primarily for his actions in Ireland with the Confederates.465 Somerset was 
allowed back into the country in July 1652 but was promptly imprisoned and spent the 
next two years petitioning for relief and for bail, complaining that he had to live on 
credit, could not afford to pay for his Tower lodging and had no money to buy his own 
bread.466 The Venetian secretary even commented on his plight, writing that: 
The parliamentarians remain utterly hostile to the nobility and great personages 
of the country, and the present state of affairs subjects those accused as 
delinquents to greater persecution than ever. Every other day one sees one of 
those despoiled of fortune or estates on mere suspicion, and reduced from great 
affluence to utter misery. Some of them find this so difficult to bear that they 
condescend to tender allegiance and obedience to Parliament. This has happened 
lately with the earl of Worcester, one of the leading nobles formerly worth 
50,000l of which he must now, like others, rest content with such portion as 
Parliament may choose to assign him for his maintenance.467 
Somerset successfully petitioned for bail in 1654 and was then granted a pension from 
the Commonwealth of £3 a week as his estates remained confiscated. The earl of 
Somerset spent the rest of the Protectorate working on scientific experiments on steam 
                                                
462 Edward had been admitted to the king’s circle in the 1630s. No doubt the king was attracted by the 
family’s considerable wealth (Ibid). 
463 Ibid. 
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465 JHL, VI, p.165 (3rd August 1643). 
466 CSP DomCom, 1652-3, pp.67, 100, 248. 
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with his scientific partner Calthoff who had been brought back to England from the 
Netherlands by the regime, which may explain why Somerset had been released and 
pensioned.468 At the Restoration he managed to regain his vast estates. 
 
Henry Arundell became third baron Arundell of Wardour on the death of his 
father Thomas, second Lord Arundell of Wardour at the battle of Stratton in 1643. Both 
men were staunch royalists. Henry was a Commander of the Lifeguard of Horse to the 
marquis of Hertford at the Battle of Lansdowne in 1643.469 Arundell soon turned his 
attentions to recapturing his ancestral home, Wardour Castle in Wiltshire, which had 
been taken by the parliamentarians after a successful siege, bravely fought by Lady 
Blanche Arundell, his mother. After a six-month siege Arundell finally retook the castle 
in March 1644 and completely destroyed it so it could no longer be used as a garrison.470 
In 1645 his estates were sequestered for his delinquency and recusancy. He compounded 
for his estates in 1653. 
 
There are, of course other examples of elite Catholic royalism. John Savage, 
second earl Rivers, succeeded to his title in 1639. He was a commissioner for the king 
and raised an infantry regiment in September 1642 in Cheshire.471 Rivers, was stationed 
in the king’s garrison in Oxford where he sat in the Parliament held there in 1644.472 On 
1st October 1645 he was before the Committee of Compounding, to compound on the 
Bristol Articles for his delinquency.473 His estates were sequestered on the grounds of 
delinquency and recusancy, although he took the Oath of Abjuration in March 1649 
which released him for his recusancy status. He died in 1654 heavily in debt.474 
 
Henry Parker, Lord Morley and Monteagle, was a colonel of horse at Hornby 
Castle in Lancashire. Parker provides an interesting case study because even though he 
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was a Catholic gentleman, he was also a JP in Lancashire.475 The civil war came at an 
opportune time for him, as he was charged with murder in 1642, but was never tried, 
since matters of state took priority.476 Parker recruited his own regiment and seems to 
have spent the majority of the war in the North. He surrendered at Skipton Castle in 
Yorkshire in December 1645. 477 Parker’s royalism seemed to have spread to his 
household as one of his servants, John Baines, a Catholic himself, joined his master’s 
regiment as a lieutenant colonel of horse.478 Parker’s estates were assessed at £3000 and 
sequestered in March 1646 for recusancy and delinquency.479 He refused to take the 
Oath of Abjuration and stayed faithful to his religion. He was charged and found guilty 
of hearing Mass said and sung on the 25th and 27th December 1650 at a Mr Crouly’s 
house in Long Acre, Martins-in-the-Fields.480 Thus, he was included in the Treason Act 
of 1652.481 By the 6th August 1651 Lord Morley was in prison in the Upper Bench for 
his religion.482 Philippa, Lady Morley, spent the early 1650s fighting for an allowance of 
one fifth of their estates, arguing in October 1650 that she did not have enough money to 
educate her son.483 By July 1651 he had also petitioned for the same allowance. This was 
granted but speedily suspended following Lady Morley’s complaints to the Committee 
for Compounding that since the allowance her son had ‘been taken by cavaliers into 
Lancashire, and she has just cause to fear his being ‘surprised and unworthily married or 
otherwise bred up to his ruin and distraction’.484 She asked that the Committee ‘put him 
into such hands as may breed him up in the fear of God’. She criticised Lord Morley for 
being ‘ready to give assistance to those who would undo the child’.485 It appears that 
Lord Morley wanted him to be brought up and stay a Catholic whereas Lady Morley, a 
convicted recusant herself, wished him to conform. In February 1652 Daniel Blagrave, 
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an MP, was judged an ‘unfit guardian… by reason of employment’ by the Committee 
and Thomas Parker was instead placed in the guardianship of Mr Arthur, minister of 
Clapham.486 Lord Morley died in 1655. 
 
These, then, are examples of a variety of militant royalism amongst the leading 
gentry. But this was not the only possible response to the upheavals of the 1640s. There 
is no surviving evidence that shows that either William, Lord Stourton, or Henry 
Neville, Lord Abergavenny, fought for the king during the civil war although both 
resided in the king’s garrison in Oxford and surrendered to Thomas Fairfax there in 
1646.487 William, Lord Stourton’s estate in Wiltshire was garrisoned for the king during 
the first part of the war but surrendered to the parliamentarians in September 1644.488 At 
the surrender of Oxford Lord Stourton, along with Lord Abergavenny and three other 
Catholic gentlemen, Edward and William Thorold and John Paston, petitioned Fairfax 
on behalf of themselves and other Catholics within the garrison, for assurances of their 
safety and leave to compound for their recusancy.489 These men believed that they 
would be included in the Oxford Articles but after the surrender found they were 
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excluded.490 Lord Stourton was adamant that he should be allowed to compound for 
leaving his home and travelling to the king’s garrison because he ‘never bore arms, nor 
otherwise assisted the King’, although his eldest son was killed at Bristol.491 He had 
earlier attempted to compound for his estates but had been refused passes to either 
London or Wiltshire.492 Lord Stourton successfully applied to Parliament in July 1648 
for passes to return to his estate in Wiltshire for his family.493 Lord Stourton finally 
compounded for his estates in December 1649 and there does not appear to be much 
more information about his experience of the Commonwealth and Protectorate except 
that one of his sons was thought to have taken part in Penruddock’s rising in 1655.494 
 
There is little evidence that Lord Abergavenny was militarily involved in the 
royalist army during the civil war either.495 The deputy lieutenants of Kent were 
instructed to take any arms stored in his house into custody in April 1642.496 After the 
surrender of the king’s garrison in Oxford Abergavenny petitioned the Committee for 
Compounding on 31st March 1648 on the basis that he had left parliamentary quarters 
and had only resided in the king’s quarters.497 Obviously the Committee refused to grant 
any sort of leniency, as in June 1649 he petitioned Lord Fairfax, complaining that his 
estate had been so tightly restricted that he could not raise money to pay his 
composition, which he judged ‘the tightest of any of the Oxford Articles’.498 Indeed, 
things looked bleak for Abergavenny. He was imprisoned in the Tower of London in 
1651, but was granted liberty of the Tower in 1651 and allowed to travel to stay at his 
estate in Scotland in March 1652 ‘on bond with good security’. On his arrival he was 
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imprisoned at Leith but soon released.499 Abergavenny’s composition was still 
unresolved in March 1654, when he petitioned the Committee denying he was a ‘papist 
in arms’ and asking for his case to be adjusted so he could compound for two thirds of 
his estate rather than just a third. Six months later Abergavenny was finally allowed to 
compound on the Oxford Articles and the Committee were ordered to repay the balance 
of just over £2,858 that they had wrongly taken from his estates.500 Little else is known 
of Abergavenny’s movements during the remainder of the Protectorate apart from 
Parliament granting him a licence allowing him to be in London in 1658.501 
 
3.5. Conclusion. 
As these studies suggest, Roman Catholic reactions to the civil war were not only 
varied but also highly individual. Catholic men such as Paulet, Arundell and Somerset 
were staunch royalists whereas the royalism of others, such as Brudenell and 
Abergavenny, was overt for only a short time. Changes occurred during the conflict. It 
can be of little surprise that as the prospects for the king’s cause began to look dubious, 
the majority of Catholic support fell away in the interests of self-preservation. The cases 
of Brudenell, Fowler and Ashton are prominent examples. Catholic royalism could play 
out not just militarily but in financial donations to the king’s cause. Ian Roy has shown 
that royalists in Yorkshire accepted arms and rents from recusants who wanted to 
support the monarchy but perhaps did not want to fight.502 It has also been argued that at 
the beginning of the war the Catholics of Staffordshire and Shropshire donated between 
£4,000 and £5,000.503 As the case of Brudenell shows, this sort of financial assistance 
was difficult to prove and for these reasons this sort of royalism must have seemed an 
easy and safe way to support the king.  
 
Catholic royalism should therefore be understood not as a consistent movement, 
but instead as the result of individuals or groups who participated to different degrees for 
different reasons. English Catholics were not wholly unified in their attitudes or actions 
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during the 1620s and 1630s and it would be misguided to believe that they were in the 
1640s. As John Walter suggests in his case study of the Stour Valley riots in Essex, 
English Catholics were not uniformly positive royalists, but were sometimes pushed 
together by circumstances – most obviously anti-Catholic puritan, parliamentarian 
agitation. Their behaviour during the interregnum pays testament to this. English 
Catholic royalism has, however, only really been conceptualised in the terms set out by 
the English Catholic recusant tradition: military involvement during the conflict. Very 
little Catholic primary evidence exists to substantiate claims of English Catholic 
royalism. This is hardly surprising. The English Catholic community had good reason to 
underplay their commitment to the king after his defeat and it seems perfectly logical 
that Catholic royalists would have taken care to destroy any incriminating material that 
they had in their possession. Yet little attention has been paid to English Catholic 
reactions to the Interregnum either. In many ways English Catholics’ behaviour during 
the 1650s sheds more light on the nature of Catholic royalism during the civil war than 
attempts to count up the number of Catholics who bore arms. Exploring this later period 
allows a clearer understanding of the political capabilities of the English Catholic 
community during the early seventeenth century, in particular Catholic factions’ 
willingness to adapt their political ideologies to changing political regimes. This is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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4. Turn Oak or Bramble?504 The English Catholics during the Commonwealth and 
Protectorate. 
 
This chapter explores the English Catholic community’s reactions to the defeat 
of the king. It shows that some parts of the community were willing to turn their backs 
on the Stuarts and attempt to negotiate with the Commonwealth and Protectorate. The 
republican regime were open to varying levels of negotiation with the English Catholics 
because of their need to garner support from Catholic European powers. But this did not 
mean that they wanted or were able to give the English Catholics what they most 
desired: full toleration. On the contrary, persecuting Catholics remained an important 
route to domestic political support. Other parts of the community remained loyal to the 
Stuarts, who were also mindful of the English Catholics’ utility as a bargaining chip in 
European diplomacy. It seems likely, however, that for most Catholics the immediate 
need for security outweighed longer-term dedication to the exiled court. 
 
The new political landscape that emerged after the English civil war and after the 
regicide fractured the synergy between different ideological and political visions within 
the Catholic community. Broadly, three schools of thought were apparent: Blackloists, 
Hispanophiles and Francophiles. It should be noted that here I use the terms 
‘Francophiles’ and ‘Hispanophiles’ as convenient means to identify those within the 
Catholic community who looked respectively to France and Spain (and the ecclesiastical 
authority of Rome) during the Elizabethan and Stuart periods. Whilst this shorthand 
significantly eases the writing and reading of the thesis, it should not be taken as 
imposing an ahistorical coherence on what were sometimes disparate groupings. The 
Blackloists believed that they needed to sever all connections with the exiled Stuart 
court and the pope to enable negotiation with the commonwealth for religious toleration. 
The Hispanophiles also believed in the importance of moving away from dependency on 
France and the royalist party in order to take advantage of the political position of 
Cromwell and the Independents. Yet, the Hispanophiles, unlike the Blackloists, were 
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still courting the pope, who was keen for a peace to be brokered between England and 
Spain. This would help toleration for Catholicism in England independent from the 
eventual fate of the Stuart cause. The Francophiles, on the other hand, remained loyal to 
the Crown. Historical attention has almost all focused on the first of these groups, the 
Blackloists. This focus on the Blackloists overshadows the most important divisions 
within the Catholic community at the time.505 It also obscures the interconnection 
between foreign and domestic affairs and Catholic political thought. 
 
Explaining these interconnections is a complex task, which requires revisiting the 
same periods several times from different perspectives. In doing so it will be helpful to 
keep in mind a general chronology of the three groups’ stances over negotiating with the 
king and the Army, and then the Commonwealth and Protectorate. In 1647 the 
Francophiles and Hispanophiles supported a three-way deal between themselves, the 
king and the Independents and were attempting to sidestep the contentious issue of papal 
power. The Blackloists were also willing to take part in such a deal but wanted to 
abandon the papacy altogether. The lack of archival material of 1648 suggests that the 
Catholics made no approaches to the king or the Army during this time. They were 
presumably waiting to see what would happen during the second civil war, following the 
king’s Engagement with the Scots. After the regicide, however, opportunities arose for 
all three groups to negotiate and make concessions with a range of interested parties. 
The Blackloists remained alienated from the papacy and now turned their back 
completely on the exiled Stuarts. The Hispanophiles also discarded their support for the 
monarchy but would not abandon their allegiance to the papacy. The Francophiles, on 
the other hand, remained loyal to both the Stuarts and the papacy. 
 
Essentially this chapter falls into two halves. The first deals primarily with the 
period between the Scots’ handover of the king to Parliament in January 1647 and 
Oliver Cromwell’s assumption of the Protectorate at the end of 1653. Within this half 
there are four sections. The first explores English Catholic negotiations with the Army 
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and the king in 1647. The second, third and fourth parts investigate the Blackloists’, 
Francophiles’ (including the exiled court) and the Hispanophiles’ reactions to the 
execution of the king and how this affected their negotiations with the Commonwealth 
and their visions for the future of the community. The second half of this chapter focuses 
on the period between 1654 and 1658. It turns from a concentration on the factional 
politics within the Catholic community to the treatment of Catholics under the 
Protectorate and the negotiations between the Catholics and the Protectorate, and 
Catholics and the exiled Stuart court. This chapter ends by arguing that the Catholic 
community’s positions under Jacobean, Stuart and republican regimes were strongly 
similar. 
 
4.1. The beginning of the negotiations. 
One Catholic reaction to the likely defeat of the king was to take the opportunity 
to improve their situation. The collection of the Constable Maxwell family of 
Everingham contains the heads for a petition of unknown authorship, drawn up to be 
presented to Parliament in 1646. It asked for the penal laws in force against the 
Catholics to be repealed. It also suggested that Catholics should not be persecuted for 
their allegiance to Charles I, because the king’s powers were ‘immediately from God 
and must be obeyed for conscience sake’.506 Neither should those who sought refuge in 
the king’s garrisons be condemned, as it was a necessary action for self-preservation. 
Parliament should not let a ‘flight in to a garrison to [be] like a sin against the Holy 
Ghost conceived unpardonable’.507 The petition asked that Parliament ‘treat us like 
Christians, fellow subjects … make us capable of what freemen and honest men is to 
enjoy’.508 Although the petition indicates arguments about Catholic loyalty that were 
already current, it does not appear that it was ever actually presented.  
 
The Scots’ handover of the king to a victorious Parliament on 30th January 1647 
signified a dramatic shift in the political landscape. The deep divisions between 
                                                





Presbyterians, who were now the majority in Parliament, and the parliamentary 
Independents provided opportunities for the king and the Catholic community, who 
hoped to exploit this rivalry to secure favourable terms in the future. The papal nuncio in 
Paris, Nicola di Bagni, approached Rome on behalf of the English Catholics to ask 
permission to begin discussions.509 In July 1647 the French ambassador, Monsieur de 
Bellievre wrote to the papal court informing them that in a meeting with Cromwell and 
Fairfax he had been assured that they would extend religious toleration to the whole 
country.510 It was not until late summer 1647 that rumours of negotiations became more 
widely known. In a letter, dated 30th August 1647, from Peter Biddulph (alias Fitton) 
dean of the English chapter, to Kenelm Digby, the queen’s agent in Rome, Biddulph 
stated that the Independents and the king had given ‘solid hopes of a liberty of 
conscience for Catholics in England’ on the understanding that the Catholics’ subjection 
to the pope did not ‘prejudice’ their allegiances to the monarch or the State.511 Biddulph 
declared that, although the king did not state it publicly, he ‘would have the Army to 
make it their request unto him’. The priest had been told that the king ‘hath advised the 
Catholics to treat with the Army about it’ in the form of an oath of allegiance.512 The 
formulation of such oaths was to give the factions within the English Catholic 
community the chance to offer allegiance to the Commonwealth, the Protectorate and 
other interested parties.  
 
At the same time of Biddulph’s letter the Venetian Ambassador in London wrote 
that it was ‘considered certain’ that Charles I had made an agreement with Thomas 
Fairfax. Part of the agreement was that Parliament would accept the toleration of 
Catholics with the ‘pecuniary penalties’ which had been levied under the Caroline 
regime.513 Five days later, on 3rd September, he wrote that the Catholics had proposed to 
the Army, via their deputies, a ‘project whereby their religion shall be tolerated and the 
penal laws and punishments abolished’.514 This referred to the approach made by the 
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Jesuit Henry More, who had been sent to the army by George Ward to answer questions 
concerning Roman Catholic theology and allegiance to the State in order to quell the 
army’s distrust of such a scheme.515  
 
The ‘project’ was More’s Three Propositions; really an oath of allegiance in 
response to the Army’s. They rejected the idea that the pope or Church had power to 
over-ride a subject’s obedience to civil government and deemed that the pope could not 
dispense with an oath to a heretic or allow the killing of anyone who had been 
condemned as a heretic or excommunicated by the Roman Catholic Church.516 The 
Propositions were signed by nine clergymen: George Gage, Thomas Carr and Philip 
Clampett, who were seculars; Henry More and George Ward, who were Jesuits; Thomas 
Dade, a Dominican; William Penry, a Carmelite; Bonaventure Bridges, a Franciscan and 
William Palmer, a Benedictine. The oath was condemned by the Holy See, however, 
who argued that it was too similar to the Oath of Allegiance of 1606 and prejudiced the 
pope’s authority.517 The two Jesuit priests, Henry More and George Ward, who had 
signed the propositions were punished by the Holy See for their part in the debate and 
sent into exile in the Low Countries.518  
 
The Three Propositions were swiftly followed by the Catholic laity’s own 
proposals for an agreement with the Independent party.519 These differed from the 
clergy’s. Whereas the clergy made clear that the Three Propositions were conditional on 
parliament granting Catholics religious liberty, the laity claimed they would accept the 
Three Propositions before any parliamentary action.520 The laity’s proposals were signed 
by men from both the pro-Spanish and pro-French sections of the community, including 
the Marquis of Winchester, Lord Brudenell, Lord Petre, Lord Teynham, Lord Powis, 
Walter Montagu and twenty-seven other leading Catholic gentry. 
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The English Catholics’ desire to be part of any negotiations between the king and 
the Independents depended on their ability to show that English Catholicism was 
consistent with the ‘civil government’ now in place. Later in September 1647 another 
petition was presented to parliament pledging the allegiance and fidelity of the Catholics 
in England to the king ‘now reigning to be true and lawful king … and rightful 
sovereign to this realm’.521 The petition continued to pledge true allegiance to ‘my said 
king, State or parliament and country … [disclaiming] all foreign power be it either 
papal or princely spiritual or temporal’.522 The pope’s power was limited in the petition, 
but allegiance was pledged first and foremost to the king and to parliament. There were 
still hopes at this time of a deal between king and parliament and Catholic negotiations 
with the Independents did not mean they had abandoned the monarch. The dean of the 
chapter, Peter Biddulph, wrote to Sir Kenelm Digby on 30th August 1647 asking him to 
‘make advantage of this business to get some thing from the pope to oblige the queen, 
and to keep the king in a good mind towards us’.523  
 
Charles I’s execution, however, changed everything. One section of the 
community utterly refused to negotiate with the new regime. Dr Winstad wrote in a 
letter to Sir Edward Nicholas in February 1649 that he would rather suffer at Tyburn 
‘then my public liberty to serve God should spring from the bloody murder of my 
sovereign’.524 But the regicide also marked the beginning of petitioning to Parliament 
from factions within the community who judged the king’s death an ideal time to 
distance themselves from the exiled Stuart court in order to secure benefits from the new 
regime and establish their own dominance over all English Catholics. The Blackloists, 
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4.2. The Blackloists. 
After the regicide the Blackloists – the secular priests Thomas White, alias 
Blacklo, and Henry Holden and the queen’s agent in Rome, Sir Kenelm Digby – 
abandoned the Stuarts altogether. To understand their actions it is necessary to return to 
their attitudes towards the Catholic community’s initial negotiations with the Army in 
1647. The Blackloists had disdained these early, tentative steps towards compromise 
with the Independents, not because it was happening but because they perceived them to 
be conditioned by kow-towing to the papacy. The Blackloists were angered that the 
papacy had prevented English Catholics from achieving an accommodation with the 
Independents. Their willingness to offer large concessions concerning the practice of the 
faith were charted by a collection of the group’s correspondence, entitled Blacklo’s 
Cabal, created by the priest Robert Pugh.525 He felt that the actions and beliefs on this 
faction resembled ‘rather the confusion of Calvin’s synagogue then the union of the 
Catholic church’.526 The Blackloists’ proposals for negotiations with the Independents 
attempted to separate religious from political allegiance severing ‘the connection 
between the envisaged Catholic Church and the pope’.527  
 
In a letter written to Digby, Holden reported that when he and Blacklo first 
presented their ideas to Biddulph ‘he like a Roman could not digest it’.528 In the same 
letter Holden revealed that Lord Brudenell and Lord Montagu, the ‘chief actors’ in the 
negotiations with the Independents, would only treat further with the Army with papal 
approval.529 Brudenell and Montagu were, during the late 1640s, under the influence of 
the Tuscan ambassador’s priest, Gilles Chaissy, who championed the English Catholic 
community’s dependence on Rome.530 Chaissy had been sent to England in June 1625 
by the French king and Cardinal Richelieu to accompany Henrietta Maria after her 
marriage to Charles I.531 The priest had worked to convert prominent Laudians and had 
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managed to convert some of the doctors at the University of Oxford whilst teaching 
there.532 Chaissy had attempted to convert James Ussher, the Protestant Archbishop of 
Armagh. Plans had been set to offer the Archbishop fifteen hundred scudi to leave for 
Rome, but these negotiations were unsurprisingly unsuccessful.533 Known as Chaissy 
was for his intelligence, success and optimism when debating with non-Catholic 
controversialists, it is no wonder that the English Catholic laity looked to him to help 
them navigate the new political regime. 
 
The Blackloists’ proposals were radical. Holden wrote again to Digby a month 
later outlining the exact points of the group’s propositions. Frustrated by the lack of 
progress from those members of the community already trying to treat with the 
Independents, he asked Digby in September 1647 to distribute the proposals in England; 
Digby was to make sure that copies fell into parliament’s hands.534 The first point of the 
proposed oath was to ‘let no foreign power intercede for them, nor meddle in the 
compounding of businesses for Catholics’.535 The Blackloists proposed that parliament 
should choose six or eight Catholic priests to be made bishops who would be in charge 
of the English community. These bishops would be ‘sufficiently Independent of the 
pope’. Although they would acknowledge the pope as their ‘head or chief pastor’, he 
could not ‘impose any special command upon them’ if they and the commonwealth did 
not ‘think it fit’.536 These bishops were only to administer spiritual authority and their 
powers on issues of temporal government, such as marriages and wills, would be 
limited.537 The oath was to be agreed by all members of the English Catholic 
community. Those who refused would be forced into exile. The Blackloists believed that 
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this was compatible with the French system.538 Some Gallican thinkers stipulated an 
episcopacy and Church partially independent from papal authority, but answerable to the 
temporal power.539  
 
Biddulph reported a month later that the community, especially Walter Montagu, 
had cried out against Holden’s paper and intended to disown all his proposals. The 
Blackloists, however, were adamant that negotiations for toleration for the English 
Catholic community should not involve the pope. They believed that the pope had let the 
community down by not supporting them enough in a hostile environment and by failing 
to seize the political initiative from the division between the Presbyterians and the 
Independents. Sensing time was running out, Digby urged Holden at the beginning of 
October 1647 to close the deal with the Independents. ‘Make them see their interest to 
strengthen themselves’, Digby wrote, ‘by union with the Catholic party, which may 
adhere to them, when after the parliament and Army dissolved, the Presbyterians will 
grow too hard for them’.540 Digby’s anger towards the pope was evident. In September 
1647 he wrote to Sir John Wintour claiming that if the English Catholics included the 
pope in the negotiations ‘the business will be foiled’.541 He argued that the court of 
Rome ‘care no more for what Catholics suffer in England then the Marechal de Grament 
or my Lord Powis, or other such good natured men, do care for what the Christians 
suffer in China or Japan’. Over a month later Sir Kenelm wrote to Henry Holden about 
the ‘wicked interested court’ of Rome who held neither concern nor esteem for the 
English Catholics.542 He went so far as to wish the pope would live longer so that 
Catholics could see his ‘gross’ neglect of God’s service and resolve to do ‘their business 
quietly by themselves’.543  
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This had not always been Digby’s position. In 1645 he had defended Rome on 
the basis that it was working to further the community’s interests.544 Presumably 
Digby’s attitude towards the papacy changed due to the pope’s reluctance to assist the 
king and queen in Ireland and the failure to respond to the English chapter’s campaign 
for a bishop. Digby’s disloyalty to his king and queen was probably nothing personal. 
Even Biddulph, who had reacted so abruptly against the Blackloists’ proposals early on 
in the community’s negotiations with the Independents, became aggrieved with the 
papacy’s apparent ineffectiveness. At the beginning of October 1647 Biddulph wrote to 
Digby enclosing copies of the Provincials’ and Seculars’ Three Propositions and an oath 
of allegiance to be presented by the Catholics to parliament. The oath pledged allegiance 
to the king and rejected all conspiracies, heresies and treasons.545 Digby was charged to 
show both enclosures to the pope and to the cardinal protector of England. If they 
disliked the proposals Digby was to tell the pope that ‘until he give the clergy a superior, 
and settle ordinary jurisdiction amongst us, worser things will be done then this’.546 
Biddulph recovered a positive attitude towards the papacy in May 1650, when he 
became the English clergy’s agent in Rome. He also relinquished his tie with the 
Blackloists. Unfortunately for him, the die had already been cast. Whilst he attended a 
chapter meeting in England in August 1649, articles against him were presented to the 
exiled Charles II. The claim was that Biddulph was an enemy of monarchical authority 
and supported the Commonwealth.547  
 
This anti-papal sentiment was characteristic of the Blackloists. Thomas White’s 
writings, supporting Cromwell whilst turning his back on Catholic teachings on the 
supremacy of Rome, are remarkable. In his book The grounds for obedience and 
government, published in 1655, he went further, justifying the overthrow and execution 
of Charles I. The Protectorate, White wrote, was a legitimate form of government 
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because Cromwell had acted for the best interests of the people.548 White centred his 
arguments on the idea of a social contract and what he termed ‘natural law’.549 The 
overthrow of Charles I had been legitimate because when a monarch, government or 
magistrate came to power they contracted ‘an obligation of obedience’, which was taken 
when a ‘Governor’ acted in a tyrannical manner and the ‘tyranny of the Governor is 
greater then the mischief hazarded’, for example rebellion or treason.550 White’s belief 
in ‘the common good’ was central to his concept of how the English Catholic clergy 
should respond to the Commonwealth and Protectorate.551 It was in the best interest of 
the community to accept the new regime, negotiate toleration and concentrate on the 
spiritual upholding of the true religion, Catholicism, as opposed to the true Church, the 
Church of Rome. It was not in the community’s interests, White argued, to continue 
allegiance to the pope or the exiled Stuart court.552  
 
4.3. The pro-French English Catholics. 
The Francophile faction was resolved to stay well clear of further negotiations 
with the Independents after the execution of Charles I. The pro-French section of the 
clergy wanted the English Catholic clergy and laity to remain dependent on France. 
Bishop Richard Smith (in effect still their leader) had been in exile in France since 1631 
and remained a strong ally of Henrietta Maria. After the split between the papacy and 
the Stuart crown over Ireland, this section of the community stayed loyal to the 
monarchy. George Leyburn, under the alias of Grant, wrote to the priest Henry Holden 
in 1647 about the Three Propositions. Leyburn, a known Francophile, wrote about the 
points he believed Protestants held against Roman Catholics.553 Only two principles 
could silence this criticism; the first, rather vaguely, that fidelity and loyalty were owed 
to the civil magistrate as tenets of the Catholic faith; the second that all Catholics should 
refuse to receive any bulls, reprieves, commands or orders from any ‘foreign prince, 
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prelate, power, authority, or superior … without first bringing to the State, your 
Lordships Sirs, to such as the king shall appoint to this effect’.554  
 
At the same time that this letter was written, an anonymous tract was printed 
focusing on the king’s supposed mistrust of Catholics. It argued that English Catholics 
were united with foreign princes ‘in Religion’ against the Crown of England.555 It 
concentrated on the interference of the king of Spain and looked back to the reigns of 
Queen Elizabeth and King James I to show the ‘practice of the popes, by the Jesuits 
instigation …to stir up the Catholic subjects of England … to rebel’. The examples of 
Cardinal William Allen and Robert Persons were used to show, through the pope’s 
‘pretended’ power to create and dispose of kings’, that the English Catholics had 
solicited the king of Spain to conquer England and assassinate Queen Elizabeth by 
absolving Catholics from their obedience to the Crown.556 In the late sixteenth century 
Allen and Parsons were notorious for their leadership of the pro-Spanish faction within 
the English Catholic community.557 Allen was responsible for publications including An 
Admonition to the nobility and People of England and Ireland concerning the present 
Warres made for the execution of his Holines Sentence, by the highe and mightie Kinge 
Catholicke of Spain by the Cardinal of Englande and A Declaration of the sentence and 
deposition of Elizabeth, the usurper and pretended Queen of England, both published in 
1588.558 The anonymous tract concluded that it was ‘generally and evidently’ known 
that the Jesuits were the ‘chief’ cause of the king’s mistrust and Protestant fear of 
Catholics: 
whilst there Spanish faction, and they call it a Catholic league, is diverted by 
those many wars betwixt the 2 great crowns, yet it is to be feared and ought to be 
prevented… Besides your lordship in the interim their daily solicitations in 
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favour of their faction do no little prejudice to his majesty of England affaires, 
lying for the most part against there designs.559  
This might seem, at first reading, to be no more than an anti-Jesuit diatribe, not in itself 
unusual. When the date it was written, its preoccupation with the unity between the 
English Catholics and the king of Spain, and the way established patterns of Catholic 
polemic worked are taken into account, however, it becomes clear that this should be 
read as an Hispanophobe tract written by Francophiles. 
 
There were several reasons for Francophile optimism in the late 1640s. As stated 
earlier, Sir Kenelm Digby had first tried to secure negotiations for the exiled Henrietta 
Maria during the mid 1640s. He reported to Pope Innocent X that the Presbyterians and 
the Independents each regarded the Catholic clergy as an ally against the other and so 
both were considering granting Catholics free and secure exercise of their faith in return 
for assurances of help.560 Digby argued that the queen was not requesting money for 
herself but was instead receiving offers from both parties and would be able to demand 
concessions from them.561 But the papacy was already starting to envisage a settlement 
for the English Catholic community without relying on Stuart whims. In fact, the 
willingness of the English Catholic body to treat with the Independents to the exclusion 
of the queen completely destroyed any chance of papal help to the exiled Stuart court.  
 
After the regicide the queen’s attempts to broker a deal with the Scottish 
Presbyterians in 1650 certainly did not make her cause more attractive to the papacy.562 
She had supported Charles II’s trip to Scotland in May 1650 and urged him to try and 
deal with the Scots but strongly regretted the concessions the young king then made.563 
Henrietta Maria wanted to reclaim the throne for her son by making deals with anyone, 
regardless of the confessional divide. Her attitude had been the same in her advice to her 
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husband after his surrender to the Covenanters in May 1646. She encouraged Charles I 
to make religious concessions to the English Presbyterians between 1646 and 1647 in an 
attempt to preserve the king’s control over the militia.564 The Blackloist Henry Holden 
reported to Digby in 1649 that George Leyburn had been sent by the exiled English 
court ‘well furnished with moneys by them’ to hinder the English Catholic clergy from 
‘engaging themselves to any subjection or fidelity to the present state of England’ and 
obstructing them from gaining any ‘favour from the Independents on matters of 
religion’.565 Holden wrote further, alleging that Leyburn had then been sent to Ireland as 
a ‘professed enemy to the Independents’ to disrupt negotiations between the 
Independents and the Irish Catholics.566  
 
It was not just Henrietta Maria, however, who gave the Francophiles hope. 
Charles made his own manoeuvres to secure support from the English Catholics, 
courting them from a European perspective, rather than relying on national divisions. He 
hoped that the community’s support would encourage France and Spain to align 
themselves with the Stuarts. On July 28th 1649 Charles Stuart sent the Catholic 
gentleman, Sir Robert Meynell, to Rome to garner papal support. On his arrival Meynell 
made contact with Cardinal Luigi Capponi. The cardinal, Meynell reported, was keen to 
promote the king’s service in the court of Rome and wanted to encourage the pope to 
represent Charles II to all his Catholic subjects as ‘one fit to be obeyed’.567 Meynell was 
not naïve about the politics of the court of Rome. The ‘ticklish body Politique’ of the 
papacy was ‘sly’ and Meynell believed that Charles’s party needed to advertise their 
business as aligned with the papal interest, if it was to stand a chance of receiving 
help.568 The Stuart court was keen to show that the restoration of Charles II was in the 
interest of English Catholics, pledging ‘favour and protection’ for Catholic subjects’ 
assistance and support. Hyde argued that the survival of the Catholic religion in 
England, and the redemption of the nobility and gentry, relied on the restoration of the 
crown; English Catholics would be short sighted if they did not ‘propose to themselves a 
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firm and entire union with the royal party’.569 Lord Arundell had proposed to the exiled 
court that the English Catholics would support Charles if he gave his word that he would 
establish religious liberty for them on his restoration.570 Until Charles II’s treaty with the 
Scots Covenanters in June 1650, this must have seemed like a convincing opportunity. 
 
4.4. The Hispanophile English Catholics. 
The pro-Spanish section of the English Catholic community saw the execution of 
their monarch as an opportune time to break from the dominant pro-French part of the 
community. They sought to do this by making their own proposals to the new regime. 
The Hispanophiles had been fighting for control of the community since the 
establishment of the bishop of Chalcedon during the dynastic match negotiations with 
France in the 1620s. Although France had tried to negotiate with James I to concede 
toleration for English Catholics, this was not achieved in the manner that many English 
Catholics had wanted. After the conclusion of the French match there was discussion 
within the English Catholic community as to whether toleration had actually been 
granted at all. Likewise the French dynastic negotiators in the early 1580s gave a ‘dusty’ 
answer to Catholic agitation for the incorporation into the Anjou marriage treaty of 
promises of toleration.571 Anjou refused to intervene to save Edmund Campion’s life. It 
is no surprise that some of the clergy were content to exclude the Crown from any deal-
making, because they had felt let down by the intersection of religious, dynastic and 
international politics in the past. 
 
The first hint that the Hispanophile section of the community would go all out to 
get one over on their rivals and try to secure greater toleration for Catholicism from the 
new regime was a letter written by Thomas Barker, a canon in London, to Bishop 
Richard Smith, bishop of Chalcedon, in exile in France, on January 30th 1649. Barker 
declared:  
I have thought myself obliged in conscience your officer though unworthy, to 
acquaint you with the design imparted to me by G. G. [George Gage] and Mr 
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Peterson much prejudicial to your lordships own, concerning the government of 
your flock … their design was to get their chapter … without any dependence on 
your lordship.572  
Peterson, whose real name was Peter Curtis, had been converted by his Jesuit brother, Fr 
Thomas Curtis, and had studied at St Omer, Seville and Louvain and had been ordained 
in 1625 by Peter Lombard in S. Sointo in Saxia.573 It speaks volumes that, on the day of 
the execution of Charles I, two known Hispanophiles were reported to Bishop Smith for 
trying to distance the chapter from dependence on him and the French court. If the pro-
Spanish Catholic clergy wanted to undertake further negotiations with the new regime, 
they would have to split definitively with France and the exiled court there. 
 
The contention between George Gage and Bishop Smith erupted again just over 
three months later. After Portugal had gained its independence from Spain in 1640 
(something Spain did not recognise for another forty-four years) a Portuguese 
ambassador had been received in England and George Gage had taken up residence in 
the ambassador’s house.574 Following rumours that the ambassador was harbouring an 
English Catholic priest, parliament ordered a search of his residence and Gage was 
found and arrested.575 He demanded diplomatic immunity, on the basis of his lodging 
and in accordance with the ruling given in the Venetian ambassador’s case in 1640. The 
government refused to allow this defence as Gage was English. Furious with this 
decision the Portuguese king retaliated by seizing English ships that were on their way 
to Spain.  
 
Smith had already ordered Gage to retire from the situation for a while, when he 
wrote to him on 1st April 1649.576 The president of Douai, who had been called to 
Brussels by the Council of State, had suggested to Smith that Gage should leave London 
at least, if not England. Otherwise Gage was warned, ‘… you will incur hazard of your 
life, your friends in Flanders of their means and that college would be in danger to be 
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sent out of Flanders or taken from the clergy … doubtless if you do not they will by 
means of parliament procure to be taken and put in prison.’577 Two weeks later, Smith 
wrote again to Gage, who had seemingly not heeded his advice. Smith pleaded with him 
to stop meddling in affairs of State as the ‘clergy hath no vocation for such matters and 
we greatly dislike it in the Jesuits’.578 Smith told Gage that his great fear was that 
sending ‘Sir’ Henry Compton579 to acknowledge the king of Portugal as a lawful king, 
would be ‘a great motive to the king of Spain to acknowledge the parliament for a lawful 
commonwealth’.580 Smith’s two letters make plain his reluctance to give any reason for 
the king of Spain to acknowledge parliament’s legality, and thus exclude the exiled 
Stuart monarchy with whom he had aligned himself. 
 
Yet the Hispanophile faction attempted further negotiations with Cromwell. 
There were two interconnected strands of this – the laity and the clergy. Dealing with the 
laity first, Sir Thomas Brudenell and John Paulet, marquis of Winchester, had signed the 
Catholic laity’s proposals to the Independents in the late summer of 1647. Both men 
were noted throughout Blacklo’s Cabal as the prime movers of those seeking toleration 
from parliament. But Brudenell and Paulet did not wish for complete independence from 
Rome in the same way as the Blackloists.581 Brudenell, Paulet and Lord Montague were 
the key players amongst the pro-Spanish Catholics who wanted to petition parliament 
for religious toleration despite the disappointment of the initial proposals in the late 
1640s. On 30th June 1652, these men and others presented a petition to parliament 
requesting the moderation of the financial penalties inflicted on them by the 
sequestration committee. In response to their exclusion from the Act of Pardon and 
Oblivion, they requested that they ‘not be excluded from universal benefit’.582 The 
petitioners asked for the opportunity to clear their religion from ‘whatsoever may be 
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inconsistent with government’.583 They stated that they would submit all judgements of 
scriptures to a general council and excused Catholic idolatry as a mere means to ‘assist 
our memories and excite our affections’.584 The petitioners ended by stating their belief 
in ‘moral law’ whereby all men were ‘most strictly and absolutely bound’ to any 
promise made to any civil power, from which they could not be relieved by any foreign 
power or authority. This was, effectively, a denial of the papal deposing power. 
Presumably the petitioners thought this was a good moment to petition parliament for 
relief and to argue that ‘faith’ could be kept with Roman Catholic subjects, following the 
commencement of the first Anglo-Dutch war, but having been read in Parliament, the 
petition was rejected.585  
 
Brudenell and Francis Browne, third viscount Montague did not give up. They 
petitioned again in 1654 with the support of Edward Vaux, fourth baron of Harrowden, 
for relief from sequestion.586 Browne wrote to Brudenell on 5th October 1654 informing 
him of a forthcoming ordinance he had seen which proposed to keep Catholic estates at 
one eighth rent (allowing Catholics only one eighth of their estates) and would fine any 
Catholic forced to sell their estates ‘upon urgent necessities’.587 Montague urged 
Brudenell to travel to London to petition Cromwell and Parliament, for, amongst other 
things, greater liberty of estate sales for Catholics.588 Without Brudenell’s input, 
Montague and Lord Arundell were ‘like a ship without a storm’.589 The Venetian 
ambassador resident in London noted that the approach was made because Cromwell 
had asked the Council of State to discuss what should be done with English Catholics to 
‘gain additional favour with the multitude’.590 A decision had been postponed and the 
Catholics hoped that if they acted decisively during the interval, by approaching the 
Protector themselves, he might act in their favour.591 It can also be seen from 
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Montague’s letter to Brudenell that the English Catholics had been encouraged to 
petition parliament by members of the Council of State. Montague wrote that ‘Sir 
Anthony Cooper and divers others of the council do assure me they know nothing of it 
[the ordinance] and very much dislike the act, they wish us, and divers other Parliament 
men to petition the Protector and the parliament’.592 Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, a 
royalist turned parliamentarian, was a moderate politician who had earlier sat on the 
Hale Commission, which had made ‘well-reasoned’ proposals for law reform.593 He had 
also served in the Rump Parliament and had opposed a bill that stipulated the sale of 
delinquent estates.594 Brudenell’s, Browne’s and Vaux’s petition was referred but 
achieved little. Further, in 1656 both Brudenell and Vaux were proceeded against in the 
Northampton sessions under suspicions of popery. Neither had taken the Oath of 
Abjuration in front of the local justices of the peace.595 
 
Thomas Brudenell had been an outspoken critic of Bishop Smith and the powers 
he claimed over the community in the late 1620s. He and Sir Basil Brooke had been 
worried that Smith’s authority would be offensive to the State, in particular Smith’s 
plans for the bishop’s tribunal, an independent judiciary system.596 As mentioned in 
chapter three, Brudenell, Paulet and Montague had also signed a ‘Protestaio 
Declaratoria’ in October 1631 opposing Smith as the bishop of Chalcedon.597 It can be 
no wonder that Brudenell, in particular, seized the opportunity to appeal to the Rump 
and Protectorate Parliaments in an effort to alienate the English Catholic community 
from Smith.  
 
Brudenell’s insistence on petitioning the successive parliaments of the 
Interregnum for greater toleration for the community was not, however, just an attempt 
to settle personal scores or gain greater influence over the English Catholic community. 
Brudenell also made concessions towards the dominant Protestant power, to the 
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disadvantage of his faith, in order to protect himself from persecution. During the Long 
Parliament in 1641, the Grand Committee discussed which eminent papists living in 
London should be summoned to appear before the Committee. When Brudenell’s name 
was mentioned a debate ensued because Sir Henry Mildmay and other men believed 
Brudenell had a ‘good inclination’ towards Protestantism and had lately attended 
Protestant Church services in the hope that he could be spared.598 Sir Simonds D’Ewes, 
in his journal, noted that Brudenell’s name was dropped from the list.599 Brudenell’s 
conflicting claims about his behaviour during the civil war – neutralism during the 
interregnum, and royalism at the Restoration, have already been discussed in chapter 
three.600 
 
Thomas Brudenell should not be taken as evidence of the lay pro-Spanish 
faction’s disloyalty to the royalist cause. Instead, he shows the compromises some 
Catholic gentlemen were willing to make to secure their own autonomy and to gain 
toleration for the community. Brudenell and his son Robert obviously regarded 
themselves as strong Catholics. They were believed to have founded the Benedictine 
Chapel of the Rosary in London sometime between 1650 and 1655. Lord Brudenell is 
mentioned in Blacklo’s Cabal as a man who once consulted only the Jesuits but had 
turned to accept nothing but what the Benedictines said.601 Yet Brudenell was also 
invited to dine with Oliver Cromwell, along with Lord Arundell: both men accepted.602 
 
The second strand of Hispanophile engagement with the regime came from the 
pro-Spanish clergy. Two deciphered letters written by Fr Francis Foster to Fr Edward 
Risley at the English College in Madrid at the beginning of July 1650 discussed a 
possible ‘league’ between Spain and the republican regime.603 Risley seems to have 
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written earlier to Foster asking how he should ‘carry himself’ towards the English 
parliament. Foster replied that since Spain, and he suspected, the pope, liked the idea of 
such an alliance he saw no reason why the Jesuits, and consequently Risley, should 
‘publicly make show of dislike in word, or deed’ to parliament. He also stated that the 
pope had been told that Charles II had sent men into England to negotiate a peace 
between himself and parliament:  
if it be so what can any expect that Antony Audley [the pope] shall doe for 
Franck Audley [the king of England], for take away his motive of furthering 
hereby Gregory Kemp [Catholics] and his, what motive hath any of Antony 
Audleys [the pope’s] profession to put ye helping hand. The more again that all 
know Flavia Bentnys [the queen of England] and all her friends stand wholly for 
Fredrick Jennings [Presbyterians] who is Gregory Kemps [the Catholics] deadly 
enemy.604 
The pope wanted to exclude Charles II from any possible negotiations with the 
republican regime. The best way to secure toleration for the English Catholics and the 
mission, without sacrificing any of the pope’s control and power, was thought to be a 
settlement between Spain and the English parliament. 
 
In another letter written from Foster to Risley, fourteen days later, on 18th July, 
Foster reported with more certainty that ‘not only Daniel Audley [king of Spain], but 
also Anthony Audley [the pope] are in some treaty with Susanna Pitz [Parliament] and 
Franck Yeuly [the Independents]’ with a view to securing toleration for English lay 
Catholics.605 Foster urged that toleration depended upon the Jesuits not appearing 
publicly as opponents of either the English parliament or the Independents, and therefore 
urged Risley ‘…pray warn Nath. Knightley [procurator in Madrid] that he be wary no 
advantage be taken by his over much zeale to Franc Audley [king of England], in 
speaking such things against these aforementioned persons as that his brethren may 
come to suffer’.606 
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These letters support Stefania Tutino’s arguments that the pope’s attitude 
towards Blacklo’s writings shows that the pope was no royalist.607 He neglected to 
punish White for his pro-Cromwellian writings because the court of Rome was willing 
to negotiate with the Commonwealth and Spain. In fact, before 1660 only those of 
White’s works that denied the ‘infallibility’ of the pope were condemned.608 Tutino 
argues that White’s Ground of Obedience and Government was not condemned until 
November 1661, after the restoration of Charles II, because the pope did not want to 
endanger the only connection the Catholic community, and Rome, had to Cromwell.609 
Perhaps this explains why the Holy See oddly condemned the ‘Three Propositions’, 
signed by Ward and others, and not the negotiations of the Blackloists. It seems more 
likely, however, that initially the pope wanted to see what was going to happen in 
England between the Presbyterians and the Independents. The papacy, according to 
Digby in November 1647, was annoyed that the English Catholic community had asked 
for directions about whether to take an oath because the court of Rome did not want to 
declare what was lawful for Catholics; such a declaration would be of huge consequence 
to the ‘retrenching of their own pretences elsewhere’.610 The papacy, Digby asserted, 
‘would have been glad it had bin done without asking leave’.611 The papacy was hedging 
its bets. It was also aware that the Blackloists seemed to be the only English Catholic 
faction that could successfully negotiate with the Independents, considering Holden and 
Digby’s correspondence with Watson, a scoutmaster to Cromwell, particularly in 
1649.612 The Blackloists’ regarded these other proposals as ‘mischiefs’. They were 
pleased when the priests involved were punished as they feared that these interventions 
would damage or even eclipse their own negotiations with the Independents.613  
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The papacy also wanted to see what happened in Ireland before choosing sides. 
Charles II’s agent in Rome, Sir Robert Meynell, reported in May 1650 that there was no 
possibility of papal assistance because they already ‘give Ireland as lost’ and so a great 
part of Rome’s interest in restoring the English crown had ceased.614 Things had looked 
optimistic for the royalist war effort in Ireland in the early part of 1649 but by May 1650 
the momentum had shifted against them. The Irish Protestants had always been sceptical 
of Ormond’s Catholic sympathies. His plans to resist parliamentarian force by fortifying 
key towns failed at Drogeda and Wexford.615 This in turn undermined morale, 
contributing to religious tensions between the Irish Catholics and the Irish Protestants 
under Ormond.616 By April 1650 the Protestants had surrendered to Cromwell. Ormond 
had to rely on the Irish Catholics to sustain the royalist war effort in Ireland but failed to 
garner enough clerical support.617 By the middle of 1650 there was little realistic hope 
for the Irish royalists. The court of Rome considered Charles II as in the ‘Presbyterian 
way’ and such an association would be destructive to the papacy’s ends; this was a 
month before Charles II agreed to sign both Covenants.618 Edward Hyde, Charles’s 
trusted councillor, had always been against such a treaty, especially as Charles had sent 
him and Francis Cottington, a crypto-Catholic, pro-Spanish royalist baronet, to Spain to 
solicit Philip IV’s support. Meynell reported to Cottington that Edward Progers, one of 
the grooms of Charles’ bedchamber, had advised Charles to assure his subjects that his 
treaty with the Scots would not prejudice his support for the Catholic community.619 
Two months later, in a letter to the Catholic courtier Sir Toby Mathew, Hyde defended 
Charles II’s position with the Scots as an act of necessity and criticised the English 
Catholics for not supporting a king ‘under whom his Catholic subjects might enjoy full 
happiness’.620 Instead, Hyde lamented, the community ‘flatter themselves that they shall 
enjoy protection and security under their devils, who in the end will extirpate them out 
of all their Dominions’.621 The treaty did not go down well with the papacy. Meynell 
                                                
614 ClSP, 39, f.305 (Meynell to Hyde, May 10th 1650). 
615 Ó Siochrú, God’s executioner, pp.160-161. 
616 Ibid. p.161. 
617 Ibid. 
618 ClSP, 39, f.305. 
619 ClSP, 39, f.252 (Meynell to Cottington, March 12th 1650). 
620 Ibid. f.312 (Hyde to Mathew, May 23rd 1650). 
621 Ibid. 
 141 
reported that Cardinal Capponi would ‘press the pope’s hand’ for assistance in Ireland to 
the royalist cause only after Capponi had been allowed to see the king’s terms with the 
Scots.622  On July 31st 1650 Meynell wrote to Cottington informing him that the pope 
had given a ‘flat no’ to assisting the Stuart cause in Ireland, claiming he did not ‘meddle’ 
in others’ affairs although Meynell was sure he was already courting the ‘rebels’. 623 All 
ears in Rome, it was reported, were shut to the king’s proposals.624  
 
It was not until Oliver Cromwell had died and Richard Cromwell had proved he 
was not capable of taking his father’s place that the court of Rome looked to France and 
to the restoration of Charles II. In 1659, when the news reached Rome that the 
restoration of Charles II was likely to occur, it was reported that the court ‘began to 
repent having showed little countenance to the king’.625 The Holy See condemned 
White’s Grounds of Obedience and Government in November 1661 because now the 
pope needed to show his commitment and support to the restored house of Stuart.626 The 
papacy’s initial reluctance to intervene, however, did not end Stuart hopes of Rome’s 
support. But that reluctance was also a sign of the effect that Cromwell’s foreign policy 
had on the fortunes of the English Catholic community and the extent to which the 
clergy were willing to exploit this for their own ends.  
 
4.5. The impact of Commonwealth and Protectorate foreign policy on the English 
Catholics. 
It is no surprise that Catholic Hispanophiles attempted to negotiate with 
Cromwell and thought themselves near to success in the early 1650s. Cromwell had 
found himself in a difficult position after the regicide. Not only did he face unrest from 
the royalists and Presbyterians, but also from the Levellers and other religious radicals, 
whom the Army had suppressed. The questionable legality of Pride’s Purge in December 
1648 and the dissolution of the Rump Parliament later in April 1653, had made many 
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enemies at home. Indeed, the Presbyterians viewed the Independents’ negotiations with 
the Catholics with disgust. They made their move after Cromwell left for Ireland in 
August 1649. The notable Catholics involved in the negotiations were arrested or 
banished.627 The Marquis of Winchester’s house was raided on Candlemas Day and his 
priest, Peter Wright, was arrested. It was hoped that Wright would be spared trial as two 
of his fellow priests with whom he had been imprisoned had recently been found not 
guilty by the jury and another priest, Thomas Dade, had also been acquitted. The 
Marquis of Winchester even offered to pay a ransom for Wright’s release, but Wright 
refused further help, stating that he believed that it was not the policy of the new regime 
to ‘spill the blood of citizens for the sake of conscience or religion’.628  
 
Unfortunately for him, as a result of the evidence given by an ex-priest turned 
informer, Thomas Gage (George Gage’s brother), Wright was found guilty. The judge, it 
was recorded, told him he was arraigned not for his religion but for returning to England 
as a priest and ‘seducing the people’.629 The French ambassador tried unsuccessfully to 
gain Wright a reprieve. Even some MPs attempted to prevent Wright’s execution, 
arguing it was not in the ‘spirit’ of the new republic.630 In his last speech Wright 
addressed his fellow Catholics as ‘my fellow-soldiers and comrades’. The uneasy feeling 
that Wright’s execution was out of step with popular ideas of freedom of conscience 
perhaps explains why after his execution his body was allowed to be transferred to 
Liege, where he was buried in the Jesuit College.631 Several other high profile attacks 
followed on the community however, with the French ambassador’s house attacked on 
Christmas Day 1650 and Count Egmond, the former Spanish ambassador, assaulted on 
the Feast of Epiphany 1651. 
 
Relations with Europe therefore became an essential part of securing Cromwell’s 
domestic power base. He believed the best way to prevent hostilities from breaking out 
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at home (perhaps a desperate attempt by Stuart supporters to foster a climate of revolt in 
order to restore Charles II) was to prevent foreign powers from supporting, financially or 
otherwise, the insurgents. Facilitating the continuation of the Franco-Spanish War, 
which began in 1635, offered Cromwell exactly this reward.632 After the execution of 
Charles I both Catholic powers were keen to negotiate alliances with the new 
government of England. It was also essential for Cromwell and the Rump that the two 
greatest powers in Europe should recognise their legitimacy. The question was which 
Cromwell would favour.  
 
Although he was not made Lord Protector until 16th December 1653, Cromwell 
was dominant in policy decisions after the regicide. France initially seemed the less 
likely choice. Not only was it experiencing its own domestic problems in the Fronde, but 
also it was a haven for the exiled Caroline court and the royalist elite. The Rump also 
believed that France was responsible for the Scottish royalist invasion in the summer of 
1651. It was therefore important for the Commonwealth to keep France weak so she 
would no longer be in a position to facilitate the Stuart cause.  
 
Conversely, the Rump looked more favourably towards an Anglo-Spanish 
alliance between 1651-54. Such an alliance would keep France weak and prove 
profitable in colonial terms. Spain had been weakened by both the Catalan and 
Portuguese rebellions and suffered heavy losses in Flanders in the early 1640s, so such 
an alliance would be profitable for both parties.633 A relationship of sorts had already 
been established between the Spanish ambassador, Cardenas, and the English 
parliament. Cardenas had offered support to parliament against Charles I before the civil 
war because of the king’s rumoured connection with the house of Bourbon and now 
parliament supported Cardenas because of French support for Charles II.634 Cardenas 
had also been the first foreign ambassador in London who had recognised the 
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Commonwealth as legitimate; his French counterpart had not been given permission by 
Mazarin to do the same and parliament ordered him to leave England.635  
 
In 1651 Spain and France both made appeals to England in order to foster an 
alliance against the other. Mazarin needed English assistance to help break the Spanish 
siege of Dunkirk and offered Cromwell the port as the incentive for an alliance; it was 
certainly an attractive offer, as it would give England more control over the Channel and 
was a significant privateer base. In response, Cardenas offered Cromwell Calais if he 
instead choose an alliance with Spain. Calais was not such an appealing option, as 
Cromwell would have to win it from the Dutch first.636 Cromwell was enticed by 
Mazarin’s offer but the cardinal stalled, realising that it would outrage French opinion. 
Since his position as cardinal was independent of Rome, he needed the support of the 
French people to keep him in power. Bearing in mind the difficulties he still faced from 
the Frondeurs, he avoided further discussion on the matter which served only to annoy 
Cromwell. He in turn became convinced that this was another example of French ill will 
towards the Commonwealth.637 The years 1651 to 1654 saw an increase in tension 
between the English and French fleets due to further privateering by both countries.638 
 
The anger caused at home by Cromwell’s inclination to favour Spain helps to 
explain the arrest and execution of the second, and final priest during the Interregnum. 
Added to the anger caused by the Protectorate’s seemingly pro-Spanish politics was the 
uncovering of a plot against the Protector. Among those arrested for taking part in the 
conspiracy were four Catholics which the Venetian secretary, Lorenzo Paulucci, 
lamented might bring ‘fresh animosity’ against the English Catholic community.639 
Seven days later the Venetian secretary wrote to the Venetian ambassador in France 
informing him of the priest John Southworth’s arrest. Paulucci explained that the priest’s 
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arrest was part of the persecution against Catholics which had ‘redoubled’ because of the 
plot.640  
 
John Southworth had been sent on the English mission from Douai in 1619 and 
had two previous convictions for being a priest, but had twice been reprieved. His final 
arrest was by Colonel Worsley in 1654. Throughout his trial the judges apparently urged 
him to plead his innocence to the indictment brought against him as there was no 
evidence that proved he was a priest (the final arrest had come after a tip-off). 
Southworth refused because he saw such a denial as a repudiation of his faith.641 He was 
therefore convicted. The Portuguese, French and Spanish ambassadors again tried to 
intervene by negotiating a deal with Cromwell. The Portuguese ambassador reported 
that he convinced Cromwell to grant Southworth a reprieve. Cromwell reportedly 
declared, ‘God forbid [my] hand should be consenting to the death of any for religion’, 
which curiously was the same defence Charles I had offered when defending his 
reprieve of priests between 1640 and 1642.642 Cromwell sent word to the ambassador the 
next day, however, telling him he could not intervene as his Council had ‘advised’ him 
that he had to obey the laws.643 Indeed the Instrument of Government had been 
implemented only six months before. In his last speech before his execution Southworth 
admitted again that he was a priest but maintained he was not guilty of treason. He 
pleaded with Cromwell to grant toleration and liberty of conscience to English 
Catholics, reminding Cromwell that ‘liberty of conscience was pretended as a cause’ of 
the civil war.644 After his execution his remains were gathered up by the Spanish 
Ambassador and, with the aid of the Howard family, embalmed and returned to Douai 
for burial.645  
 
Southworth’s case indicates the limits on Cromwell’s ability to implement 
religious toleration. The Presbyterians would always oppose the Catholic community 
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being granted toleration and Cromwell’s intervention meant nothing without their 
support. The plea for Southworth’s life was not helped by the recent royalist uprising. 
The fact that both priests’ bodies were allowed to be transferred to the seminary colleges 
on the Continent, however, instead of being displayed publicly on the city gates, 
indicates a change in the symbolism of Catholic persecution. For the interests of 
Cromwell’s foreign policy, he could not be seen to persecute English Catholics or 
disrespect the bodies of these priests. The English Catholic community would remain a 
useful bargaining tool for Cromwell to use both at home and abroad. 
 
4.6. The Blacklo – Leyburn controversy. 
Just as Spain and France vied to make terms with Cromwell, so too did the 
English clergy. Throughout this time of uncertainty the divisions between the clergy 
heightened. Blacklo and Gage’s attempts to negotiate with Cromwell and the 
Independents had worried many of the clergy, especially those backing the exiled court 
and France. George Leyburn wrote to Blacklo in 1650 defending both himself (Blacklo 
had disapproved when Bishop Smith made Leyburn a vicar general and had written that 
latter could not say boo to a goose) and Smith, who had personally condemned Blacklo’s 
work. Leyburn argued that he had a ‘pastoral care to prevent division in our body that 
might arise to contentious disputes’ concerning Blacklo’s publications.646 In discussing 
the heresies of one of Blacklo’s books dedicated to Christopher Davenport, Leyburn 
maintained that Davenport had written to Walter Montagu declaring his distaste at being 
attached to Blacklo’s work. Leyburn accused Blacklo of bringing ‘prejudice if not ruin 
to our body which already root and branch is accused of … dangerous doctrines in the 
court of Rome’.647  
 
Blacklo was also reminded of ‘Mr [George] Blackwell’ and how the Catholic 
body ‘zealously disavowed’ his scandalous actions even though he was their 
archpriest.648 This was a reference to the arguments in 1606 over the Jacobean Oath of 
                                                




Allegiance and probably also to the previous Appellant (or Archpriest) controversy.649 
The pro-Jesuit Blackwell, who had been appointed archpriest in 1598, at first ordered 
that the oath of allegiance should not be taken, but then had changed his mind. A papal 
brief was issued forbidding any Catholic to take such an oath, and so Blackwell changed 
his mind again. Blackwell was soon imprisoned and ordered to take the oath, which he 
did. He then encouraged other Catholics to follow suit, arguing that it was not against 
their religion or the supremacy of Rome. His decision to take the oath pleased James 
greatly and encouraged debate over Catholic allegiance to the Crown and the pope’s 
political authority. Dismayed, the secular clergy refused to follow Blackwell’s line. The 
pope reiterated his previous order against the oath and Rome gave Blackwell two 
months to retract. He refused to do so and was suspended and then replaced as archpriest 
by George Birkhead.650 This, then, was the context for the Leyburn and Blacklo dispute. 
Members of neither Francophile nor Hispanophile factions felt they could accept the 
terms proposed by the Blackloists, even though to do so would have sat very well with 
the new regime. In Leyburn’s case the Francophile faction did not agree with political 
allegiances being pledged to the new regime above the pope or the Stuart court. 
Meanwhile the Hispanophile faction would not pledge outright political allegiance 
against the pope. 
 
The archpriest controversy was essentially a dispute about the mission’s 
ecclesiastical organisation rather than about ecclesiastical political allegiance.651 Since 
the 1590s, if not earlier, some of the English clergy had been concerned about perceived 
‘encroachment’ on the mission by the Jesuits, whose political aspirations were regarded 
with suspicion. To restrict the Jesuits’ influence over the government of the English 
Catholic community, the clergy wanted to establish a hierarchy that could govern clergy 
and laity.652 Rome refused to grant this request but instead created an archpresbyterate 
and nominated Blackwell as its first archpriest. As a result of Blackwell’s well-known 
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‘pro-Jesuit’ stance some secular clergy saw this as a Jesuit conspiracy to overthrow the 
legitimate ecclesiastical order and so in 1598 rejected Blackwell’s authority 
completely.653 After James I’s accession an opportunity was created for the Catholic 
clergy to negotiate political allegiance to the new regime. The secular clergy regarded 
this as a way to rid themselves of the Jesuit menace. If negotiations excluded the Jesuits 
and their political agenda, all the better for the survival and success of the mission. 
Negotiations ended however when the Privy Council made proposals that would have 
tolerated religion but not the priesthood. This would signify an end to the clergy’s 
ecclesiastical status and the mission itself. The oath of 1606 implied the same thing and 
so most of the former appellants refused to accept it. They also did not want to alienate 
the papacy, since denying the authority of the pope would damage the prospects of an 
ecclesiastical hierarchy in England.654 As will be seen later the secular clergy also 
campaigned for the same type of ecclesiastical hierarchy during the Commonwealth 
years. Leyburn was concerned that the Blackloists’ continual interference with the 
mission in terms of political allegiance and doctrine would antagonise the papacy and 
that this would scupper their chances of obtaining an ecclesiastical hierarchy in England. 
The Jesuits were dividing the community in the same way as had their aggressive 
political programme during the early Jacobean period. 
 
Leyburn’s stark warning to Blacklo did not end the controversy. Another 
unknown member of the chapter wrote to the Bishop of Chalcedon with criticisms of 
Blacklo’s works. The author stated he felt ‘forced’ to speak out against Blacklo’s 
‘heretical’ doctrines ‘by the complaints of noble and honourable persons of the laity who 
… had heard Mr Harrington and Mr Gage defending some of the said doctrines’.655 
Interestingly, a letter written by the Bishop of Chalcedon to George Leyburn a year later, 
on the same topic, lamented that Leyburn had gone against Smith’s order to ‘suppress all 
clamours’ against Blacklo’s work. Smith told Leyburn ‘… you will cause the 
inconvenience and schism which will bee worse then the Books are, whose esteem will 
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fall off itself if you cry less against them.’656 Smith acknowledged he would like nothing 
more than for the Apostolic See to judge Blacklo’s books heretical, but if they ruled they 
were not, Smith would submit his own judgment, as he could ‘no way like them’. Smith 
feared that the matter was a judicial one and was more concerned with this than with the 
upset it had caused the Catholic laity.657 He informed Leyburn that his criticism had 
‘incensed’ Blacklo so much that he had threatened to ‘frame an accusation judicially’ 
against Smith and therefore urged Leyburn not to speak further of Blacklo’s doctrines, 
‘whilst the Sea Apostolic speaketh not of these novelties you have no need to cry so loud 
against them’.  
 
Hostilities between the two factions were further heightened in March 1653 
when Mark Harrington, the Vicar General alongside Leyburn, and a supporter of 
Blacklo, called a chapter meeting without first obtaining permission from Bishop Smith. 
This was a concerted attempt to exercise Jesuit control, or at least anti-Francophile 
ecclesiastical control, over the chapter. The object of the meeting was to send an agent to 
Rome to muster support for the appointment of a coadjutor to Bishop Smith and three 
other bishops for the chapter.658 This would mean some power being taken away from 
Bishop Smith, who was seen as the only obstacle to successful negotiations between the 
chapter and Cromwell, because he was both the leader of the Francophile faction and the 
bishop of Chalcedon. Harrington and his supporters were worried too that on Smith’s 
death Leyburn would succeed to the bishopric. After being notified of the meeting by 
Leyburn, Smith resolved its decisions were invalid, but the chapter managed to justify its 
actions and Smith was forced to rescind his judgement.659 
 
The factional dispute had still not been brought to a close by 1654 when Walter 
Montagu wrote to Blacklo about his doctrines. Montagu stated he did ‘truly find them so 
bitter and foul’ and wondered how a person of Blacklo’s calling could use them against 
persons of ‘so great esteem and authority, as those who have held the contrary opinion’. 
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Montagu believed Blacklo’s writings had exposed ‘our religion to the reproaches of our 
adversaries’.660 Montagu thought it would be condemned by Rome and other Catholic 
countries. This letter also needs to be put in context. Montagu devoted his life to the 
service of Henrietta Maria. He had been involved in the diplomacy that secured the 
queen’s marriage to Charles I. He was also rumoured to have had an ‘intimate 
relationship’ with the exiled Maria Amee de Rohan, Duchesse de Chevreuse.661 Yet 
there was still, in the eyes of the clergy, much for which to play. For the French faction 
the hope of the restoration of the Crown was heightened by Charles II’s attack from 
Scotland and royalist risings. For the Spanish faction, the negotiations of only a few 
years earlier still kindled hope. Either way however, Cromwell was negotiating with two 
Catholic powers, and this created an opportunity for a number of Catholic interest 
groups to represent themselves to the Cromwellian regime as appropriate political allies 
and to claim that they were capable of promoting and advancing specific foreign policy 
courses.  
 
By 1657 the chapter had managed to bring the controversy surrounding Blacklo’s 
publications almost to an end. This was in part because of recent shifts in foreign policy. 
By 1655 the balance between France and Spain had altered and so too had Cromwell’s 
preference for an alliance. Allying with France now seemed the more favourable option. 
The Fronde had ended and it had become evident to all parties that Spain was no longer 
in a position to fund its own armies, let alone fund Cromwell’s intervention in the 
Franco-Spanish war or aid him to help fight the Dutch.662 Cromwell was looking further 
afield and realising that an attack on the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean would be 
extremely profitable by securing free trade for England in those waters.663 France was 
now also more powerful than Spain and needed to be contained. It was vitally important 
to make sure that they would not offer money or soldiers to restore Charles II. 
Cromwell’s keenness to negotiate a peace with France was not even altered by the 
Vaudois massacre in March 1655 or Cardenas’s attempts to stir up trouble in England by 
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enticing radical preachers to attack such a peace.664 A treaty between France and 
England was signed in October and November 1655. Spain’s reaction was to sign an 
alliance with Charles II in April 1656. 
 
It can be no surprise that the Catholic clergy’s response to the Anglo-French 
treaty was to start an active campaign for the reintroduction of episcopacy to the English 
chapter especially following the deaths of Pope Innocent X on 7th January 1655 and 
Bishop Smith on 18th March in the same year. The treaty between Charles II and Spain 
was further security for them; all bases were covered. Their campaign followed the 
rhetoric that they had used towards the same ends in the 1620s and 1630s. Among the 
six reasons included in one letter were the claims that a bishop would unite the divided 
chapter, and that to deprive England of a bishop would be an injustice. Interestingly, the 
third out of the six asked, ‘when is a General more necessary then when soldiers are to 
fight?’665 Another document also gave six different reasons for supporting Catholic 
episcopacy in England and included the argument that a bishop would not increase the 
persecution of Catholics. The only priests who were prosecuted were those who 
admitted that they were priests. The fifth reason was that: 
There can be no fear that the bishop can or will exert a tribunal or external court 
by reason the Pr[otestants?]: will never consent there unto butt will endeavour to 
hinder it by reason they know it cannot be don but by the envy of the public 
courts … and great disturbance of the commonwealth as matters now stand.666  
It seems evident that the chapter were willing to make peace with France work to their 
advantage. But finding a bishop upon whom both factions could agree proved the 
sticking point. Both submitted their own nominations for a new bishop for the chapter, 
but each was vetoed by the opposing side. The Hispanophiles were against the 
nomination of Abbot Montagu because, as has been noted before, he had been a close 
associate of the Caroline regime and would disadvantage the chapter in future 
negotiations with Cromwell.667 Conversely Henrietta Maria displayed her displeasure at 
the Hispanophile faction’s choice of Henry Taylor. Taylor was the chaplain to Archduke 
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Leopold and served the Spanish court.668 Negotiations continued until February 1656 
when the Congregation of Propaganda in Rome categorically rejected the chapter’s 
demands. Besides, there was still a feeling from some members of the chapter that the 
appointment of a bishop would not be a positive thing for the clergy at all. Thomas 
Courtney argued that Cromwell might see the establishment of Episcopal government 
for the chapter as the beginning of Spanish attempts to restore Charles II, which would 
increase persecution against the English Catholic community.669 
 
Although the chapter continued its quest to obtain episcopal government until the 
Restoration, all attempts were unsuccessful. But it did finally demand an end to the 
Blacklo controversy. In May 1657 members of the English chapter wrote to Leyburn and 
Blacklo to ‘advise and propose some means of pacification’ between the two men.670 
The chapter asked Blacklo to make a public testimony pledging to submit all his 
previous work to the Apostolic See for censorship before it was published. The chapter 
also asked Blacklo to guarantee that all his future work should be given to be ‘perused 
and consented’ by two or three of its four leading doctors of divinity; Mr Blunston, Mr 
Daniel, Mr Ellis and Mr Jennings, before publication. If Blacklo agreed to follow these 
guidelines, the chapter believed there would be no further complaints against him, 
especially from Leyburn, which would prevent further ‘fears or blemishes which is 
pretended to fall upon it’ from Blacklo’s ‘exotic’ theories.671  
 
Blacklo replied on 18th May professing that he believed it right for all Catholics 
to submit their writings to the Apostolic See and the Church and that this should apply to 
both his previous and future work.672 He also expressed his goodwill towards Leyburn. 
Dr Holden however, in a letter to a friend, included a copy of Blacklo’s submission 
which was more bitter. Here, Blacklo wrote that he was angry that Leyburn had been 
allowed to disgrace him by accusing him of being ‘contrary’ to the pope’s authority and 
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said that although he would submit his work for censure to the four previously named 
doctors of divinity such a demand was without precedent.673 The chapter later proposed 
that priests should not again discuss differences of opinion concerning conscience in 
front of the laity.674  
 
Nevertheless, an uneasy truce had been temporarily achieved. Leyburn’s 
contention with Blacklo resurfaced after the Restoration but by this time the chapter 
ruled against Leyburn. The timing of the chapter’s efforts to end the controversy caused 
by Blacklo’s submission was significant. As mentioned above, it would have been 
beneficial to the chapter’s campaign for a bishop, but 13th March 1657 also saw the 
signing of the Anglo-French offensive treaty against Spain. Two months later Cromwell 
formally declined the crown. There had also been attempts by the exiled Stuart family in 
France, in particular the Duke of York, to explore the possibility of their Restoration that 
had been met with hostility and had remained unsuccessful.675 There were many reasons, 
therefore, for the chapter to unite and cease their associations with any discourse that 
might be considered anti-monarchical. 
 
4.7. Persecution of the English Catholics, 1654-1658. 
Yet persecution against the Catholic community had not ceased. Many historians 
have viewed the Protectorate’s attitude towards the English Catholic community as 
tolerant. Claire Cross even argues that Catholics had not enjoyed greater freedom since 
1558.676 This was simply not the case. On 19th January 1654 Cromwell enacted the 
continuation of all the penal laws of Elizabeth’s and James’s reigns. In April 1655 he 
issued a proclamation demanding full conformity to laws against Roman Catholic 
priests, which the Venetian secretary, Lorenzo Paulucci, suggested could have been 
caused by the election of Pope Alexander VII.677 In May Paulucci noted that the 
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Proclamation also required English Catholics to take an oath abjuring the ‘supreme 
authority of the pope’ and denying transubstantiation.678 Proceedings would be taken 
against those who refused to do so. These measures should be seen in the context of the 
aftermath of Penruddock’s rising in March 1655, after which there was a major 
clampdown on suspected royalists and papists.679 There had already been commands to 
disarm papists in the aftermath of the failed rising. Royalists involved were ether 
imprisoned or banished and their estates sequestered. Further, those men who had fought 
against Parliament or had been sequestered for delinquency were forced to pay an 
extraordinary ‘decimination’ tax, to fund a new militia that would supplement the main 
army.680 
 
At the same time Cromwell also agreed to the surveillance of foreign embassies 
in the hope of arresting English Catholics on their way to Mass. The winding down of 
the Spanish embassy in October 1655 and its final closure in November after the Anglo-
French treaty saw an increase of English Catholics at the Venetian embassy.681 Giovanni 
Sagredo, the Venetian ambassador, wrote to the Doge and Senate that twenty ‘religious’ 
who had ‘enjoyed refuge’ at the Spanish embassy now sought ‘asylum’ at his.682 To 
accommodate this influx, Sagredo reported that he was holding six masses every day, 
increasing to ten on festival days.683 In January 1656 Sagredo stated that numbers of 
Catholics attending mass at the Venetian embassy had increased again, to such an extent 
that it ‘causes no small umbrage to the preachers and Protestant ministers here’.684 These 
ministers, Sagredo wrote, had petitioned Cromwell to stop Catholics entering the 
embassy but the Protector declined, arguing that it would not be right to deprive Sagredo 
of the ‘liberty enjoyed by other ambassadors’. Cromwell argued that it was not 
Sagredo’s fault for keeping the embassy open, but the English Catholics’ fault for 
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entering to hear mass even though this was not allowed.685 It had been decided, Sagredo 
concluded, to ‘send a corps de garde’ to monitor the Venetian embassy one Sunday and 
arrest Catholics on their way out. Over four hundred Catholics, he thought, had been 
detained.686 In April 1657 the Venetian resident, Francesco Giavarina, reported that 
there was still intense monitoring to deter Catholics attempting to attend mass at the 
embassy.687 
 
By June 1657 rumours were circulating of a new severe law against Catholics, 
which would, as Giavarina put it, ‘utterly exterminate [them]… making them altogether 
wretched and beggared for the rest of their lives’.688 The law intended to specifically 
target those Catholics who had entrusted their estates to Protestants to escape 
sequestration. Anyone found doing this would forfeit their property. Giavarina believed 
all Catholic houses would be searched and all Catholic children removed to ‘be 
instructed in the false dogmas of Luther and Calvin’. Any Catholic refusing to follow 
these stipulations would be exiled.689 The French ambassador, he thought, had asked for 
an audience with Cromwell in an attempt to stop the law being passed.690 In July 
Giavarina reported that when the act had been presented to the Protector, General 
Lambert had opposed it, arguing that measures should be taken against Catholics ‘but 
with moderation and not such severity’.691 Lambert, however, had only managed to 
muster two men to support him and therefore ‘could do nothing effective to prevent its 
passing’.692 Giavarina also reported that the ‘principal Catholics’ had petitioned 
Cromwell to prevent the act being implemented, ‘promising in consideration, to add to 
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the £80,000 sterling which the exchequer receives yearly from the Catholics, £20,000 
more, squeezed out of their reduced fortunes’.693  
 
Their pleas were to no avail and the Act for Discovering, Convicting and 
Suppressing of Popish Recusants was enacted by Parliament on 26th June. The oath 
stood as planned, to be taken by all Catholics of sixteen years and over, who had to 
swear against papal disposing power. Those refusing to swear the oath would be 
convicted as papists and would have their estates sequestered immediately.694 The 
Catholics again offered to pay Cromwell £50,000 to suspend the act, but he refused, 
demanding £80,000 instead.695 In December there was a new drive for the apprehension 
of priests and, in response to rumours of a forthcoming invasion by Charles, a 
proclamation in 1658 ordered all Catholics to leave Westminster and London unless they 
lived there.696  
 
Nearly seventy years ago, William Trimble dismissed these measures as mere 
‘threats’ used to control the Catholic community. The increasing severity of the laws 
enacted against them was not really religious prejudice but instead was aimed at 
Catholic royalist sympathies.697 This is perhaps best indicated by the penalties enacted 
against Catholics in 1654 and 1658 after two unsuccessful royalist attempts to restore 
Charles II by force.  
 
Yet, persecuting the Catholics was also about money. The Protectorate 
desperately needed cash to fund the standing army and its foreign policy. During the 
civil war royalist and Catholic estates had initially been sequestered to raise money for 
the parliamentarians, since, when Charles I left for Oxford, he had taken the exchequer 
with him. Government borrowing had increased ‘dramatically’ during the 1640s and 
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1650s.698 The growth in the financial demands of the government rose from £856,857 
between 1626 and 1640 to £1,891,900 between 1649 and 1660.699 The decision to gain 
control of Scotland and Ireland had serious financial implications. Between 1649 and 
1656 the annual cost of keeping an English army in Ireland was around £400,000. 
Despite a reduction in the size of the army in Ireland it still cost £336,000 in 1658.700 
Keeping an army in Scotland cost the Protectorate around £270,000 annually.701 
Keeping the navy was also expensive and built up large debts. At the beginning of 1657 
the government did not award the navy treasurer enough money even though the 
Protectorate had decided to go to war with Spain. As a consequence the navy’s debt 
increased more rapidly between 1657 and 1658 than it had done between 1652 and 
1656.702 The navy’s financial situation was so precarious that in 1658 those responsible 
for sourcing food were unable to purchase supplies unless they paid cash in advance.703 
The second Dutch war alone had cost £5.25 million.704  
 
It was suggested at the time that this had also been a factor behind the increased 
severity of anti-Catholic laws in 1654. Paulucci had written in October 1653: 
The necessity for keeping the navy and army in a good temper and well paid 
adds to the financial embarrassments of the government. There are no funds and 
it is not considered safe to impose fresh taxes, as those now in force are a heavier 
burden than the English have ever been accustomed to. So to avoid insurrection, 
before doubling the ordinary and extraordinary assessment, they have decided to 
raise money from the so-called ‘delinquents’ and Catholics.705 
Again, in October 1655 Giovanni Sagredo wrote that the ‘chief preoccupation’ of the 
Protectorate was to ‘find money’ and the increasing taxation of the populace was 
causing ‘consequent grumbling and unpopularity’ which Sagredo thought ‘might one 
day lead to a universal rising’.706 This was a reference to the ‘decimation’ tax, enforced 
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by the Major-Generals.707 It is telling that the 400 Catholics who had been arrested 
outside the Venetian embassy in January 1656 were released afterwards ‘on paying 
according to their means’.708 In 1657, when the Venetian resident Giavarina reported the 
rumours of a new act against Catholics, he wrote that when the French ambassador went 
to try and prevent the act being enforced, parliament would probably 
point out to him that it was done to provide him with money and if he will not 
ratify it the sum voted will be diminished and they will deduct from it what 
might be raised by the destruction of the Catholics. So it is impossible to say 
whether conscience and justice will prevail in Cromwell’s mind over interest and 
avarice.709 
As has been seen, when the act was passed it also sought to raise money from 
Protestants who helped Catholics protect their estates. 
 
One should not, of course, take these Venetian reports at face value. The 
Venetian ambassador and ministers in London were strong supporters of the English 
Catholic community which could lead to, at times, rather strange and not altogether 
accurate interpretations of the political situation. For example, Giavarina suggested that 
the plots against Cromwell at the end of 1656 and the beginning of 1657 were 
engineered by Cromwell himself ‘to cast odium on the name of the king, to secure a 
firmer hold on those who favour their party, and to dissuade the parliamentarians from 
deciding anything favourable about the amnesty’.710 This had been, the Venetian 
resident argued, what King James had done during his reign in order for him to ‘treat the 
Catholics with severity’.711 To excuse the Gunpowder Plot as a royal conspiracy must 
seem a little far fetched to even the most ardent defender of Catholicism.  
 
Yet it does seem from other evidence that 1657 and 1658 was a time of more 
rigorous persecution against the community. The records of the pipe office of the 
exchequer, the recusant rolls, suggest that those suspected of being ‘popishly affected’ 
were proceeded against more frequently during this period than before. The form of 
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proceeding against recusants during the interregnum was not just the sequestration of 
estates but also involved county JPs prosecuting those who refused to take the various 
forms of the Oath of Abjuration (although it should be noted that Protestant dissenters 
also appeared on the list of people who either refused to take the oath or to appear before 
the county quarter sessions). Some areas increased prosecutions for recusancy indicated 
increasing persecution for Catholics. Some counties witnessed substantial increases 
between the number of people proceeded against in 1655 and 1656, and those proceeded 
against in 1657 and 1658. In Suffolk, for example, forty-eight people were proceeded 
against for refusal to take the oath or failure to show at the sessions in 1655, whereas 
168 people were proceeded against in 1657 and 1658.712 In Wales forty-two people were 
proceeded against in 1655 but 68 were listed in 1657/1658.713 In Devonshire thirty 
people were proceeded against in 1655 and 149 in 1658.714 Dorsetshire also saw an 
increase in prosecutions. 139 people were proceeded against in 1655 for being ‘popishly 
affected’ and refusing to take the oath or neglecting to turn up in the first place.715 This 
rose to 191 people in 1657 to 1658.716 The JPs of Leicester proceeded against over 130 
more people in 1658 than they had done in 1655.717 One can also see a big increase in 
those proceeded against in the London session records after 1657. In January 1657/8 78 
people were presented for being popishly affected, which increased to 100 in April 1658 
and 151 in January 1658/9.718 Those proceeded against during the London sessions 
included John Paulet, marquis of Winchester, Augustine Cornwell, agent for the 
Portuguese ambassador, John Salvetti, ambassador for the duke of Tuscany, and Robert 
Seager, servant to the Venetian ambassador.719  
 
Results taken from these exchequer records vary however, and not all counties 
saw an increase. Kingston-upon-Hull only saw two more people proceeded against in 
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1657 and 1658 than in 1655.720 Only one more person was proceeded against in 
Newcastle in 1657 and 1658 than had been in 1655 and 1656.721 Other counties saw a 
decrease in those proceeded against for refusal to take the oath or neglecting to attend 
the county sessions. The JPs in Norfolk, for example, proceeded against 151 people in 
1655 but only 92 in 1658.722 Lincolnshire saw a fall of more than half over the same 
time frame.723 There are many variables that could explain these disparities. These could 
include differences in the size of the English Catholic community in each county, 
whether some counties were more interested in proceeding against recusants than others, 
whether some counties proceeded against Roman Catholics rather than against other 
Protestant dissenters, and JPs’ attitude to their Catholic neighbours. Nevertheless, in 
many areas of the country, Catholics seem likely to have been conscious of increased 
persecution. 
 
But Cromwell also had other issues to address when considering penalties 
against Catholics. One was his foreign policy and the other was pacifying his critics at 
home. This was a fine line to walk. Cromwell could not be seen as persecuting the 
English Catholics at a time when he was cosying up to two great Catholic powers but 
neither could he afford to alienate his critics and popular opinion by being seen to be 
lenient towards Catholics. There was speculation at the time that Cromwell was enacting 
severe penalties against Catholics so he could suspend them following a request by a 
foreign prince, who would then become ‘indebted’ to him.724 Mazarin was dismayed by 
reports of the severe treatment of Catholics in 1657 as his own people were openly 
criticising him for making peace with a leader who was persecuting Catholics. 
Cromwell, however, in a meeting with the French ambassador Antoine de Bordeaux, 
claimed that he hoped to provide more favourable terms to Catholics in the future, when 
his political position was stronger.725 The Venetian ambassador thought that Cromwell 
had already taken steps to suspend the 1657 act against Catholics soon after the meeting 
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to ‘mollify the wrath of the French prelates’.726 Cromwell also made sure he was seen to 
protect the rights of Roman Catholics in his territories abroad, most notably allowing 
Lord Baltimore to remain proprietor of Maryland in the face of puritan criticism. He also 
allowed private Catholic worship in Dunkirk.727 Cromwell gave a safe passage for the 
French ambassador in 1657 to take fourteen Spanish friars and four native Indian 
Catholics to Rome and gave permission for the funeral Mass of the Tuscan agent 
Amerigo Salvetti to be held in London.728 It was this sort of policy which allowed 
Cromwell to tell Mazarin he had ‘plucked many [Catholics] out of the fire’ of 
persecution but at the same time allowed him to use strong anti-Catholic rhetoric with 
the Swedish diplomat Christopher Bonde conveying his fears of a general war of 
religion throughout the world and the need for Sweden and England to unite against the 
‘Catholic enemy’.729  
 
Cromwell had other pressing matters at home. The prospect that he would accept 
the crown had caused eruptions of discontent within the army and made him desperate to 
achieve political equilibrium at home. A letter from St German en Laye written on 2/12 
June 1657 mentioned the controversy over whether Cromwell would accept the crown. It 
said that there was a ‘great appearance of a breach betwixt him [Cromwell] and the 
Army’ and that ‘many were of the opinion that the government would revert to a 
republic’.730 The Army had spoken out in disgust at Cromwell assuming such a title and 
their point of view obviously influenced his decision not to take it, especially as he 
viewed the Army as ‘God’s Instrument’.731 Although some soldiers threatened to resign 
over the issue there was never any evidence of a political coup in the offing. Cromwell 
had not been bullied into making the decision.732  
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Nevertheless, some at the time suggested that Cromwell heightened the 
persecution of Catholics as a means to reinforce his position. On 26th December 1657 
and 5th January 1658 Peter Church reported to Edward Nicholas that five suspected 
priests had been apprehended in London and arrested, four of whom were then 
imprisoned in Windsor Castle.733 Another letter followed again from Church to 
Nicholas, dated 8/18 January, where Church lamented that  
If Cromwell begins his parliament with the sacrifice of the apprehended priests 
blood it will be but an addition to his former great crimes and possible not 
advance either his ends at home or glory (as he desires) abroad whatever he or 
his council may think to the contrary.734  
The same sentiments were also reported by the Venetian resident, Francesco Giovarina, 
in a newsletter to the Doge and the Senate: ‘With the return of the parliament at hand 
and nothing being done so far in execution of the act against Catholics the Protector, to 
show that something is being done, has issued a Commission to arrest all priests that are 
found’.735 Anzolo Corraro, the Venetian ambassador at Rome wrote in February 1658 
that as the holding of parliament was imminent, the laws against the Catholics were put 
into ‘execution with the utmost severity’.736 
 
A proposal was issued on 11th June 1658 by the chapter, seemingly in response 
to the penal statutes enacted against the Catholic community. It outlined the chapter’s 
belief that appointing a bishop would not breach the ancient laws of the country and that 
it meant no offence to the Commonwealth but was ‘a part of the ordinary government of 
this kingdome’.737 The Instructions hinted that the clergy were willing to give up 
adherence to the pope’s arbitrary authority to avoid offending the State, recognising: 
that the ancient laws of England admit no extraordinary power of the pope rules 
it be pre-acknowledged by the civil power, and by the bishops and clergy of the 
country; and otherwise tis punishable by praemunire if any receive it… 
[secondly] that the clergy of Henry the 8ths time fall into this praemunire; and by 
force and fear of that quitted the pope’s authority to be delivered from it… 
[thirdly] that the present clergy and chapter depend for their safety on the … 
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State, which is jealous of nothing more as entrenching upon the politick interest 
then the arbitrary power of the court of Rome.738  
Not only was this a response to the arrest of the five priests at the end of the previous 
year but also Cromwell’s ‘strict’ proclamation published on 27th of March 1658 ordering 
papists to retire from London. If they did not adhere to the proclamation they were to be 
proceeded against as ‘high delinquents’ to the Commonwealth. The Army had been 
quartered in London and all guards had been doubled.739  
 
4.8. English Catholics and the exiled Stuart court. 
English Catholics’ prominent political role was not just a product of Cromwell’s 
political designs in Europe. The exiled Charles quite clearly sought to take advantage of 
the opportunities which arose from the factional politics playing out between Cromwell 
and the parliamentary Presbyterians. This made the Catholic community an important 
component of his restoration ambitions. Charles II’s further approaches to Rome, riding 
on the back of these clashes, were timely. Just as Cromwell’s foreign policies had 
opened up opportunities for the Catholic community to petition Cromwell for toleration 
and to petition for the re-establishment of a bishop to govern the English chapter, the 
parliamentary Presbyterians’ refusal to tolerate Catholicism proffered opportunities for 
the exiled court. The royalist court member Marmaduke Langdale noted how important 
it was for Charles II to gain the support of the English Catholic community. Langdale 
wrote that although Catholics were not ‘considerable’ in England ‘they are in this part of 
the world, and if they could be joined in the common interest [the restoration of Charles 
II] it would make the work less difficult’.740 In January 1653 Charles attempted to open 
correspondence with the pope following the exclusion of Catholics from the Act of 
Pardon and Oblivion, and to coincide with Glencairn’s Rising. The king assured the 
pope of his ‘sincere professions’ to ‘protest and advantage the Catholics in my three 
kingdoms’.741 Charles hoped that the pope would acknowledge the truth behind his 
protestations, as he acknowledged the truth of the pope’s ‘expressions’ of a desire to 
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contribute towards Charles’s restoration. The king concluded that he would send an 
agent directly to negotiate with the pope.742 
 
During the first Protectorate Parliament in 1654, Hyde reiterated that Charles 
would make large concessions to the Catholics in England if they supported him, 
perhaps seizing the political advantage against the hostility of the Presbyterian majority 
in Parliament to the concept of religious liberty. The crypto-Catholic Jerome Weston, 
earl of Portland, was thought the best person to communicate between the Stuart court 
and the English Catholic community, with ‘whom yourself had a particular trust’.743 The 
problem, Hyde wrote to Weston, was that ‘there is so great difference amongst the 
Catholics about the true interest of Catholic religion, and the best way of promoting that 
interest, that there are too many to cross at some men shall propose’.744 Hyde believed 
the reason the community were not offering assistance to the king was that they hoped 
that he would find himself in such a difficult position that he would be forced to convert 
to Roman Catholicism; this plan had been urged ‘unreasonably and unskilfully’. Instead, 
Hyde wrote, Weston was to receive ‘ample power’ from the king to make substantial 
concessions to gain the community’s assistance, including those who have ‘as much 
grace and credit with the Jesuits as you want’.745 The community would be required to 
be ‘ready to join in any noble action or attempt which they shall see discreetly entered 
into, by persons of a commission’ and to supply money to the exiled Stuart court; this 
presumably being a nod towards Penruddock’s rising which would take place in March 
1655.746 Weston was to persuade the community that Cromwell was ‘very well disposed 
and resolved to sacrifice both their persons and fortunes’ if it proved convenient to him. 
 
In February 1655 Charles II released a statement of readiness to repeal the penal 
laws against the Roman Catholics in England. This asserted that in accordance with 
Roman Catholics’ good affection towards him, and as an acknowledgement of their 
suffering at the hands of the rebels, Charles had made testimony only a few days into his 
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succession of how far he was from enacting penal law against them.747 He pledged he 
would place Catholics in all three of his kingdoms in ‘the same condition’ as his 
Protestant subjects and all those whose estates had been forfeited by Parliament would 
be freed. This could be achieved if other Catholic princes supported his cause. In fact 
parliamentary intelligence reports in April 1654 included the news that the Holy Roman 
Emperor of Mentz (Mainz) had given Charles II a hundred thousand dollars of his own 
money, and was encouraging Italian princes to do the same, in order to relieve the 
‘distressed’ Catholics of the three kingdoms ‘by the means of R. Carolus …upon certain 
conditions to be made betwixt Rome and emperor with R. Carolus’.748  
 
This was, however, another carefully timed tactical move. Charles II’s statement 
followed the launch of Cromwell’s Western Design in December 1654 and was in 
preparation for the Penruddock Rising. It also was released after Peter Biddulph, the 
English clergy’s agent at Rome, named his successor and the English clergy began their 
campaign for a bishop for the English chapter.749 Charles was however warned by 
Marmaduke Langdale to be wary of the politicking of the court of Rome. ‘Rome will be 
found like other courts’, Langdale wrote, ‘that regard their own interest which is getting 
good conditions as they can for Catholics, rather than the justness of the cause of them 
that solicit them’.750 
 
Cromwell’s alliance with the French and Charles’s expulsion from France gave 
Charles the chance to appeal to Spain. This position was helped further by the 
appearance of Edward Sexby, a Parliamentarian officer and ex-Leveller. Sexby had 
become increasingly disillusioned with the new political regime in England and, bruised 
by the attempt to arrest him in February 1655, decided to throw his lot in with the 
Protectorate’s enemies. By June Sexby had made proposals to the king of Spain for 
negotiations with exiled royalists and was using the Jesuit priest Father Peter Talbot as a 
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‘go between’ between himself and Charles II.751 On August 16th 1655 Talbot wrote to 
Charles II with great hopes that Sexby would negotiate successfully for him in Madrid if 
Charles II could show the Spaniards that he had enough power amongst his subjects to 
incite disturbance in England that would keep Cromwell too busy to retaliate against 
Spain.752 Talbot believed that negotiations should take place in Madrid rather than 
Rome, probably because the papacy was still unwilling to help Charles; this was 
indicated by the presence of Dr Bailey, an agent of Cromwell, at the papal court.753 
 
At the same time as Cromwell and Mazarin were on the verge of a treaty, 
Charles II was working hard to counteract such an alliance. Not only were some 
royalists in Rome lobbying the papacy to encourage a general peace between France and 
Spain, which would scupper Cromwell’s foreign policy completely, but parliamentary 
intelligence also indicated that Charles was secretly negotiating with Mazarin to marry 
one of the cardinal’s nieces.754 Negotiations seem to have been stopped by Henrietta 
Maria, who presumably would not have wanted a marriage alliance with a cardinalate 
which agitated against the papacy and had made an alliance with Cromwell. 
 
The Anglo-French treaty in October 1655 cemented the belief that negotiation 
with Spain was the only way to see Charles II restored. Spain could provide both money 
and help in soliciting the pope’s support. The Spanish saw negotiations with the exiled 
Stuart court as the only way to secure ‘their monarchy … from Cromwell’.755 News of 
Spain’s declaration of war on Cromwell was welcomed with relief by the court in exile. 
Hyde, in particular, realised that Spain would now be more open to negotiations with 
Charles II as it would be the most ‘hopeful way’ for Spain to continue the conflict with 
success.756 Again the exiled Stuart court would have to prove to the king of Spain that it 
‘could do much in England’ before any deal could be struck.757 To help this process, 
Charles II met the queen of Sweden at the end of October 1655. The queen was a recent 
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convert to Roman Catholicism and having an interview with her would hopefully help to 
endear Charles II to other important Catholic European powers, especially Spain. The 
meeting apparently went so well that the queen offered the Duke of York a place in her 
carriage to travel to Rome.758  
 
Such hopes of gaining support from Catholic powers explain the king’s 
displeasure at Henrietta Maria’s discussions with the Presbyterian agitator Bamfield, 
concerning a joint endeavour to overthrow Cromwell, and Charles’s instruction that his 
mother and Jermyn should cease such meddling.759 By the end of March 1656 Charles 
had travelled quietly to Brussels in the Spanish Netherlands to discuss such an alliance. 
By May, the king had taken up residence in Bruges and was granted an allowance by the 
Philip IV. Richard White reported in September 1656 that the king of Spain would do 
‘all he could’ for Charles, adding that he ‘would not believe’ how much the king of 
Spain had been vexed by the Protector’s failure to correspond with Philip IV ‘as he 
ought to’.760 
 
With negotiations opening between Charles II and Spain, the exiled court felt it 
was time to try and approach the court of Rome again. Hyde was led to believe that the 
pope was willing to ‘concur with his Majesty in what is not contrary to the Roman 
Catholic religion’.761 Once more Charles II’s intentions towards his subjects became the 
‘chief motive’ to engage with the papacy.762 Hyde wrote to the Catholic Richard 
Clement in April 1656 with a softer approach to the English Catholic community than he 
had previously displayed, probably evoked by political circumstance rather than any 
new fondness towards the religion.  
Whoever knows the king cannot but be well satisfied with his very gracious 
purpose towards his Catholic subjects, and I never yet spoke with any who hath 
not confessed to me that they are as great as soberly can be desired, however I 
know they are by others undervalued, who without considering what is practical 
or indeed possible, do not think any favour to your religion of importance 
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without renouncing his own, and therefore hate those who are against that more 
than they do the Presbyterians, and truly, I am much mistaken if those men do 
not bring more prejudice to the Catholic English than the Presbyterians.763 
Hyde stated again that Charles was far from enacting severe penalties against his 
Catholic subjects but believed, in reference to the penal laws, the less discussion of them 
the more easily they could dispense with them.764 
 
In 1657, Charles II was approached by the Irish politician Richard Bellings, an 
important figure in the coalition opposing Cromwell in Ireland in 1649 and a supporter 
of Ormond. Bellings wrote to the exiled Stuart on behalf of the Catholic priest Louis 
Stuart, Sieur d’Aubigny, a cousin of the king, with proposals for the advancement of 
both Catholicism and the king’s affairs. Although the proposals were not dated, from the 
king’s response to them, it seems that they were written around the time of Cromwell’s 
refusal of the Crown. D’Aubigny’s main proposal to the king was that he should allow 
his brother, the Duke of York, to convert to Catholicism, thus giving the English 
Catholic community a ‘visible testimony’ of Charles II’s affections towards them.765 
D’Aubigny proposed that the duke should be allowed to travel to Spain and be educated 
there, and therefore would secure the pope’s good affections towards both Charles II and 
Spain, in the hope of disadvantaging Cardinal Mazarin and his treaty with Cromwell.766 
D’Aubigny warned that the conversion should happen as quickly as possible to secure 
the English Catholic community’s support, since they were about to make a proposition 
to Cromwell to enable the English clergy to establish a bishop in England. The 
Catholics, in return, would live quietly. The English Catholics, Bellings wrote, 
thought of addressing themselves to Cromwell … to let them know, that they are 
ready to come to a final composition with them for their estates, and that they 
themselves will present such a form of oath, as shall not only bind their 
consciences but their affections; nay that they will give him a greater pledge of 
their fidelity in the person of one man, who shall be a bishop or superintendent 
over the clergy of England, and consequently have power over the consciences of 
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the whole Catholic party…and who will from time to time impose the execution 
of his commands as a matter of conscience on the Catholics.767 
Sieur d’Aubigny had already been approached to hold this position. This proposal by the 
community had received encouragement by men considered to be in ‘great credit’ with 
the Protector. It was thought that after Cromwell had listened to this proposal Mazarin 
would ‘press with all earnestness imaginable’ that he should accept it. This would block 
any prospect of the king’s restoration. Mazarin would then defend his treaty with 
Cromwell as a means to protect the Catholic religion and the community in England.768 
Conversely Cromwell would grant the proposal on the ground of the security it would 
bring to the Protectorate. If, Bellings argued, the duke was to become a Catholic, 
however, it would ‘instantly crush so dangerous a design; and that no respect of the 
Catholic sufferings, no promises, no offers from Cromwell, would in such a case induce 
the pope to give them a prelate’.769 This in turn, Bellings and Sieur d’Aubigny thought, 
would induce other Catholic princes and prelates to support Charles’s restoration. The 
letter ended by reassuring the king that d’Aubigny had considered whether his proposals 
would prejudice the king’s party in England but thought that it would not override their 
hatred for the regicide, the ‘abolition of old ways’, the ‘depressing of the ancient 
nobility’ or the ‘arbitrary power Cromwell hath assumed to insult over parliaments, 
which at all times were held as things sacred by the nation’.770 Further to this, although 
realising that the aforementioned ‘considerations’ might extend to other religious sects, 
who would claim to strengthen Charles II’s party ‘to compass their own ends’, Bellings 
asserted that ‘none of them [were] so dim-sighted, but he sees how powerful assistances 
are, which may be drawn from the Catholic party at home and abroad’.771 
 
Hyde and the king, however, met these proposals with hostility. In a letter to the 
king, Hyde explained the reply he had written for Bellings to deliver to d’Aubigny. 
Hyde considered the proposals unfit and unreasonable and, as things stood, it remained 
with the English Catholic community and their ‘unskilful importunity’ if they took any 







action which would ‘put it out of your power to do that for them which you intend’.772 
The king’s subsequent instructions to Bellings conveyed a diplomatic refusal of the 
proposals. Whilst passing on his thanks to d’Aubigny and asking for his continued 
support, Charles stated he was ‘ready to give as much evidence of an indulgent 
disposition and gracious purposes’ towards the community as he could, but, being of a 
different faith, could not ‘do what I know will hurt myself’ and would prove to Catholic 
disadvantage.773 It was not known how far Cromwell was from an agreement with the 
English Catholic community or how the pope would react to these negotiations, but ‘the 
apprehension of it’ would not induce the king to ‘do anything contrary to my own 
judgement and conscience’. If the Catholics believed Cromwell ‘after so many execrable 
perjuries and horrible revocations of all promises’, it was their problem, not Charles’s.774 
The instructions concluded that d’Aubigny was mistaken ‘in the temper of England, as 
to its indifference to religion, and inclinations to Catholics’ but nevertheless Charles was 
not, and could not be ‘an enemy to the Catholics’.775 
 
As this reply shows, like Cromwell, Charles had to carefully balance his 
solicitation of English Catholic support so as not to alienate other factions. Edward 
Nicholas reassured Marmaduke Langdale that there was ‘much more application made 
to the Catholics then to the Presbyterians’ adding that the king, whilst planning for his 
restoration, desired nothing more than ‘to take in all parties to serve him’.776 Similar 
sentiments were expressed concerning the attempted conversion of the duke of 
Gloucester by Henrietta Maria.777 Parliamentary intelligence reported that Charles II’s 
court had ‘thought themselves lost for ever, and to lose all their parties in England’ if 
they had allowed the conversion to go ahead.778 Their refusal, however, had reportedly 
led to Catholics in Rome, Spain and France to ‘speak against R:C and disaffect him’.779 
This could explain why a month earlier, in December 1654, the priest Talbot had warned 
                                                
772 ClSP, 55, f.982 (Hyde to the king, July 13th 1657). 
773 Ibid. f.983 (Instructions for Mr Bellings, July 13th 1657). 
774 Ibid. 
775 Ibid. 
776 Nicholas Papers, III, p.64. 
777 This will be discussed in more depth in chapter 6. 
778 Thurloe, III, p.44. 
779 Ibid. 
 171 
Hyde of rumours that the king’s civility towards the Catholics was false and just a 
consequence of his exile. Once he had made use of them for his ends, it was thought, 
Charles would ‘laugh at their folly’.780  
 
4.9. The 1640s and 1650s: a continuation of earlier political trends. 
The Restoration brought hope to the English Catholic secular clergy’s episcopal 
chapter in their hopes to reacquire jurisdiction over their community in England but 
Rome was still unwilling to grant them a bishop, at least until ‘the inclinations’ of the 
new regime were known.781 There was a strong precedent for the behaviour of both 
factions as well as that displayed by Cromwell and the Independents during the 1650s. 
The politics of the clergy after the civil war were reminiscent of strands in clerical 
politics in the late 1590s. Cromwell never really had majority support after the division 
between the Independents and the Presbyterians in 1649 and the alienation of the 
royalists after the regicide. Therefore he had to look for support abroad, from either 
France or Spain.  
 
It is instructive to see just how similar the patterns of religio-political manoeuvre 
and counter-manoeuvre were in Jacobean foreign policy, with James using a range of 
politick diplomatic tactics and playing off a variety of domestic interest groups in much 
the same way that Cromwell would do in the 1650s. James, before the death of 
Elizabeth, had canvassed the same European powers for support. In turn, he too had 
offered toleration to the English Catholic community in an attempt to gain its support. 
One of the preliminary articles of the Anglo-Spanish negotiations for the peace treaty of 
1604 was that the Spaniards would make payments on behalf of the English Catholics in 
return for a degree of toleration.782 Such toleration proved, however, impossible to 
achieve at that time. A letter from the Constable of Castile to Philip III in November 
1604 suggested that James could not authorise aid to the English Catholics because the 
Puritans were so ‘numerous’, in Scotland and England, and thought to be of such sinister 
intent that James was worried that if he supported the English Catholics the Puritans 
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would stage some kind of rebellion.783 Throughout the peace negotiations between 
James and Spain in 1604 there was serious debate behind the closed doors of the Privy 
Council about the repeal of recusancy laws.784 Whilst these discussions were going on, 
Parliament, determined to protect ‘their right’ over legislation, petitioned the king to put 
the recusancy laws against Catholics into full force.785 The Protestants in Parliament 
were too powerful to be resisted. It was clearly noted by those trying to negotiate a peace 
with England that even if King James was inclined to leniency towards the Catholics ‘he 
will be turned away and prevented by Parliament which will not allow it’.786  
 
Throughout his reign, James was also keenly aware of the antagonistic 
relationship between domestic religious issues and foreign policy. This can be clearly 
seen in both the Spanish and French dynastic match negotiations of the 1620s. In a 
concerted effort to maintain peace, James sought to secure a marriage settlement with 
either France or Spain from as early as 1614. This became more of an issue with the 
beginning of trouble in the Palatinate in 1618. From that year, when the negotiations 
were being debated in London, commissions of pursuivants against the Catholics were 
momentarily recalled and all the imprisoned Catholic clerics were released and put into 
the care of the Spanish ambassador, Gondomar, so they could leave the country with 
him.787 In a letter to Philip III in May 1614, Gondomar wrote that toleration for the 
English Catholics very much depended on the good will of James I, which was starting 
to be questioned:  
As to reason of state, he makes use of it towards our side by not appearing to be 
very severe against the Catholics and by dissimulating somewhat out of fear to 
retain the advantage which he is going to reap by enforcing the laws that are 
extent against them. They are the most severe that ever have been.788  
Philip III was urged to take no action unless ‘there is an affront to our honour’ as 
Gondomar feared the consequences for the English Catholics.789  
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As negotiations between Spain and England gained momentum James addressed 
his newly called parliament of 1621, asserting that he was a ‘true Protestant’ but arguing 
that when it came to matters of foreign policy and the consequent changes of domestic 
religious policy parliament should not bind his hands. To do so would be detrimental to 
the political standing of the kingdom on the Continent. This did not stop Protestant MPs 
attacking the English Catholics and demanding penal measures against them. Similarly, 
when James was negotiating a dynastic match with France in 1624, Parliament pressed 
for the enforcement of penal statutes against Catholics. As James arranged more 
favourable terms for English Catholics so that international negotiations could be 
successfully concluded, parliament continued to try to implement penal measures against 
them. As has been discussed earlier, the marriage between Henrietta Maria and Charles 
in 1625 did not improve the English Catholics’ lot. The same could be said of the Anglo-
French peace treaty in 1655. Both James and Cromwell, however, had used the position 
of Catholics in English society to secure concessions abroad. This was something which 
many Protestants were unwilling to countenance. Whether enacted or not, the possibility 
of such concessions for the Catholic community, placed them directly at the centre of 
politics and allowed Catholics to negotiate directly with the regime of the day, 
notwithstanding the qualms of the traditional standard bearers of anti-popery.  
 
This is not, however, to argue that Cromwell was doing nothing more than 
following pre-civil war precedents. Cromwell considered Roman Catholicism heretical 
in a way James VI probably did not, and his own beliefs were in constant conflict with 
his public endorsement of religious toleration. Yet, the dynastic match negotiations of 
the 1620s (Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-French) provided the same political opportunities 
for the clergy and the English Catholic community as did Cromwell’s foreign policy in 
the 1650s. On both occasions the Jesuit and the secular clergy fought for dominance in 
the community, especially over the exercising of ecclesiastical authority. In 1622 as the 
Anglo-Spanish negotiations were in full swing, George Gage told the pro-French faction 
among the secular clergy in no uncertain terms that they should stop trying to block the 
discussions with Spain by campaigning for their pro-French candidate for bishop. Gage 
argued that it was in their interest to ensure the negotiations were successful, otherwise 
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they would leave the English Catholic community exposed for the puritans in parliament 
to persecute them as they wished. The Anglo-French treaty of 1624 created the 
opportunity for the pro-French faction to become dominant within the English Catholic 
clergy. They managed to secure the bishopric of Chalcedon for Richard Smith thus, for a 
while, establishing an episcopal mode of government in England.790 As in the 1620s, in 
the negotiations between the chapter and Rome in 1656 there were still members of the 
clergy who were opposed to episcopal government in England, arguing that it would 
only increase anti-Catholic persecution.791 Such opposition was, however, usually 
factionally based. If the chance was that the bishop would be a member of an opposing 
faction and therefore dominate the community at the expense of his Catholic critics, it 
made sense to lobby at Rome against episcopal government altogether. 
 
There was also a clear precedent for the chapter’s calls for episcopal government 
at the time of the Anglo-French peace treaty in 1655. Members of the secular clergy had 
begun a campaign in the 1620s during the dynastic match negotiations between England 
and Spain for the appointment of a bishop to exercise local ordinary jurisdiction over 
Catholics in England and Scotland. Catholics who supported episcopal government in 
the 1620s argued that it would help secure Catholic loyalty to the Crown by silencing 
those Catholics of a ‘hotter sort’ who might be considered a threat to the monarch’s 
safety. A bishop could command obedience to the Crown and would ‘underpin the 
purposes of the Jacobean state’.792 This was also the tack taken by the clergy in 1655. 
The peace treaty heightened the chapter’s hopes for toleration; pledging its loyalty to the 
republic would, they thought, only further their cause. Neither in 1625 nor 1655 was 
there enough support from France to sustain Catholic Episcopal government in England, 
but the clergy also failed to persuade the majority of the Protestant population of their 
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4.10. Conclusion. 
There can be no doubt that the factional in-fighting among the clergy weakened 
their hopes for toleration. But amongst all the bickering the English Catholic Church 
was able to continue much as it had done under the Jacobean and Caroline regimes. In 
fact, one could argue that the secular clergy actually benefited from the collapse of royal 
government. At least their programme was not impeded by the new republican state. 
Before 1640 the institution of a Catholic bishop and chapter was important to the 
English Catholic community because it was a challenge to the monarchy and the 
National Church. After the regicide it assumed a different role. For a time the secular 
clergy were able to operate a hierarchical system of church government, even after the 
death of Bishop Smith and the refusal of the court of Rome to confirm the chapter. The 
chapter set out clear proposals for advancing the mission, outlining matters of etiquette 
and guidelines for the arrival of new missionary priests, in order to secure a safe and 
quiet existence. All new priests were required to meet with the vicar general of the 
district they had been sent to before they did anything else. The proposals outlined the 
circumstances when a priest could be given money from the common purse and required 
that all cases of a mixed Protestant and Catholic marriage to be referred to the vicar 
general immediately as a mixed marriage was regarded as a ‘dangerous’ situation.793 
Chapter meetings and assemblies were held to enable the clergy to regulate themselves. 
Discussions were held on the appointments of rural deans and their approval by the 
archdeacon and the vicar general of the particular district. There was also debate about 
how best to use the chapter’s capital.794 Much care was taken on the division of the 
counties and the appointments of archdeacons to control the clergy in them.795 The 
clergy also responded to the Marriage Act of 1653 when parliament made a concerted 
effort to register marriages. The Marriage Act stated that only a civil ceremony marriage 
conducted by a Justice of the Peace would be recognised by the State.796 The Catholic 
community resolved that after the civil marriage the bride and groom had to present 
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themselves before a priest who would then marry them in a Catholic ceremony, before 
the marriage could be consummated.797  
 
The pre-civil war clergy had attempted to work out a credible distinction 
between what they claimed were matters of politics and activities they argued were 
solely religious. In doing so they pledged their political allegiance to Charles and 
attempted to achieve greater toleration for the mission and the community. But the 
defeat and execution of the king and the alliance between Scottish Presbyterians and 
Charles II changed everything. The English Catholic clergy, whether Blackloist, 
Francophile or Hispanophile, used many of the strategies which they had deployed 
before the civil war. The Blackloists tried to negotiate grounds for toleration from the 
new regime by pledging their political allegiance to it, in particular, by denying 
important aspects of papal political authority. In principle Thomas White argued, Roman 
Catholicism, by the law of nature, dictated no particular mode of polity. The 
Francophiles never abandoned their royalist political roots and only when the peace 
treaty was signed between France and England were they hopeful of religious toleration. 
The Hispanophiles, on the other hand, supported approaches by Spain and, indirectly, 
the pope to negotiate toleration for the community. Cromwell was, however, unwilling 
to make the concessions for which the Catholics agitated. He needed support at home 
from both the Presbyterians and the ‘old parliamentarians’, that is, those who had fought 
against the king on account of the ‘popish plot’ conspiracies. Whatever his other needs, 
Cromwell could never quite abandon the assumptions of contemporary anti-popery.  
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5. English Catholic politicised discourse 
 
 
A review by George Tavard in 1978 of recusant thought in the seventeenth 
century concluded that during the Interregnum, ‘apart from some writings of Christopher 
Davenport and the conversions of a few Anglicans’ political events had ‘little impact’ on 
Catholic political thought.798 The previous chapters of this thesis, however, have 
suggested that this period saw the English Catholic community trying actively to 
integrate itself into rapidly shifting national and international political frameworks. One 
way in which to trace the twists and turns made by different parts of the community as 
they attempted to make alliances with other political interest groups is to examine the 
large number of texts published by Catholics during this period.  
 
English Catholic books were published at much higher rates in the 1650s than in 
the 1630s and 1640s.799 The writers who were most prolific, and whose texts were 
republished most frequently between 1641 and 1660 were also prominent actors in the 
politics of the Catholic community. The most popular was the infamous controversialist 
Thomas White, but Peter Walsh, Hugh Cressy, John Austin, John Sergeant and Peter 
Talbot were not far behind.800 Catholic books published during the 1650s tell us a great 
deal about how English Catholics participated in national politics. 
 
Catholic printed material of the 1650s suggests that the English Catholic 
community developed three possible routes to navigate through Interregnum politics. 
The first was to stay loyal to the Stuart monarchy and hope for the its future restoration, 
as favoured by the Francophile section of the clergy. The second was to accept the 
Independents’ ideas of religious pluralism and seek acceptance as one of several 
‘tolerable’ denominations. This strategy dated back to the approaches made by the 
Catholics to the Army in 1647 and continued by the Blackloists, in particular. The third 
strategy was to utilise the development of religious pluralism to their advantage by 
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seeking to establish a common cause with other denominations who wanted an ordered 
church structure. These negotiations were based on episcopacy. Common ground was 
most apparent with Laudians, who, led by the absence of a monarch during the 1650s, 
saw episcopacy as the defining feature of Anglicanism. Yet English Catholics also saw 
the possibilities of an alliance with those Presbyterians801 who believed a limited 
episcopacy would help to maintain moral discipline in a parish-based system, and fill a 
vacuum in church government that resulted. This emphasis on episcopacy, however, 
inevitably got entangled with some clergy members’ campaign for a Catholic bishop. 
 
This chapter consists of six parts. The first looks at Catholic political thought 
between 1650 and 1654 and shows how the debate within the community over whether 
to seek toleration from the new regime or stay loyal to the monarchy played out in print. 
The second and third sections explore English Catholics’ attempts to participate in 
debates over a national Church settlement and, in particular, the interactions between 
some members of the community and moderate Presbyterians who favoured reduced 
episcopal authority. The fourth section of this chapter looks at Laudian responses to 
Catholic controversial literature, especially Catholic attempts to align themselves with 
moderate pro-episcopal Presbyterians. The fifth surveys English Catholic reactions to 
the failure of the Cromwellian Church settlement and the sixth explores Catholic 
attempts to show the compatibility of Roman Catholicism and monarchical authority in 
anticipation of the Restoration. 
 
5.1 Catholic political thought, 1650-1654. 
Catholic published tracts which circulated in England during 1651 and 1652 
concentrated on allegiance to civil authority and the possibility of toleration. Twenty-
five Catholic tracts advocating religious toleration were published during the 1640s and 
1650s. John Austin was the most prolific author of this type of publication and his tracts, 
along with others mentioned below, were part of a substantial Catholic petitioning 
                                                
801 I am aware that ‘church puritan’ is a more accurate description of the beliefs of these English 
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campaign before the 1653 Parliament.802 Austin, who used the name William Birchley, 
published The Christian Moderator, or Persecution Condemned in 1649.803 It was 
republished in 1651 and again a year later with additions. The Christian Moderator was 
written to ‘demonstrate that conscience-persecution amongst Christians is clearly 
repugnant to the Light of Nature, the law of God and the evidence of our own 
principles’.804 Austin asserted that now that English Catholics had ‘so happily shaken off 
that intolerable yoke’ of the pope’s infallibility, papist political practices were consistent 
with civil government.805 Austin’s second edition of this work, The Catholiques plea, or 
an explanation, was a much longer tract, arguing strongly for religious toleration and 
overtly aligning Catholicism with the Independents against an alleged Presbyterian 
tyranny. Austin argued that it was the Presbyterian and prelatical factions that stood in 
the way of legalising the practice of Roman Catholicism. Austin wrote: 
The papists of England would be bound by their own interest (the strongest 
obligation to wise men) to live peaceably and thankfully in the private exercise 
of their consciences, and becoming gainers, by such compassion, could not so 
reasonably be distrusted as the prelatical or Presbyterian party, who must needs 
reckon themselves no small losers, in that the reins of authority are taken out of 
their hands, which they had by turn abused into mere whips for their brethren.806  
Austin attempted to absolve English Catholics from allegations of ‘non-submission’ to 
the new government and included a copy of the ‘Humble Petition of the Roman 
Catholics’, submitted to parliament on the 20th June 1652.807 The petition, Austin 
argued, made reasonable appeals and showed Catholics’ ‘much respect and 
submissiveness’ for the new regime.808  
 
Austin had strong links with Blacklo and Henry Holden, but although he shared 
their Gallican principles, he was not a Blackloist.809 Later on in this tract, however, 
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Austin made a claim that would come back and haunt the Catholic community after the 
restoration of Charles II, when he questioned the prevalence of Catholic royalism: ‘I am 
well satisfied, that a great part of those papists, who are sequestered as absolute 
delinquents, were never in actual arms against the parliament, but only fled to the 
enemies garrisons for shelter’.810 Although this type of claim had been made by 
Catholics elsewhere, most notably by those charged with both delinquency and 
recusancy by the Committee for Compounding, Austin’s defence would repeatedly be 
used in anti-Catholic rhetoric after the Restoration. Austin’s work was used to argue that 
Catholics had been disloyal to the Stuart monarchy and so justify the exclusion of 
Roman Catholics from a mainstream national church settlement. Austin’s tract 
concluded with anti-popish cases that had taken place at Haberdashers Hall in the City 
of London and a list of executed priests. It caused outrage amongst Presbyterian 
booksellers who petitioned parliament to forbid ‘heretical’ publications.811 Austin’s 
work was condemned along with Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.812 The Independents in 
the Army, however, stepped in to defend Austin against what they regarded as 
‘Presbyterian slavery’.813 The third edition of Austin’s Christian Moderator was 
published in 1653. 
 
Austin was not alone in publishing arguments in favour of toleration. The priest 
Miles Pinckney, alias Thomas Carre, published his A Treatise of Subjection to the 
Powers in 1651 also. Pinckney had been a close associate of Bishop Smith during the 
approbation controversy during the late 1620s and early 1630s.814 He had been trained at 
Douai college and although he had founded and led the Augustinian nuns at Paris, it was 
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thought that he was still consulted on financial matters concerning Douai.815 By July 
1668, however, George Leyburn noted that Pinckney was a priest who ‘always strongly 
upheld the strange and harmful doctrine of White, and to the best of his power promoted 
Jansenism’ and that he had refused to help his nephew join the priesthood because of its 
aversion to Jansenist principles.816 Pinckney’s work, A Treatise of Subjection to the 
Powers, suggests that these accusations were true. Dedicated to the honourable 
Committee for Plundered Ministers, Pinckney argued that Catholics were taught 
subjection to ruling powers by the Scriptures and therefore should be considered loyal 
subjects. Pinckney justified the overthrow of Charles I on the grounds that although it 
was unlawful to resist a king, Charles I’s government was not an ‘absolute’ monarchy. 
Instead authority was invested in ‘king and parliament [in] conjunction’ for the benefit 
of the people. It was therefore lawful, Pinckney argued, for the people and parliament to 
take power from the king.817 Pinckney went on to state he did not look upon the power 
of the present parliament as ‘usurped or tyrannical’ as their power had come from 
God.818 He went even further, claiming to have been ‘amazed’ by Charles I’s continued 
declarations of Protestantism given the late king’s proclamations ‘in popish parts’ for the 
advancement of Catholicism, his invitation to the Irish rebels, the presence of the papal 
nuncio at Court and Charles’s decision to allow papists to arm themselves.819 Pinckney 
then encouraged English Catholics to take the Engagement.  
 
These assertions, although extreme, are not surprising, since Pinckney was one 
of the priests who had signed the Three Propositions to the Army, discussed in the 
previous chapter. His work may also have been a response to the crowning of Charles II 
by the Scots at Scone in January and to Charles’s defeat at the battle of Worcester in 
September 1651. It is noteworthy, however, that despite this publication Pinckney was 
still accepted into Henrietta Maria’s circle in France and returned to England with her 
after the Restoration.  
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Catholic pleas for toleration in these first years of the Commonwealth became 
mixed up with the Jesuit rhetoric which had been used by William Allen and Robert 
Persons during the reign of Elizabeth I.820 They had argued that it was, under certain 
circumstances, licit to depose monarchs rather than to waste time petitioning such a ruler 
for toleration, and played up the political power of the papacy.821 The Jesuit Thomas 
Fitzherbert was one of the most prominent figures of this school, and it was by no means 
coincidental that his famous tract A Treatise Concerning Policy and Religion was 
reissued in 1652. Twelve years after his death and forty-six years since its first 
publication, Fitzherbert’s political ideas suited those who were trying to reconcile the 
English Catholic community to the new regime. Fitzherbert wrote that the duty of the 
subjects was to give to ‘Cesar that which is Cesar’s, and to God that which is Gods’.822 
A tyrannical ruler would, however, be deposed by God and, therefore, rebellion could be 
seen as His work. Fitzherbert wrote: 
the true cause of the decay and overthrow of most families, is the same that I had 
showed by evident examples to be the ruin of kingdoms and States, to wit the 
sins of men, punished either in themselves, or in their children and posterity 
whereby whole families are extirpated, races extinguished, ancient houses 
decayed and personal defects or imperfections continued, sometimes in families 
for many descents.823 
Fitzherbert lamented the changing meaning of the Latin word ‘Tyrannus’. Once, he 
recalled, it ‘signified a Monarch and absolute King’ but now, after the abuse of royal 
authority, it signified ‘only a Tyrant’.824 Powerful words in 1606, but equally so in 1652.  
A Treatise Concerning Policy and Religion was a strongly anti-monarchical tract. This 
was a common Catholic trope in the late sixteenth century. Jesuitical Catholics were 
considered as bad as Presbyterians. John Knaresborough, the Catholic antiquarian, 
claimed that Protestants learned rebellion from Catholics.825 
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It was not just Jesuit publications that were employed to court the new regime. 
Richard Smith’s An Historical Epistle, republished in 1652, although dedicated to King 
James, aimed to show, through the history of England, how nations benefited from 
‘mutual amity and league of friendship’ between princes and court of Rome.826 While it 
held a papal alliance, Smith argued, ‘the sceptre of England continued and flourished’ 
but after Henry VIII had broken the alliance ‘upon mere passion’, the kingdom fell into 
‘dangers and troubles…[and] his progenie consumed, and his crown translated to an 
other royal line, against which in his time he made a sharp war’.827 This could also be 
read in a Caroline context. The Stuart court had never re-established an alliance with 
Rome and had then been overthrown. Smith’s An Historical Epistle could serve as 
encouragement to the new political regime to begin overtures to the pope. The motives 
behind the publication of this 1652 edition are, however, ambiguous. It could also be 
argued that since the author was a prominent Francophile associated with the exiled 
Stuart court, the republished work was a plea to the exiled Charles to work with Rome, 
showing how an alliance would benefit his cause.  
 
These Catholic publications do not, however, tell the whole story. As has been 
shown in the previous chapter not all of the English Catholic community believed in an 
accommodation with the new regime. These publications were therefore 
counterbalanced during 1650-1653 by others arguing that there should be no association 
with the Independents. In 1652 the publisher John Heigham’s 1634 Touchstone of the 
Reformed Gospel was reprinted. Touchstone fitted well into the new political 
circumstances. It told the story of Acacius, Bishop of Constantinople, who ‘had greater 
desire to satisfy the Emperor’s mind’ then to advance his own faith.828 Heigham used the 
words of the philosopher Themistius to argue that Acacius worshipped the Emperor 
instead of God, warning his readers that ‘a known dissembler is never well thought of, 
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‘John Heigham [alias Roger Heigham] (b. c.1568, d. in or after 1634), bookseller’, ODNB. 
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yea, he is always secretly misliked of the same potentates whom he thinketh by soothing 
and yielding, to gratify’.829 The book’s message was that a good Catholic should ‘resist 
the fancy of his Prince’ even if it meant discomfort, as the reward offered in Heaven 
would be better than any earned on Earth.830 
 
1652 also saw the publication of an edition of Lorenzo Scupoli’s The Christian 
Pilgrim in his Spirituall Conflict and Conquest. The tract sought to inspire spirituality 
and discipline to Roman Catholic scripture in the English Catholic community. Versions 
of this book had first been published in 1598 and again in 1610 and 1613. Scupoli 
dedicated the epistle to ‘the devout champions, fighting in this spiritual warfare’.831 He 
argued that Roman Catholics were well equipped to defend their beliefs with scripture. 
This would make them ‘conquerors and triumphers’.832 The Christian Pilgrim was really 
a rallying cry to the Catholic community to resist oppression and, in Scupoli’s words, to 
bring ‘the animal man under the feet of the intellectual, in raising up the intellectual man 
to his proper sphar which is the creator’.833 The Catholic community, Scupoli suggested, 
should not politick for earthly gains. 
 
Nicholas Caussin’s life of King Herod, The Unfortunate Politique was published 
in 1653.834 Caussin was a staunch royalist dedicated to both the French and English 
courts. His tract discussed the actions of the ‘irreligious and imposperous politician’ 
Herod whose ‘malice and hostility against God’s chosen people – by usurpation and 
borrowed title’, and his tyrannical government, held no ‘civil or legal regard of his 
people’. 835 Caussin’s Herod bore similarities to Cromwell, a politician who had usurped 
a divinely chosen power and was now persecuting the English Catholics. 
 
It should be no surprise that, as with Catholic overtures to the Army and 
parliament many Catholic publications from 1650 to 1653 advocated an agreement with 
                                                
829 Ibid. pp.69-70. 
830 Ibid. p.72. 
831 L. Scupoli, The Christian Pilgrim in his Spirituall Conflict and Conquest (Paris, 1652), Epistle. 
832 Ibid. 
833 Ibid. The subject of the spiritual conflict. 
834 N. Caussin, The Unfortunate Politique (London, 1653). 
835 Ibid. To the Reader. 
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the new regime. The introduction of the Protectorate in 1653 signified the highpoint of 
the new order which had defeated Charles at Worcester, gone a long way to subjugating 
Ireland, and won battles against the Dutch. By arguing for the compatibility of Roman 
Catholic teachings and republican ideals, a section of the English Catholic community 
hoped to promote an understanding with this new government. Ironically, this even went 
so far as to make use of Jesuit polemic from the Elizabethan era. As we have seen, the 
establishment of the Protectorate allowed Catholics to negotiate again for toleration and 
to exploit approaches to the new regime from the courts of Rome, Spain and France. The 
former were unsuccessful. The latter rumbled on inconclusively and did not secure the 
rewards for which many Catholics had hoped. They did, however, create a space for the 
expression of Catholic political ideas.  
 
Non-Catholic reactions to Catholic approaches to the Independents included a 
flurry of anti-Catholic pamphlets which criticised Independency and tried to portray 
negotiations as a Jesuit plot.836 An anonymous pamphlet argued against the 
Independents, stating that God had given power to magistrates to make laws for the 
advancement of true religion against idolatry and heresy.837 A pamphlet by Henry Hall, 
Digitus testium, or a dreadful alarm to the whole kingdom, published in 1650 argued 
that the Engagement was part of a Catholic conspiracy and was ‘like the Trojan horse 
that hath concealed in the belly of it [the plot], the ruin of the lawful magistracy, lawful 
ministry and lawful reformed religion’.838 Hall held the Jesuits responsible for the 
execution of Charles I as the pope was against monarchical power and argued that 
Presbyterianism was a Catholic plot that got out of hand and needed to be curtailed 
(hence the king’s actions against the Covenanters and Rinuccini’s actions in Ireland).839 
Hall even accused the Independents of involvement in the Catholic plot, writing that 
Independency ‘was but the wooden horse with a thousand heresies in his belly, brought 
                                                
836 See, for example, Anon, England Ichabod, Glory departed, discoursed by two Christian men, zealous 
for the glory of God and true lawes of their Nation (London, 1650), p.10. 
837 Anon, The Examiner Examined (London, 1652), p.5. 
838 H. Hall, Digitus tesium, or a dreadful alarm to the whole kingdom (London, 1650), Preface. 
839 Ibid. pp.8-10, 12, 13, 18. 
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into the kingdom of England by the Romish politicians … to fly in the face of the 
reformed religion’.840 
 
5.2. English Catholics and visions of a national church settlement. 
The counterattack from those Catholics who believed that their co-religionists 
should not compromise their faith displayed the divisions within the Catholic 
community over whether to support the new regime or to stay loyal to the exiled Stuart 
monarchy. They warned their fellow Catholics of the risk of displeasing God by shaping 
their beliefs to fit the new political dispensation, particularly the restriction that would 
be placed on religious liberty concerning the authority of the pope and the taking of the 
sacraments. The year 1654, however, signified a profound change in Catholic political 
thought as the Catholic community reacted to new political opportunities created by the 
Cromwellian search for a Church settlement. As a result, an ‘episcopal nonconformist’ 
minister, Richard Baxter, came to have a significant effect on English Roman Catholic 
thought. 
 
After the Independents came to power in 1651 there was widespread agitation for 
a national Church settlement, since the Rump’s passing of the Toleration Act in 
September 1650 rendered the Presbyterian reforms of the Westminster Assembly in 
1643 essentially null and void.841 Protestant appeals for a Church settlement grew 
stronger in 1652 with many counties presenting petitions to Parliament.842 In response 
Independent ministers presented their Humble Proposals to the Rump in February 1652. 
They proposed that ecclesiastical authority should be vested in local commissioners who 
would not only vet ministerial candidates against scandalous doctrine but would also 
purge the Church of existing ministers whom they judged scandalous in religious 
                                                
840 Ibid. p.15. 
841 The Toleration Act repealed Elizabethan legislation requiring attendance at one’s parish church. There 
is no specific reference to Catholics in the wording of the act. It ambiguously stated that it was intended 
only for the relief of ‘pious and peaceably minded people’, (see C. Firth and R. Rait (eds.), Acts and 
Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, II (London, 1911), pp.423-425). On the same day that the act 
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Parliament 1648-1653 (Cambridge, 1974), pp.238-239). 
842 J. Collins, ‘The Church Settlement of Oliver Cromwell’, History, 87, 285 (2002), pp.18-40, at p.24. 
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belief.843 Such proposals would provide a Church settlement based on the union of godly 
Protestant parties.844 The Rump recalled the commission for the propagation of the 
gospel to debate the proposals and in turn they agreed them. By March/April 1653 
several points of the Humble Proposals had been passed but, before further progress 
could be made, Cromwell forcibly dissolved the Rump. The Barebones Assembly was 
established in place of the Rump and Cromwell’s subsequent campaign for a church 
settlement was a direct attempt to revive the Humble Proposals.845 There was, however, 
much opposition from pro-sectarian members, concerned that these proposals would 
curtail religious liberty and make the Church too reliant on state power. In frustration at 
the Barebones Assembly’s inability to reach a settlement and fearing that radicals within 
it would usurp power to impose their legal ideas, Cromwell’s supporters launched a 
coup that saw the Assembly surrender its power on 12th December. Cromwell was 
established as Lord Protector four days later.846 This opened the way for a Cromwellian 
Church settlement, a type of ‘magisterial Independency’.847 
 
Amongst those calling for a Church settlement was Richard Baxter, an ‘episcopal 
nonconformist’ minister from Kidderminster, Worcestershire. In response to the 
numerous sects which had formed after the civil war, Baxter argued for the necessity of 
a national Church. He used Archbishop James Ussher’s ideas of a limited episcopacy to 
encourage unity amongst Protestants. A version of a national Church had been offered to 
the king during the negotiations with parliament in 1647; the king had accepted but the 
parliamentarians refused it. By 1652, however, Baxter regretted the lack of a disciplinary 
structure, such as had been supplied by the Church courts.848 With a positive response 
from his congregation in Kidderminster he set up a ‘coercive jurisdiction’ policy 
whereby he was authorised by his congregation to investigate any of the worshippers 
                                                
843 Ibid. p.25. 
844 For a historiographical review of the debate over whether the Cromwellian regime was tolerant or 
sought Protestant unity see B. Worden, ‘Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate’, in W.J. Sheils 
(ed.), Persecution and toleration: papers read at the Twenty-Second Summer Meeting of the Ecclesiastical 
History Society (Oxford, 1984), pp.199-233. 
845 Collins, ‘Church Settlement’, p.25. 
846 Coward, The Cromwellian Protectorate, pp.13-21. 
847 Collins, ‘Church Settlement’, p.22. 
848 S.R. Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1660, II (London, 1897), p.325. 
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suspected of lax morals.849 He then, in turn, created the Worcester Association, a 
mixture of Worcestershire ministers from different Protestant sects, who worked to 
support each other’s ministry in the community regardless of their different opinions, 
thereby creating a substitute for episcopal authority.850 The Worcester Association 
petitioned parliament at the end of 1652 asking them to work towards establishing a 
limited episcopacy (of Presbyterian discipline) in order to save God’s ‘Church, his 
Gospel, and the souls of ourselves and posterity’ from seduction by ‘Romish 
adversaries’.851 The petition focused on Baxter’s distinction between episcopacy and 
‘prelacy’. He wanted an episcopal model for coercive jurisdiction, whereby ministers 
from the Independents, Presbyterians and Baptists would work together parochially to 
unify the Church.852 The petition argued that establishing a limited coercive episcopacy 
whose ministers were ‘some of the most godly, prudent peaceable divines of each party’, 
would produce an accommodation over Church government and bring unity of religion 
for the English.853  
 
Although the petition seemed to suggest that Roman Catholics would not be 
included, Baxter’s private correspondence with John Dury, a Church of England 
minister, gave an altogether different impression. Dury was a natural choice of 
correspondent for Baxter. A previous member of the Westminster Assembly, he had 
spent most of the 1620s and 1630s campaigning for a worldwide Protestant union and 
even trying to secure Archbishop Laud’s support.854 Dury had renounced his royalist 
credentials in 1649 and aligned himself with the new regime by supporting the 
Engagement Act. Writing to Dury before the Worcester petition, Baxter suggested a 
conference be held amongst Protestant divines to agree to a Church union.855 The 
                                                
849 Ibid. 
850 Ibid. For more discussion on religion in parishes during this period see D. Beaver, ‘Behemoth, or civil 
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854 J.T. Young, ‘John Durie [Dury]’, ODNB.  
855 J.C. Spalding and M.F. Brass, ‘Reduction of Episcopacy as a Means of Unity, 1640-1662’, Church 
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proposed meeting would include Protestant, Independent, Episcopal and Erastian 
representatives; Catholics, Baxter wrote, should not be part of the original negotiations 
but once a settlement was reached he thought it ‘pious and laudable’ to accommodate 
with the Catholics too, ‘At such a time’, he pondered ‘there might be an international 
council initiated by the sovereign power’.856 Baxter was attempting to co-opt Protestant 
divines into an agreement implementing a reduced episcopacy. Once terms were agreed, 
he was willing slowly to introduce Catholic divines into the Church settlement. Not only 
did Baxter believe that ‘the silliest soul is precious and must not be vilified or neglected’ 
but he also recognised the Catholic Church as a direct descendent of the Ancient Church 
and admired the discipline it taught.857 Baxter could appeal to a particular sort of 
Catholic and was trying to exploit extant divisions between the English Catholics, in 
particular the ones that stretched back to the Elizabethan period. He argued for Christian 
unity based on a rejection of Jesuitical politicization of religion. Indeed, during the 
ensuing debates concerning the religious settlement during the first years of Charles II’s 
reign, Baxter corresponded with the Catholic priest William Johnson, alias Couborne. 
They debated (in a gentlemanly manner) the infallibility of the Church of Rome and the 
necessity of communicating with the See of Rome.858 It must be remembered that 
Baxter’s prime reason for negotiation was to stop separatist sects and, although he saw 
the possibility of accommodating Catholics into a church settlement, Jesuits were to be 
excluded.859 
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With the establishment of the Protectorate came renewed efforts to reach an 
agreement over the national Church. Cromwell set up a committee of the Council of 
State in 1654 to pursue ideas that had been included in the Humble Proposals. In 
February, Dury held a meeting of the London clergy made up of five Presbyterians and 
five Independent divines. They discussed proposals for a church settlement, but enjoyed 
only very limited political support.860 Baxter was invited to attend but was disappointed 
with the outcome. The Independent ministers rejected his plans for ‘total 
latitudinarianism’.861 The main point of contention between Baxter, Cromwell, and Dury 
was how to bring about a Protestant union. Baxter believed any that changes should be 
carried out by divines whereas both Cromwell and Dury felt that ‘directive power’ 
should rest with parliament.862  
 
From the aforementioned committee of the Council of State two ordinances were 
passed in 1654: Triers in March and Ejectors in August. These were policies that had 
been outlined in the Humble Proposals and could now be implemented because their 
critics had been removed. The Triers were to judge whether ministerial nominees were 
godly enough to preach and be given a living and Ejectors were to eject ministers who 
were scandalous and, therefore, disloyal to the government and to God.863 Neither body 
was composed of solely clerical authority; in fact the Ejectors were all laymen, men 
specifically loyal to the Protectorate. The clergy no longer had independent authority; 
the removal of episcopacy was viewed as the removal of ‘seditious political faction’.864 
The separation of the spiritual and temporal had been overridden; religion was now 
under state control.  
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There was no space within this Church settlement for Roman Catholics, 
episcopalians or separatists. It does not, however, appear totally to have disenchanted the 
English Catholic community. Incredibly, ‘certain divines’, no doubt with the knowledge 
and support of Baxter, presented a petition to the General Sessions of Peace at Worcester 
in 1654, defending Roman Catholics against a recent petition. They asked the justices 
and jury at Worcester to join with them in petitioning ‘his highness the Lord Protector’ 
against such violent anti-Catholic aggression although they also clearly stated that they 
disliked Catholicism.865 The petitioners argued that the Catholic community was already 
persecuted and held no power anyway. To add to its ‘suffering condition’ could ‘intend 
nothing but destruction’.866 Such desires from ministers of the Gospel, the petition 
continued, were not a part of Christianity and Catholics no longer represented a threat to 
the safety of the country:  
Let any divine show me how in conscience he can be persuaded to destroy 
anyone, or to deprive him of liberty or livelihood because being of a different 
Christian faith to him… And for restraining or securing in their sense: what 
securing without punishing. It is the means of deceit to make difference in the 
terms when there is no real difference in the things themselves. What other 
securing then the laws still in force: such as the most exasperated times did 
produce: and such as send to prison banishment yea and to death itself in those 
cases of offending against the civil government.867  
 
The petitioners’ pro-episcopal stance was conveyed by their argument that not 
only would Church government prevent schisms but that without such government 
Catholics were likely to fall ‘into their extremes and so consequently to their ruin: so 
doth religion as it hath a human and worldly part in it’.868 The petition attempted a clear 
distinction between English and Irish Catholics to counteract the hostility created by the 
Irish Rebellion. The English Catholics, it stated, had always denied the pope’s 
infallibility and temporal power whereas the Irish were ‘never naturally in their 
allegiance to England’ because they ‘never had any natural born king since they were 
conquered but foreign government over them’. The petition appears almost ‘appellant’ 
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in tone and used the same rhetoric as William Cecil in his famous publication The 
Execution of Justice in England in 1583.869 It was also strongly anti-Jesuit, arguing that 
Spanish popery was synonymous with treason, referring to the plotting of the Earls of 
Westmorland and Northumberland against Queen Elizabeth. It accused Persons and his 
fellow Jesuits of corrupting papists’ children in seminaries but was keen to state that not 
all Catholics supported Spain or Spanish popery. It emphasised that there had not been 
‘the least whisper of treason from the papists’ since the Gunpowder Plot in 1605.870 
There were ‘great many in the Army’, the petition closed, that were ‘opposers of the 
Church’, but it argued that ‘So as we see generally and commonly there is a nearer way 
to security than by the severity especially in affairs of religion’.871  
 
An anonymous pamphlet published in the same year expressed similar 
sentiments. Stereoma stated that it was reasonable for English Catholics, priests 
excluded, to be tolerated.872 It argued that different opinions should be tolerated except 
popery because its doctrines were ‘directly contrary to the tenor of the scriptures’.873 Lay 
Catholics could be tolerated, however, as long as they lived peaceably and did not hold 
authorative positions within society.874 If Catholics increased exponentially or engaged 
in plotting, the author said they could be rounded up and sent to live either under the 
governance of foreign Catholic leaders or in a new colony by themselves.875 Catholics 
could be punished for plotting against the State, even if the king or nobility were 
involved in the rebellion.876 The pamphlet also advocated a reduced episcopacy 
sufficiently independent of state control. Magistrates, the author wrote, had no further or 
higher power to judge religion than that given to every man.877 The magistrate, it was 
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argued, was only a ‘determinative’ judge in political matters, a synod was the highest 
judge in ecclesiastical matters.878 
 
Baxter’s interventions, the non-establishment of a reduced episcopacy and a 
Church settlement that failed many people, presented a new opportunity to the English 
Catholic community, the Jesuits excepted.879 There can be little doubt that this was 
attractive, particularly to the episcopal chapter. Certainly reports reached the exiled 
Stuart court suggesting ‘compliance’ between the Catholics and the Presbyterians. 
Joseph Jane wrote to Edward Nicholas at the Hague that if an alliance had been made 
between the two parties it was for profit only ‘for at present the Presbyterians are not so 
tender to endure the breath of no papist. They fear more of the Independent, if he get a 
mastery’.880 Yet, it should be remembered that Baxter was not a typical Presbyterian. He 
favoured an inclusive ministry (along with the Laudians and Catholics) unlike many 
other Presbyterians who did not. 
 
Anti-Catholic writers were aware of these potential connections between 
Catholicism and Presbyterianism. Pamphlets published during the early 1650s argued 
that Catholics and Presbyterians were of the same ilk, especially regarding ecclesiastical 
authority. The writer Edward Lee, in his Legneda lignea directly answered Birchley’s 
Christian Moderator and argued ‘If an erroneous conscience may have liberty to 
conceive what opinion he please and to speak and act what he will, there will be no end 
of scandals and offences’.881 He also defended, in effect, iure divino episcopacy.882 Lee 
argued that Catholics and Presbyterians were working together to enforce a change in 
religion and it was these two groups who were responsible for Laud’s execution. Lee 
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quoted from a sermon of Laud’s, which alleged that ‘the Romans will come, and will 
take our country’.883 Lee continued, ‘That prediction proves now to a true prophecy; see 
the politique union of bitter enemies, using the same means to contrary ends’.884 Both, 
Lee argued, had been trying to implement their own religion but the English, unlike the 
Scottish, had had not fallen for their plans. Now the Catholics had resorted to 
campaigning for toleration. Lee accused those Catholics who took the Oath of 
Abjuration of doing so in order to save their estates from sequestration and sneered at 
Birchley’s attempt to seek protection under the Army’s motto of ‘liberty to all tender 
and oppressed consciences’ as, Lee argued, it was ‘papal and Presbyterian’ tyranny that 
the motto was meant to serve against.885 The papists’ ‘erroneous consciences’ were 
‘inconsistent’ with civil government.886 Lee ended his work hoping ‘[t]hat the great 
bellows of faction and sedition (the Presbyter, and the Jesuit) might have their mouths 
stopped that they might not breathe so freely, and further blow and kindle the coals of 
dissention’.887 
 
An anonymous pamphlet entitled Old popery in a new dress of presbyterie 
expressed similar sentiments. It argued that Presbyterianism and Catholicism were 
similar because they both interfered with temporal authority. Roman Catholicism had 
‘clipped the wings of temporal power’, and the Presbyterians were guilty of the same 
thing, ‘whether a National Church government by a General Assembly of Presbyters, as 
it has been exercised in Scotland and strongly endeavoured to be established in 
England’.888 The pamphlet lamented that Catholics and Presbyterians had taken in ‘the 
rulers of the Earth… to interweave a secular power with their ecclesiastical’.889 
 
5.3. English Catholic pro-episcopal tracts. 
Previous research into Catholic responses to the regime has concentrated on the 
English Catholic community’s approaches to the Army. Here, however, was another, 
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altogether different strategy from a section of the community. These Catholics who 
identified themselves by their opposition to the alleged evils of the Jesuits thought they 
had more in common the Presbyterians than with the Independents. This was a golden 
opportunity for a religio-political alliance. 
 
From 1654 until the Restoration Catholic pro-episcopal/anti-sectarian tracts 
dominated the material published by English Catholics. Controversies between Catholics 
and Protestants showed that many English Catholics championed a reunion between the 
two churches. For example, the publication An Answer to a book, published in 1654, 
under the initials R.T, argued that the Church of England, although distinct from those in 
communion with her, was not different to the Roman Church. It pleaded to any 
Protestant readers, ‘I heartily pray, that instead of replying to this answer, you may be 
reconciled to Gods holy Catholic Church’.890 The Jesuit priest John Spencer published 
his Scripture Mistaken in 1655. It argued that Protestants manipulated scripture to 
support their own doctrine unlike the Roman Catholic Church that was based on 
tradition.891 He and John Lenthall, a converted Protestant, formed a sort of ‘controversial 
group’ with the Protestants Peter Gunning and Dr John Pearsons that over a year’s worth 
of meetings and letters in 1657 debated whether Roman Catholics or those from the 
Church of England were schismatics.892  
 
The English Catholic community was also keen to show itself as an ordered, 
traditional Church, independent from secular jurisdiction in contrast to the ‘Imperial 
puritanism’ of the Cromwellian Church settlement.893 There are many examples of this. 
1655 saw the reprinting of Richard Broughton’s Monastiction Britanicum, which was a 
history of the religious orders founded in Britain by the Roman Catholic Church.894 
Broughton, a Catholic priest, had been a prominent secular clergyman during the 
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Jacobean and Caroline periods. He wrote devotional and polemical literature and also in 
defence of the institution of Catholic bishops.895  
 
John Sergeant published his Schism Disarmed in 1655 and quoted the work of 
Richard Hooker ‘one of the best, and perhaps the most prudent writer of all that 
profession’, who, Sergeant wrote, stated that the Church of England would not last more 
‘then four score years – as bearing corruption the material prima of a secular basis; 
which continually exposed it to a mortality, as the forms of government should have 
their ever-limited period’.896 In contrast the Catholic church had strong foundations 
which could ‘never fail or decay; since they rely not on the slippery and weak prop of 
temporal power for their authority’ but instead on the ‘never-altering’ eternal foundation 
of power.897 Catholic priests’ power could not be taken away as it was power derived 
from God himself. But ‘the jurisdiction of your bishops may be taken away by the same 
parliamentary power that set it up’.898 Sergeant argued that Catholics too longed for a 
peaceful communion between the two Churches, ‘Embossing the daughter – Church of 
England in a charitable communion with her dearest mother; by whose painful throes 
she was first born to Christ’.899 Sergeant baited the Protestant Dr Hammond, poking fun 
at the emerging differences between Presbyterians and Episcopalians. He wrote: 
The puritans (following the Protestants example) now refuse obedience to the 
Church of England, seeing in her so many dregs of popery remaining. Unjustly 
did the Church of England (saith the Doctor) in obliging them to her 
disobedience, and cutting off poor Bastwicks, Burtons and Prynne’s ears.900 
In the most recent disputes concerning a new Church settlement for the Protectorate, 
Hammond had ‘while he disputes against his brother Presbyters, fallen into a sudden fit 
of popery, and unawares laid grounds for a greater authority in the pope, then many 
papists will grant him’.901 Henry Hammond and John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, were 
both Church of England clergymen and controversialists. In their publications during the 
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1650s, both defended the Church of England from accusations of schism, and asserted 
the importance of episcopacy and their claim to apostolic succession.902 Sergeant 
attacked both men’s work because he believed that the Church of Rome was the superior 
Church, the ‘mother’, and that the Church of England was a poor imitation that had no 
traditional justification, whose novelties had led to sectarianism. Both Anglican and the 
Catholic controversialists tried to show themselves as the alternative to the anti-
episcopalians and the Independents. 
 
The Franciscan priest Christopher Davenport entered into debate concerning 
reconciliation between the two Churches in his An enchiridion of Faith, published in 
1655. Through dialogue between a disciple and his master Davenport asserted that 
Catholics should not attend Protestant services and that although papal power was a part 
of Catholic faith, ‘it is not acknowledged by the Church, any power in the chief pastor to 
disturb’ temporal power.903 Exploring what would unite the two churches, Davenport 
wrote it should not be an accommodation but instead ‘a conciliation’ based upon the 
subscription to the definitions set out by the Council of Trent.904 Davenport wrote: 
Condescendency in matter of opinion is charitable and reasonable… we should 
not for opinions judge, that, is in our case leave our brethren… The old Christian 
way was by mildness to work upon the affections rather then with violence to 
attempt hypocritical conversions.905 
Davenport had written something similar in 1634, Deus, natura, gratia, which argued 
that the Thirty-Nine Articles were not incompatible with Roman Catholic doctrine. The 
publication caused great scandal because Charles I refused to ban it. In 1656 Davenport 
published An Explanation of the Roman Catholics to explain the greatest Protestant 
anxieties when confronted by the Roman Catholic faith, namely idolatry and 
transubstantiation. Davenport insisted that Catholics did not worship images but instead 
images had been kept in Catholic churches with ‘decent respect’ to ‘assist our memories 
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and excite our affections’.906 The Eucharist was a ‘visible sign’ in the form of bread and 
wine which ‘no Catholic may or doth direct his worship’, invisible grace was signified 
by the bread.907 Davenport almost certainly chose to publish these two works to coincide 
with the Anglo-French treaty of October 1655, alongside further calls for toleration from 
the English Catholic community. 
 
Likewise in the same year Henry Holden’s work The Analysis of Divine Faith 
was also published; a second edition appeared in 1658. The book was translated by an 
anonymous writer who dedicated it to several prominent Church of England clergymen. 
The translator stated that he had chosen to publish the book because its proposals would 
secure a union between the Church of Rome and the Church of England, a marriage he 
had believed impossible ‘in respect of several temporal interests’.908 In this book Holden 
discussed the importance of episcopacy and the internal order that general councils and 
popes provided for the Catholic Church.909 The testimony of God was conveyed by the 
instruction and discipline of bishops and pastors: 
Pastors and rectors have a true and rational certainty of the infallibility of the 
means by which this divine doctrine is conveyed to them, … it is noted …that 
Christ himself hath instituted in the Christian Church certain ministers, pastors 
and preachers, who are to continue in an uninterrupted succession to the World’s 
end.910 
He went so far as to say that ‘all true faith and religion is either Catholic and universal or 
none at all’.911 Holden also stated that oaths must be made only when ‘necessity require 
it with judgement, with truth and with justice… a compelled and forced oath, contrary to 
a man’s honesty or utility … is of no value’.912 It was no accident that this section of the 
English Catholic community thought it opportune to intervene polemically in this way at 
a moment when not only were the secular clergy campaigning for a new bishop in 
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Rome, after the death of Bishop Smith, but Cromwell was also negotiating with Mazarin 
for the Anglo-French treaty. 
 
The Irish priest Peter Talbot waded into the controversy, laying the blame for the 
rise of sects on the Church of England itself: 
the liberty of war giving licence to those infinite sects (which lay lurking in 
every corner of the English Church) to sally forth, and to appear to the world in 
different colours, every one took notice, how few were grounded on those 
tenents, whereon the Church of England is built… [the curse of Cain] is fallen by 
inheritance upon our English Protestants, their last change is to turn into 
Quakers, whose sect is nothing else but Protestantcy fallen into paulsey, and 
inclining to a sudden apoplexy.913 
The heresy of Protestants was indicated by their ‘liberty of believing’.914 Although 
Talbot’s tune was distinctively anti Independent/anti-secular it did not follow that he 
was, as a Jesuit, in favour of an alliance or rapprochement with the Presbyterians. At this 
time Talbot was trying to establish alliances between Charles II and European Catholic 
powers, in particular Spain, with whom Cromwell’s negotiations had broken down as a 
consequence of the Anglo-French Treaty.915 Talbot also tried to encourage the king to 
convert to Roman Catholicism in an effort to help along negotiations between the exiled 
Stuart court, Rome and Spain.916 
 
Even Thomas White got in on the act, dedicating his work to John Coates, a 
royalist but not a Catholic, and other gentlemen like him who: 
yet (by an unhappy mistake of some seduced zealots) were therefore disesteemed 
and cast off, as being scarcely either good Christians, or loyal subjects. An error 
nourished by some of our greatest … and so far drove on by design, under 
pretence of securing the state, their temporal interest, and the new established 
Gospel; that now at length they have lost and undone themselves, their best 
subjects and friends, and the formalities (though that be least to be lamented) of 
their supposed Church.917  
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Although White had previously written anti-puritan polemic, one suspects that the 
purpose of this publication was not an alliance between English Catholic 
controversialists, pro-Episcopalians and Presbyterians against Cromwell, as it was 
widely known that Blacklo was still appealing to Cromwell’s ‘Independency’ as late as 
1657. It is likely that this was part of such an appeal: an attempt to criticise Cromwell’s 
political opponents in order to ingratiate himself with the Protector.  
 
 
5.4. Laudian responses to English Catholic pamphleteering. 
Some Laudian controversialists responded to this Catholic literature. Discourse 
between these two religious groups accounted for thirty per cent of all books published 
by Catholics during the seventeenth century.918 This can be of little surprise. There were 
several high profile conversions of Laudians to Roman Catholicism during this period, 
most notably a former member of the Tew circle, Hugh Cressy, along with Thomas 
Vane, Thomas Bayly, Stephen Goffe, Richard Mileson the Archdeacon of Suffolk and, 
most prominent of all, John Cosin, the only son of the Bishop of Durham.919 Cressy’s 
attack on the Church of England in his infamous Exomologesis was described by Hugh 
Trevor-Roper as a ‘body-blow…to a reeling institution’.920 In Legenda lignea Edward 
Lee listed fifty-three well-known people who had converted from the Church of England 
to the Church of Rome and had ‘violated and broken their oaths, vows and promises 
with God and man’.921 By 1654 prominent Laudians were complaining about the lack of 
episcopal guidance for their group. Sir Robert Shirley bitterly noted that ‘Anabaptists, 
Presbyterians and papists all have it’ and warned that if leading Laudians did nothing 
‘the wisest part will become papists or Socinians and the more foolish Anabaptists or 
Atheists’.922 Robert Bosher, in his study of Laudians during the Interregnum, identified 
three main groups of Laudians: loyal conformists, disaffected conformists and a High 
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Church party.923 It was the last that took up the gauntlet thrown down by Shirley and 
others who wanted more episcopal guidance. This group consisted of controversialists 
and theologians such as the Tew circle members Henry Hammond and Gilbert Sheldon, 
along with Peter Heylyn and William Sancroft, with the support of former bishops Brian 
Duppa and Mathew Wren. These Laudian controversialists debated with their Catholic 
counterparts, defending the Church of England from accusations of schism, accusing the 
Church of Rome of idolatry and denigrating the papal supremacy.924 Sheldon, in 
particular, defended the episcopacy of the Church of England from the attacks of Cressy, 
Bayly and Knott.925 John Bramhall, in his A Just Vindication of the Church of England, 
argued that it was Roman Catholics, not Protestants, who had separated from the court 
of Rome. The king and the kingdom, Bramhall suggested, were vindicated in ancient 
law, which gave them sufficient grounds to withdraw from Rome.926 Bramhall also 
found himself defending the Church of England from Presbyterian attacks on the 
authority and succession of Church of England bishops.927 Another Laudian 
controversialist, Thomas Smith, defended the Church of England in his translated 
version of Daille’s An Apology for the Reformed Churches. Smith attacked Gallican 
principals amongst the English Catholic clergy by arguing that the Church of England 
could ‘justly challenge, Gallican privileges’, ‘largely described in two vast tomes, and 
written by the appointment of Cardinal Richlieu, when he advised the king of France to 
set up a patriarch in opposition to the See of Rome… (if our succession was schism, 
what would that have been?)’.928 Smith also argued that the Old Testament 
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acknowledged that kings and emperors could reform the Church and that Knott’s 
arguments concerning papal infallibility in fact only showed probability.929 He also 
attacked Birchley’s arguments in the Christian Moderator. Smith stated that Catholics 
were not as moderate or rational as Birchley had alleged, since Protestants suffered more 
in religiously hostile countries due to the Inquisition than Catholics did in similar 
circumstances.930  
 
Laudian controversialists such as Peter Heylyn, although condemning papal 
supremacy, argued that it was better for a Church to have a head than none at all.931 He 
argued that the Church of England was derived from the Roman Church, whilst still 
maintaining his loyalty towards Cromwell.932 Laudians also, however, had to defend 
themselves from Presbyterian accusations of popery.933 When asked who he thought the 
Church of England’s greatest enemy, the Laudian Bishop Duppa replied that although 
Jesuits and Presbyterians were ‘united in malice’ against the Church of England, it was 
the Presbyterians who were the greatest enemy as they sought to destroy the Church.934  
 
Laudian response to religious controversy, especially in support of episcopacy 
(albeit for their own Church) and the prominence of Bishop Duppa (a man already 
considered by some members of the English Catholic community to be positively 
predisposed towards a possible reunion) gave Catholics alternative avenues to travel 
along apart from accommodation with the Protectorate, which had already shown itself 
hostage to foreign policy and domestic enemies.935 Not only did Catholics agitate for 
papal reintroduction of direct and local episcopal government over the English 
community, but they also attempted to exploit the apparent failure of the Cromwellian 
Church settlement. As can be seen above, Catholic controversialists were keen to show 
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that episcopacy meant independence from the State. When put into the political context 
of 1655, this can be seen as a strategy to generate support from the Catholic community. 
For in January of that year Cromwell dismissed parliament by force and in August 
established the extremely unpopular rule of the Major Generals.  
 
5.5. English Catholic discourse and the failure of the Cromwellian Church 
settlement. 
When the first Protectorate Parliament met in September 1654, Cromwell had 
high hopes that his reform programme would be furthered by the support of sitting MPs. 
Instead the Presbyterian majority in parliament followed its own programme. It tried to 
amend the Instrument of Government, which some MPs felt limited parliament’s power, 
making sure that the Army remained subordinate to Parliament and questioning limits of 
religious toleration. Cromwell’s forcible dismissal of parliament in January 1655 was 
widely perceived as an abuse of his power. Then in March came the Penruddock Rising. 
The appointment of the Major Generals, who were in post from August 1655 to the end 
of January 1657, was a reaction to this royalist rebellion. They disarmed known royalists 
and put them under heavy scrutiny, monitoring their movements and imposing ‘heavy 
security periods’, to prevent further royalist plotting.936  
 
Although there had been a visible military presence in England, especially in 
London, since the civil war, the Major Generals’ regime was much more than military 
rule. They ejected wayward clergy and imposed strict religious and moral codes in order 
to establish a ‘godly state’.937 The Major Generals tried to implement localised puritan 
rule, something that was highly unpopular. Socially and politically insignificant puritans 
were given local administrative authority.938 At the end of 1656 Prynne wrote that the 
Major Generals had usurped ‘all the civil as well as military power and justification into 
their own hands’.939 Here the new regime seemed to be using centralising, arbitrary and 
unconstitutional power to impose its own moral and religious rules, no matter how 
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unrepresentative those were. Many felt that Cromwell had betrayed the ideologies 
behind the overthrow of Charles I and now posed a similar threat towards civil liberty. 
Men who had supported the overthrow of Charles I, such as Sexby, became vigorous 
critics of the Protectorate, Sexby defecting to the exiled Stuart court. There were also 
rumours during April and June 1657 that the duke of York was exploring the possibility 
of restoring the Stuart monarchy.940 From 1655 onwards there was also an increase in 
anti-Protectorate tracts such as John Wildman’s A Declaration… Against the Tyrant 
Oliver Cromwell and the reprinting of the Laudian play The Floating Island, both in 
1655.941  
 
The play, written by William Strode, was first published in 1636. It had been 
commissioned by Laud and performed in front of Charles I and Henrietta Maria during 
their visit to Oxford. The tragi-comedy poked fun at the king’s puritan critics and 
stressed the virtues of monarchical authority.942 The priest George Leyburn observed the 
performance, recounting that the king laughed heartily at the puritan characters’ folly.943 
In the second edition, published in 1655, those behind its reprinting gloated about its 
contemporary relevance. They wrote: 
be pleased to consider this tragi-comedy was both written and presented above 
eighteen years since; and if now it seem (in language and plot) to fit these times, 
it must be by prophecy… ’Tis sufficient for its worth that the best liked it best; 
the rest (especially those great ones of the weaker sect) should claim no lawful 
judicature over it, since it was not written for them, though they thought 
themselves too severely dealt with, which yet was an inquiry to the author as 
well as his poem… It is not now inscribed to any for protection, but left 
dedicated (as it was by the author when it was first born) to the authors noble 
patron.944 
The story fitted the political situation very well. The play concerns the plotting of three 
puritans, Malevolo, Melancholico and Irato, who plan to overthrow the king, Prudentius, 
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to create an elected monarchy. Sensing the plot, Prudentius hands his crown over to the 
puritans who then offer it to the character Phancy, who would become queen. At first 
Phancy declines the offer. The character of Liveby, a favourite, agrees with her that 
kings are born not made.945 Eventually Phancy concedes to the puritans’ wishes and 
accepts the crown but her reign descends into chaos as she overrules established law and 
bids her subjects follow their own lusts. Disenchanted by the chaos their actions have 
caused Malevolo, Melancholico and Irato set up a suicide pact. Just as they are about to 
kill themselves, Intellectus Agens, the king’s councillor (representing Laud) appears and 
stops them. Prudentius resumes his authority, order is restored and the kingdom is 
saved.946  
 
Taking into account the puritan characters’ disappointment with the realities of 
elected monarchy, it is easy to understand why the printers of The Floating Island 
thought it remained highly relevant. It is thought the character of Malevolo was based on 
Prynne: both had lost their ears as punishment for work they had published.947 The 
timing of the second edition of Floating Island could not have been better. Cromwell 
had just forced the dismissal of the first Protectorate Parliament in January. He had also 
begun to replace the regular Army with a militia, made up of his supporters, in 
preparation for the rule of the Major Generals in August.948 
 
It is possible to see here a direct connection between growing Protestant 
disaffection with the Protectorate and tentative steps towards an alliance between 
English Catholics and pro-episcopal Protestant groups. Similar to Baxter’s views on the 
Protectorate and the English Catholic community (he had always regarded Cromwell as 
a traitor and rebel)949 was Joshua Baildon’s 1655 work ‘The damnable opinions 
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Blasphemies and Tenets both of Ancient and Modern Hereticks’. This purported to teach 
Catholics how to be good subjects whilst lamenting plurality of religion.950 Baildon 
based this tract on the work of the episcopalian Alexander Ross, a Laudian royalist 
clergyman and critic of Hobbes whose literary response to the Commonwealth was to 
see retirement as a ‘legitimate response to political chaos’.951 Although attention is given 
to sects, including Brownists, Barrowists, Socinians, Quakers, Ranters, Independents 
and Presbyterians, much more attention is paid in this book to Roman Catholics and 
explanations of their services, tenets and sacraments. Baildon went on to discuss 
differences between Protestants and Catholics, remonstrating that ‘Some others make 
differences there are, and fewer there might be if men would be moderate on either 
side’.952 He argued against the plurality of religion on the basis that it damaged the State, 
writing: 
Religion (as is said before) is the foundation of states and kingdoms, therefore in 
one state or kingdom there ought to be but one religion, because there can be but 
one foundation, for one building cannot have many foundations. Religion is the 
band, and cord by which the unity of the state is preserved, if this band be broken 
into many pieces, how can it bind the affections of the people and preserve their 
unity either amongst themselves or with their princes and governors… Diversity 
in religions beget envy, malice, seditions, factions, rebellions, contempt of 
superiors, treacheries, innovations, disobedience and many more mischiefs which 
pull down the heavy judgements of God upon that state or kingdom where 
contrary religions are allowed, because whilst everyone strives to advance his 
own religion above the other all distempers now mentioned must needs follow.953 
Baildon argued that toleration was possible if religious practice was undertaken 
privately, and on condition that men did not overthrow the fundamentals of faith or 
disturb the State. Those who professed different beliefs must be obedient to their 
superiors: Baildon listed all the erroneous opinions ‘in religion have been received or 
hatched since fall of Church and Government’.954 Baildon used Germany and France as 
examples of countries where Catholics and Protestants lived peaceably side-by-side. He 
even stated that Turks were ‘zealous’ in their religion yet permitted worship by 
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Christians, Jews, Persians and Ethiopians too.955 Baildon believed that religion should 
not be compelled as it just encouraged discontent against the State. He advised that 
‘Princes and magistrates must like wise ship masters, rather strike sail and cast anchor, 
then make shipwreck in a storm, and rather sail back with safety than virtue upon the 
rocks in the harbour with danger’.956 Baildon lamented at the end of his work: 
These are some poisonous weeds which have (too much of late) infested our 
English garden I mean the Church, once admired (both at home and abroad) for 
the beauty of her doctrine and discipline and envied of none but ignorants, or 
men of perverse minds.957  
The disappointment of pro-episcopal groups with Cromwell’s Church settlement gave 
the English Catholics a political party with which to align themselves. It does seem that 
dissatisfaction towards both the Protectorate’s religious and domestic policies ran 
parallel with campaigns for an established episcopacy, limited or otherwise from 1654 
onwards. Baildon’s religious leanings are unclear, but one can infer that since his work 
was based upon Alexander Ross’s, he belonged to the Church of England. Baildon could 
argue against the plurality of sects and solicit support from the English Roman Catholic 
community. He proposed that English Catholics should be tolerated if they were not 
subversive to the State. Bosher identifies the mid 1650s as the ‘high age’ of ‘Anglican 
theology and apologetic’, which by 1655 had aligned itself with a royalist country party 
that stirred up rebellion.958 Charles II’s break from the Scottish Presbyterians won 
further support for the party.959 It is therefore important to remember that in 1656 
Archbishop Ussher’s plan for a reduced episcopacy, a plan to unite Presbyterian and 
episcopal government, was published for the first time. By 1657 Laudian views of 
episcopacy and church ministry were regarded as orthodox Anglicanism.960 
 
It is in the light of the discussion above that the work of the well-known priest 
Thomas White, alias Blacklo, needs to be re-evaluated and placed within political 
context. Blacklo’s Grounds of Obedience, published in 1655 was, as discussed earlier, 
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an extremely pro-Cromwellian tract. It identified the Protectorate as a legitimate regime 
acting in the best interests of the people and justified the tyrannicide on grounds of a 
broken social contract between ruler and subjects.961 As has been described, Blacklo’s 
work met hostility from many members of the English chapter, particularly Walter 
Montagu and George Leyburn. His work caused wide divisions within the community. It 
also gave critics of Catholicism powerful arguments to use against them after the 
Restoration.962  
 
But White’s ideas and arguments were not new. As has been seen earlier on in 
this chapter, they derived from Elizabethan Catholic political theory. The work of 
Fitzherbert, whose A Treatise had been reprinted in 1652, is a significant example, as is 
Thomas Carre’s A Treatise of Subjection to the Powers, published in 1651. His fellow 
Blackloist Henry Holden also published The Analysis of Divine Faith, espousing the 
virtues of a social contract.963 Why, then, did Blacklo’s publication cause such frictions? 
The answer seems to be first, that his doctrine was more extreme than Holden’s and 
second, that he published Grounds of Obedience at the wrong time. Even Holden’s The 
Analysis had courted pro-episcopal groups and was presented as laying the groundwork 
for a reunion between the Church of England and Rome. White’s work could not be seen 
in this way. Moreover, White’s pro-Cromwellian ideas were, in 1655, out of step with 
the majority of Catholic controversial literature. If Grounds of Obedience had been 
published just two years earlier, it would not have elicited the negative reaction that it 
did in 1655. The year 1655 should no longer be considered the ‘height’ of Blackloism, 
as Beverly Southgate asserts, but rather the beginnings of its decline.964 The moment for 
coming out in support for Cromwell, in an attempt to align the Catholic community with 
republicanism, had passed. This was not the time, as Southgate argues, when Cromwell 
‘looked virtually invulnerable’ but instead the start of a crisis for the Protectorate.965 
White’s work would better have suited the political situation of the early 1650s when the 
                                                
961 See T. White, Grounds of Obedience. 
962 See Evangelium Armatum. A Speciman; or Short Collection of Several Doctrines and Positions 
destructive to our Government, both Civil and Ecclesiastical (London, 1663), pp.54-57. 
963 Holden, The Analysis of Divine Faith, pp.357, 372. 
964 Southgate, ‘Covetous of Truth’, p.39. 
965 Ibid. 
 209 
ideals of republicanism were celebrated and integrated into Protectorate foreign policy, 
in particular during the Dutch wars, before the stark realities of a republican dream were 
felt at home.966  
 
Holden wrote in support of Blacklo in the face of this fierce criticism. He argued 
that the condemnation of Blacklo’s work was unjust since his doctrine was ‘solid, sound 
and substantial’, but even Holden distanced himself from parts of Blacklo’s beliefs.967 
Holden wrote that Blacklo’s expressions and manners of speech were not common in 
‘our schools’ and ‘he hath several exotic and peculiar opinions which (be it spoken with 
due respect, though in opposition to so great a scholar and so learned a man) are much 
different from my sentiments’.968 The Blackloists were no longer as solid a group as they 
had been during the late 1640s and early 1650s. No wonder Leyburn wrote with great 
glee that priests such as Andrew Knightly, the vicar general in London, and Thomas 
Medcalf had refused consent for the publication of Blacklo’s work in 1657.969  
 
Tutino’s assertion that Blacklo was supported by the papacy and the chapter, as 
their only link to Cromwell, is accurate to an extent.970 Certainly the papacy wanted to 
negotiate with Cromwell, even as late as 1658, and the chapter certainly did not want to 
burn any bridges or risk antagonising the State authorities whilst they might benefit from 
their contacts with the Protectorate. Indeed, Christopher Davenport’s 1656 Explanation 
of Roman Catholic Belief was presented to the Lord Protector.971 Yet the publishing of 
Catholic political tracts indicates that the English Catholic community were conscious of 
the changing mood and no longer wanted White’s complete association with 
republicanism. Southgate’s argument that Blacklo’s work should not be understood as ‘a 
naïve or suicidal political gesture’ is therefore unsound.972 
 
                                                
966 See Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism. 
967 H. Holden, Doctor Holden’s Letter to a Friend of His, Upon the Occasion of Mr Blacklow’s submitting 
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971 J. Dockery, Christopher Davenport, Friar and Diplomat (London, 1960), pp.102-3. 
972 Southgate, ‘Covetous of Truth’, p. 44. Also see Browne, ‘Anglo-Irish Gallicanism’, p.78. 
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5.6. Catholics’ anticipation of the Restoration. 
By 1658 Catholic works published in England were already beginning to 
anticipate a Stuart restoration. Some Catholic controversialists sought to show how 
Catholic episcopacy could complement monarchical authority. Thomas Carvell in his 
Labyrinthus Cantuariensis, published in 1658, concerning Archbishop Laud’s disputes 
with Fisher, wrote that kings could not be deposed by papal authority and that the 
supreme government of the church was monarchical in nature. He also argued that 
countries should exist as two kingdoms, one spiritual and one temporal.973 Carvell used 
the example of the kings of France and Spain to support his argument.974 Carvell wrote 
of English Catholics’ and Anglicans’ loyalty to Charles II. He wrote‘…the heat of the 
war being over, and many of the prelatique party (who, together with ourselves, did 
daily entertain a confidence of the happy return and restoration of our gracious sovereign 
King Charles the second)’. Carvell continued: 
This is certain, Roman Catholics alone can glory in this, that whereas in these 
late unhappy times, some of all other religions in England, opposed either his 
sacred Majesty that now is, or his royal father, they only have been, all and ever 
faithful to them both: thereby showing, that the doctrine of allegiance to their 
lawful sovereign in necessary part of their belief.975 
 
In the same year The Politicians Cathechism was published, under the initials 
NN (probably written by Peter Talbot although it has also been attributed to Nicholas 
French and others). Politicians Cathechism argued that Protestantism and sects had 
inclined ‘Princes to tyranny, and subjects to rebellion’, because they had opened up ‘a 
wide gap for plain Atheism’, and both Atheists and Protestants ‘do agree in rebellion 
against God, and in being refractory against supreme authority’.976 The author wrote: 
He that rebels against the king’s lieutenant, will soon declare against himself; 
and this is the reason we see so many Protestants become atheists… As 
rebellions grow to a height of degrees, first they point at evil counsellors, then at 
the favourite, at length at the king’s person, so atheism professeth mens minds, 
first by vice, then by Protestantcy, and at last by no religion.977 
                                                
973 T. Carvell, Labyrinthus Cantuariensis: or Doctor Lawds Labyrinth (Paris, 1658), pp.219, 222-4. 
974 Ibid. p.224. 
975 Ibid. To the Reader. 
976 N.N. The Politicians Catechism for His Instruction in Divine Faith, and Morall Honesty (Antwerp, 
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Protestantism was worse then atheism; ‘an atheist expects not any invisible power or 
providence to support him because he believeth none: a Protestant persuades himself 
that God will second his zeal for the Gospel and [so] is more resolute and denying’. The 
author’s approach to the reader at the beginning of the book sets the tone. It reads:  
time hath kept the name, and changed the notion of a politician, as it has a tyrant, 
which anciently signified a king, without that odious character it puts us now in 
mind of. In these our days, when we hear a politician named in any language, we 
represent to ourselves a man so ignorant, that he knows no other God, nor good, 
but his own interest.978 
The author argued obedience to authority was the teaching of the Church of Rome, and 
pointed to Hobbes’ Leviathan as the highest expression of Protestantism.979 Although 
the argument that Atheism and Protestantism were close was a standard polemical tool 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the publication of Talbot’s work was 
significant. Since 1655, he had made a strong alliance with Edward Sexby, a republican 
‘dissident’. He now solicited the support of republicans who had become disillusioned 
with the Protectorate to join the exiled Stuart court and to overthrow Cromwell.980 It is 
in this context that his work should be read and understood. 
 
The year 1659 also saw the reprinting of Birchley’s Catholique Plea, in an 
edition identical to the 1653 version. This publication seems totally out of step with 
other Catholic publications, quoting as it did Hobbes to prove that Catholics were loyal 
and worthy subjects. As suggested above, Birchley’s work was to prove a thorn in the 




This review of English Catholic literature during the Interregnum refutes 
Tavard’s claims, as well as the views of historians who see the English Catholic 
community during the 1650s as a dying, irrelevant sect. Roman Catholic 
controversialists’ ability to integrate themselves into national political and religious 
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980 Clavin, ‘Peter Talbot’; also see Chapter 4. 
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debate is evident, as is their tactical flexibility in attempting to establish common cause 
with pro-episcopal Presbyterians. But such an alliance could never be achieved. Too 
much doctrinal difference existed between Roman Catholics and pro-episcopal 
Presbyterians and there was little likelihood in practice of a reunion between the Church 
of Rome and the Church of England (if there ever was a chance for such an endeavour, it 
had passed by in the 1630s). There was also the general dislike of Jesuits with which to 
contend. Both Baxter and the supporters of the Worcestershire petition were not willing 
to include any sort of ‘Spanish Popery’. Much was written about the link between the 
English Jesuits and the equally despised Quakers. A belief remained that Jesuits, under 
the guise of Quakers (and in some cases Seekers), were planning to bring down the 
country, by ‘venting all manner of extravagant opinions among the ignorant and 
simple’.981 The Regicides and the Levellers had also been described as Jesuits in the 
1650s newssheet Mercurius Politicus. Presbyterians had been accused of having ‘little 
difference in politics’ with papists.982 As we have seen, Catholic controversialists saw 
these accusations as blows below the belt, since it was the very structural failure of the 
Church of England that had encouraged sectarian activity on such a widespread scale.  
 
Nevertheless, the separation between the ‘Presbyterian’ and ‘Independent’ 
positions on Church governance created space for the expression of Catholic political 
and ecclesiastical opinion on exactly the same issue. As was seen in the previous 
chapter, despite the extensive royalism of some Romanists during the civil war, the 
English Catholic community stood to gain more from the Commonwealth and 
Protectorate than they had from the monarchy. This was particularly true because no 
consensus had been reached for a national Church structure that would enforce 
conformity or uniformity of worship. At the same time, toleration from the 
Commonwealth and Protectorate regimes seemed almost in reach, as the issue was part 
of Cromwell’s diplomatic negotiations with the continental powers. The English 
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Catholics had been placed in this position before. During the 1560s Queen Elizabeth and 
some of her councillors had intimated that Catholics might ultimately achieve some of 
their ecclesiastical programme partly in order to maintain good relations with France and 
Spain. 
 
As has been demonstrated, Blackloism formed just one part of English Catholic 
political thought during the Interregnum. By removing White and his fellow Blackloists’ 
work from the political context in which they were written, a conclusion can be reached 
about the political attitudes and capabilities of the community as a whole which is totally 
unrepresentative and actively misleading. The English Catholic community’s survival 
depended on their ability to adapt to the domestic political situation and the foreign 
policies of the Commonwealth and Protectorate.  
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6. The Restoration 
 
The factional disputes that had plagued the English Catholic community since 
the beginning of the mission in England continued at the Restoration and seriously 
hindered the community’s efforts to secure a bishop and the repeal of the penal laws 
against them. This infighting, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the papacy, the 
hesitancy of Charles II and the conflict between Edward Hyde, the earl of Clarendon and 
George Digby, the earl of Bristol, meant that the Catholics stood little chance of 
achieving their aims. This chapter shows that divisions within the Catholic community 
continued beyond the Interregnum and that these divisions contributed significantly to 
the failure of Catholic campaigns for toleration. 
 
Much has been written about the chapter’s campaign for a bishop at the 
Restoration and Charles II’s failure to grant toleration to the English Catholics 
immediately after his reinstatement. Current explanations for the Catholics’ lack of 
success, however, are unsatisfactory. This is partly because the conflicts amongst the 
Catholic clergy and the circumstances of consecutive, and at times competitive, pleas for 
toleration to the king and the House of Lords have been understood only in isolation. 
But it is also because factional conflicts have been interpreted through confessionalised 
contemporary polemical writings and correspondence, with little account given to the 
motivation behind such conflicting versions of events. Mainstream historical narratives 
place the main emphasis of the failure of formal toleration on the deeply antagonistic 
relationship between Hyde and Digby, who were both competing for the king’s 
favour.983 Catholic secondary accounts of the negotiations between the English Catholic 
community and the House of Lords in 1661 place the failure to reach a settlement firmly 
at the Jesuits’ door. The Jesuits (long perceived as a treasonable popish army) were 
unable to accept any of the proposed conditions for toleration or forms of oaths of 
allegiance and so prevented the English Catholics from securing official toleration from 
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Charles II.984 Malcolm Hay’s study, The Jesuits and the Popish Plot, readdressed this 
version of events within confessional history. Hay based his argument on Patrick Con’s 
correspondence. Con was one of Queen Catherine’s almoners and his letters enabled an 
understanding of the role Louis Stuart, tenth sieur d’Aubigny, played in toleration 
proceedings. Hay, however, was biased towards the Jesuits’ cause and misrepresented 
the politics of the English chapter.985 The Jesuits, Hay believed, had been made scape-
goats by the selfish Blackloist chapter who were trying to manipulate proceedings so 
they could gain full authority over the Catholic community. 
 
More recent research into the community at the Restoration has looked at the 
dispute between George Leyburn and the chapter that began in response to Blacklo’s 
publications.986 T.A Birrell traced the growth of the dispute during the Interregnum to a 
peak in the late 1660s, culminating in Leyburn’s resignation in 1669.987 This dispute, 
Birrell argued, underpinned Catholic inability to gain toleration from a well disposed 
king. He made little attempt, however, to place the dispute within the wider context of 
the community or the political circumstances surrounding the Restoration and the 
religious debates that followed, and only touched upon the Jesuits’ refusal to accept 
proposals for an oath of allegiance  
 
These differing versions of the historiography of English Catholicism at the 
Restoration have meant variously that: the chapter has been understood as the spawn of 
Blackloism; the Jesuits were held singly responsible for the breakdown of toleration 
negotiations of the early 1660s; and George Leyburn was viewed as a loony maverick, 
dancing to his own tune, who became the most hated man in the English Catholic 
community in the seventeenth century. In order to address these historiographical 
misconceptions it is necessary to correlate information from the correspondence of 
secular and regular clergy, the Stuart court and mainstream political sources. This 
chapter puts the politics of the Stuart court, the papacy and the English chapter 
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(including the factions within it) into the context of events on the eve of the Restoration, 
before focusing on the negotiations for toleration during the early years of Charles II’s 
reign and the factional disputes that enveloped English Catholicism. First, it explores 
Catholic perceptions of the process that resulted in Charles II’s restoration. Second, it 
examines the problems these circumstances posed for Catholic relations with Rome, 
problems further complicated by English Catholic sectarianism. Third, it looks at 
Catholic attempts to secure toleration after the Restoration. Fourth, it explores the 
impact of Clarendon and Bristol’s dispute on English Catholics. The chapter ends by 
discussing the opportunities lost to the English Catholics as a result of the failure to 
procure d’Aubigny a cardinal’s hat. 
 
6.1. The Catholic secular chapter’s perceptions at the end of the Protectorate. 
In July 1658 Cardinal de Retz wrote to Cardinal Barberini, the former papal 
protector of English Catholics, informing him of the commands he had received from 
Charles Stuart concerning the English Roman Catholic community.988 These seemed a 
direct approach to de Retz to petition the pope on Charles’s behalf for assistance in his 
restoration. The future king affirmed his treaty with Spain and declared his intention 
that, if restored, he wanted nothing more than liberty of conscience within his kingdom. 
His re-establishment would be to the great advantage of the Catholic religion.  
 
Cardinal de Retz evidently thought this a worthwhile policy, urging Charles to 
support the English Catholics because they were polar opposites of the puritans and 
Independents who held ‘no good intentions’ towards him. The cardinal’s royalist 
enthusiasm was no doubt largely due to the fact that he was strongly opposed to Mazarin 
who, as has been discussed, had thrown his lot in with Cromwell four years earlier. It 
was also a chance, de Retz argued, to take advantage of the European situation. De Retz 
looked to Frederick William ‘The Great Elector’ as a possible ally in leading Charles II 
back to England. Frederick William had begun to wield considerable power in Europe 
was renowned for his military and political prowess. He was strongly against the 
interests of France and Sweden after their failed invasion of his territory, and 
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consequently against Cromwell.989 Cardinal de Retz also argued that Cromwell’s 
domestic position was unstable, alleging that the exiled claimant to the throne had 
almost been restored ‘two or three times this year already’.990 Rome should seize this 
opportunity, the Cardinal argued, to get behind Charles Stuart before Cromwell died or 
was deposed. Such events would allow Charles to be restored without Catholic 
intervention (European or otherwise), leaving him without obligations towards Roman 
Catholics.991  
 
Rumours of domestic political problems for the Protectorate were evidently 
circulating. Oliver Cromwell had dissolved the second Protectorate Parliament in 
February 1658 after republican MPs questioned the legitimacy of the ‘other house’. This 
enraged Cromwell who had been plagued throughout the Protectorate by what he 
perceived as consecutive parliaments’ failure to install his vision of a religiously unified 
republic. On dissolving parliament he stated ominously, ‘Let God be judge between you 
and me’.992 In his letter Cardinal de Retz warned that Spain’s weakness might cause the 
exiled future monarch to look elsewhere for support, most likely towards the Protestants. 
This might have dire consequences for English Catholics; both cardinals must encourage 
the pope to deal with Charles to ensure liberty of conscience on his restoration. Charles 
was still soliciting support from Rome by using the English Catholics as a bargaining 
tool to restore him to the throne. As demonstrated in earlier chapters, this was a long-
term Stuart policy. 
 
It was not only Cardinal de Retz who was ready to help Charles in return for 
assurances of future toleration. From 1656 Abbess Knatchbull of the English 
Benedictine cloister at Ghent had arranged credit for the exiled Stuart court and 
established a correspondence network relaying mail from England to Charles and his 
courtiers.993 This network was of great importance from 1658 onwards as the royalist 
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plotters and Hyde became increasingly reliant upon it.994 Knatchbull’s hope that her help 
would encourage Charles to allow liberty of conscience on his restoration was later 
conveyed in her correspondence with Hyde.  
 
On 3rd September 1658 Cromwell died at Whitehall after a short illness. Richard, 
his son, was made the second Protector. Further political discontent followed. Faced 
with an annual deficit of over £500,000 and Army arrears of £890,000, Richard was 
forced to call his first parliament, the Protectorate’s third, in January 1659.995 The 
republicans within parliament refused to acknowledge Richard as Protector and called 
for the repeal of the Humble Petition and Advice. Further, parliament angered the Army 
by voting for the limitation of its political involvement and its potential conversion into 
a militia, whilst also enforcing additional restrictions on religious tolerance. The Army 
persuaded Cromwell to dissolve the parliament and, in the form of the general council, 
recalled the Rump which reassembled on 7th May 1659, having not been seen since its 
dissolution in April 1653. The Rump, however, failed to follow the Army’s manifesto, 
electing a new Council of State and demanding Richard’s resignation on the 24th May 
1659. It then re-established the Commonwealth.  
 
Hyde’s correspondence during this time is telling. In the midst of the political 
confusion the English Catholics fell silent. Hyde wrote a letter to one of his 
correspondents, Cooper, at the beginning of May to complain that neither he nor the 
exiled Stuart court had much, or indeed any, contact with English Catholics; ‘we have 
less correspondence with them and receive less fruit from their affection, than you can 
imagine’.996 Matters had not been improved by the death of Father Wilford, the Catholic 
priest who corresponded with Hyde. The priest recommended to replace Wilford by 
Marmaduke Langdale was Robert Rookwood, who did not keep Hyde informed and 
whom Hyde did not trust.997 Rookwood’s decision to undertake this role had apparently 
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caused much opposition within his order, members of which spread the rumour that 
Rookwood was an apostate.998 Indeed some of the clergy disliked any priest 
corresponding with the chancellor. Francis Gage, the English chapter’s agent in Rome 
during this time, on hearing of Wilford’s death, asked God to forgive him for his 
correspondence with Hyde and described such a position as ‘an employment so ill 
becoming a religious person, that it having been first desired to have been undertaken by 
the Jesuits, their General absolutely forbid them to undertake it’.999 This is noteworthy 
since, just a year later in 1660, Hyde twice signalled his support for the chapter’s 
petitioning for a bishop on the grounds that the chosen priest would be loyal to the 
king.1000 Perhaps it was exactly this point that inspired Gage’s disdain. The need for 
Catholics to prove their loyalty to Charles II in order to secure toleration meant they had 
to adopt an uncomfortably positive attitude to Blackloism.1001 In 1659 Hyde also 
discussed information he had received about an ‘intrigue now driving the Catholics’. 
Hyde believed that many of them held mischievous intentions towards the king, 
especially priests ‘who are not governed by the Jesuits’ and therefore could not be 
trusted, as shown by those willing to negotiate with Cromwell to the exclusion of 
Charles II. When Abbess Knatchbull wrote to Hyde with news from England in 
September 1659, she informed him that the Rump treated the Catholics with more 
favour, even offering a ‘toleration of conscience and all other privileges as the surest 
means in this conjuncture to keep the quiet at home and to persuade the Catholics both 
princes and chiefs abroad to confer with a government which is like to prove so 
advantageous to the Church’.1002 If this were true (which seems most unlikely) it would 
advance the chapter’s attempt to secure a bishop from Rome to the disadvantage of the 
exiled court. As has been demonstrated in previous chapters, factions within the English 
Catholic community were willing to make deals and sacrifices with anyone who would 
favour them. Dealing with the Rump would not have been completely out of character. 
The Abbess continued her letter with the hope that ‘his majesty’s entire endeavours and 
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the wisdom of his council will I hope permit them in this policy of theirs, by true piety 
and a lovely cooperation with God Almighty his designs in restoring him to his 
kingdom’. She seemed to use the Rump’s favouring of the Catholics to encourage a 
declaration of support from the exiled court. 
 
If there was actually any favourable treatment from the Rump, it had little effect 
on royalist and Catholic attitudes. Charles Stuart received a letter in early May 1659 
from Lords Mordaunt, Willoughby, Newport and Carleton assuring the king of their 
support for a future restoration. The Lords asserted that they were ready for the king to 
come and remove the Rump Parliament and claimed that many Catholics were fixed to 
serve the king.1003 Two months later correspondent Brodrick wrote to Hyde that Oliver 
Cromwell’s death allowed the opportunity for peace between France and Spain which, 
Brodrick claimed, would ‘allow all the councils of Christendom, they plainly discern 
and look on it as a design’ to advance monarchy and the Roman religion.1004 Some 
royalists, then, saw the restoration of the Stuart Crown as a part of a European peace 
policy. The unity of the two main Catholic monarchical powers would benefit the 
royalists one way or another. This placed the predicament of the English Catholic 
community back in the limelight once again. Brodrick felt that circumstances were 
finally beginning to favour the Cavaliers. 
 
Just over a week after Brodrick’s letter was written, a pro-royalist Presbyterian 
uprising, led by Sir George Booth, took place in Cheshire and Lancashire. It was easily 
defeated by the Army. Hyde’s correspondence contains a list of prisoners taken in the 
town of Stafford who had participated in the rising. Listed were those identified either as 
Cavaliers or papists, including a mayor, a JP and Mr Cotton, a Jesuit priest. All named 
prisoners were considered ‘dangerous and disaffected persons’ to the present 
Parliament.1005 Although the rising had been easily put down, it showed the level of 
disaffection towards the Rump Parliament. This disaffection grew, especially in the 
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Army, when the Rump declared all acts and ordinances instituted since its dissolution by 
Cromwell in April 1653 illegal, and attempted to purge its critics from local government 
and the Army. Military radicals, led by John Lambert, forcibly dissolved the Rump on 
13th October 1659. This in turn aroused widespread condemnation. General George 
Monck, leader of the Army in Scotland, called for the Rump’s reinstatement.  
 
News of the events soon reached Hyde. Bramble, his correspondent, claimed that 
John Lambert’s ‘game’ was beginning to get desperate, since the king might attempt his 
own restoration whilst the political climate was so confused.1006 News was circulating in 
England, Bramble reported, that Charles had reached an agreement on religious 
toleration for English Catholics with the now pacified French and Spanish crowns. 
‘[C]ertain churches in or near several great towns’ would be assigned as Catholic to 
guarantee this future toleration.1007 Bramble also alleged that John Lambert wanted to 
persuade Charles Fleetwood, commander-in-chief of the Army, to reinstate Richard 
Cromwell in the protectorship and, in an attempt to restore political order but keep the 
Army’s autonomy had approached the Anabaptists and fifth monarchy men for their 
assistance to then ‘pull down Cromwell’ if such an occasion arose.1008 In this endeavour 
Bramble believed the English Catholics were Lambert’s ‘surest friends’.1009 By late 
October, when this newsletter was written, both Lambert and Fleetwood had become 
extremely influential after the dissolution of the Rump, Fleetwood as Commander-in-
chief and Lambert sitting on the Committee of Safety, the replacement for the Council of 
State, which was in effect running the country. There is little proof, however, of serious 
plans to reinstate Richard as Protector. There were rumours that he was being 
temporarily held at Hampton Court as a prelude to reinstatement, but it is more realistic 
to accept that Richard retired to Hursley and remained there until travelling abroad after 
the Restoration.1010  
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By December everything seemed to be falling apart. There was popular 
disaffection towards the Army, tax strikes and a blockade of the Thames, which was 
stopping the supply of coal. The Rump Parliament was reinstated on 26th December 
1659 by three Army regiments in London, spurred on and by Monck whose Army had 
marched from Scotland and nearly reached the capital. Hyde now hoped, but thought it 
unlikely, that there would be a Catholic intervention to the ‘great prosperity of the 
Rump’.1011 Its reinstatement, he feared, would hinder the king’s restoration. 
Nevertheless, due to the overwhelming pressure to reform the political process and call 
‘free elections’, and with Monck’s support, the Long Parliament (the Rump plus those 
MPs purged in 1648 by Colonel Thomas Pride) voted to dissolve itself and provided the 
opportunity for Charles II to issue the Declaration of Breda in April 1660. The 
Declaration of Breda was designed to undercut any opposition to Charles’s restoration. It 
promised a constitutional monarchy with liberty of conscience for subjects whilst 
adhering to the rule of law. Free elections followed which returned a largely pro-royalist 
government, the Convention Parliament, which voted for the restoration of Charles II. 
The king landed at Dover on 25th May 1660. 
 
6.2. English Catholic reactions to the Restoration. 
Whilst these political events unfolded, the English chapter were preoccupied 
with their own endeavours to secure a bishop from the papacy. As has been shown, the 
English chapter had continually petitioned for a bishop since Smith’s death in 1655, but 
Oliver Cromwell’s death profoundly altered the situation. As seen above, the 
Restoration, although a possibility, seemed far from inevitable in 1659, although the 
English chapter were keen to portray it as such in order to advantage their campaign in 
Rome. But using the prospect of a restoration meant input from the exiled court, which 
indeed occurred throughout summer 1659.  
 
News of the chapter’s plans soon circulated around the Stuart court. Clement 
wrote to Hyde informing him of the campaign for a bishop:  
                                                
1011 ClSP, 68, f.136 (Hyde to Hannock, 12th/23rd January 1660). 
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Dr Gage has already begun to negotiate and endeavour to make the court to 
believe that this parliament has made fair promises to Catholics and it is here 
reported I believe (by him) that one Winter Grant [George Leyburn] is to come 
over about it, and that Lord Bristol is expected here: I am fully of the opinion no 
resolution … [has been taken] as yet, so that you may have time to get the nuncio 
to cross it.1012 
Francis Gage, the chapter agent sent to Rome to petition the papacy for a bishop, relayed 
to John Sergeant, secretary of the chapter in England, in June 1659, that the court of 
Rome had been told that ‘the king of Scotland in Flanders hath expressed a dislike of our 
having a bishop’.1013 Gage did not believe this, instead choosing to believe that it was a 
case of dirty tricks in Rome by the chapter’s enemies, namely the Jesuits, who were 
against the idea of electing a bishop.  
 
This proved to be wishful thinking. Later in September Gage reported that he had 
been informed that Charles II had indeed written to the pope to request papal refusal of 
the English chapter’s request for a bishop on the grounds that to do so might ‘prejudice’ 
his affairs in England.1014 Any speculation, however slight, that a Catholic bishop would 
be installed in England, would cause an anti-Catholic backlash, stimulating popish plot 
fears, which would greatly damage the possibilities of Charles’s restoration. Charles was 
now very careful not to be seen to be emulating his father’s sins. The papacy was of the 
same mind and did not wish to commit itself before matters were settled in England. 
They repeatedly rebuffed Gage’s and the chapter’s pleas. The papacy advised Gage that 
he should not seek an audience with the pope until he knew how affairs in England were 
changing and how this might affect the chapter’s plans.1015 It continued to fob him off 
well into December 1659. He was told in February 1660 that the English chapter ‘were 
ridiculous people to think this was a time to determine anything of that nature’.1016 To 
press such business, Gage was warned, risked ruining the English Catholics altogether. 
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These might only have been temporary problems for the chapter, but the major 
issue weakening requests for a Catholic bishop was the factionalism that had existed 
within English Catholicism since the beginning of the mission. Tension had increased 
when some Catholics adopted Gallican principles. As has been discussed in previous 
chapters, the priest George Leyburn, royalist Francophile and president of the college of 
Douai, was one of the Blackloists’ greatest critics, denouncing their anti-papal doctrines 
as religious novelties. The Blackloists were just as hostile to Leyburn, defaming his 
character in published pamphlets. There had been attempts to end the controversy during 
the 1650s but the dispute raged on after the Restoration. Leyburn’s resentment of the 
Blackloists’ Gallican policies and his (mistaken) accusations that the chapter was 
heavily Blackloist meant that he refused to support their campaign for a bishop. As a 
result, he found himself alienated from the majority of the chapter at the Restoration.  
 
The simultaneous possibilities of the restoration of Charles II and the Catholic 
campaign for a bishop placed the chapter in a very delicate situation. The clergy needed 
to prove that they would be loyal to a restored king and so the Blackloists’ position – 
curtailing papal power and pledging full allegiance to a temporal power – was very 
attractive. Adopting these policies would be extremely beneficial in stabilising the 
chapter’s position in England. Using Blackloist principles to gain advantage at home, 
however, ruined their chance of securing a bishop from Rome. The papacy was worried 
that if the English were granted a bishop the chapter would soon break from Rome and 
become entirely self-governing. Any hope of re-establishing Roman Catholicism in 
England would be lost, with significant implications for the pope’s European power.  
 
The quandary was particularly difficult for members of the English chapter who 
disliked Blackloism but saw it as their best chance to achieve toleration, as Francis Gage 
explained to John Holland in July 1659. In the same letter, ironically, he wrote that 
Leyburn was also charged with Blackloism, as were other members of the chapter. Gage 
wrote ‘Somebody hath already cast a slur both upon Mr Leyburn and myself as being 
abettors of Mr Blacklo’s doctrine, whereof Mr Hart took notice; but alas how 
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undeservedly the world knows’.1017 A month later Gage reported to the chapter that 
Blacklo’s doctrines were hampering his efforts to obtain a bishop. In response to 
criticism over Blacklo, Gage replied that his writings had been submitted to the See 
Apostolic and that this case showed the need for the English chapter ‘of having a power 
to contain and keep in order such exorbitant spirits’.1018 A year later, Gage noted the 
difficulties posed by the accusations of Blackloism. Relaying the news that White’s 
work Obedience and Government had been translated into Italian and given to the 
Inquisition to censure, Gage warned that he feared: 
the censure of it at present would not have the effect they [the papacy] expected, 
which was to please the king: who might have liked the censure of it at its first 
coming forth, when it seemed to favour Cromwell but the case being now 
altered, to the doctrine thereof being now as much to the king’s advantage, as it 
was then prejudicial to him, he might imagine the censure of it to come a 
countertemps.1019 
 
Mr Hart, mentioned in the first of Gage’s letters, was the English Jesuit priest 
William Hargrave, resident in the Venerable English College in Rome; the Jesuits would 
soon become Leyburn’s greatest allies. They had equal reasons to fear the Blackloist 
faction. Robert Pugh, the author of Blacklo’s Cabal, played an important role in this 
alliance. Pugh was a priest who had been dismissed by the Jesuits for his military 
involvement in the king’s army during the civil war, but remained strongly attached to 
the group. He is also thought to have been a tutor to Henry, duke of Gloucester, when in 
exile.1020 Pugh entered into a pamphlet war with Blacklo, publishing De Anglicani cleri 
retinenda in apostolicam in 1659. He criticised the Blackloists’ attitude to the regular 
clergy, their views on the infallibility of the pope and their passive obedience to civil 
government. The pamphlet neatly coincided not only with Leyburn’s war of words with 
Blacklo and the chapter, but also with the chapter’s campaign for a bishop. As news of 
Pugh’s pamphlet reached Rome, Gage reported that it was scandalous to the English 
clergy ‘but so larded with sycophancy and flattery of this court, that it will be hard to 
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procure their dislike of it’.1021 Gage thought that Pugh’s motivation in publishing the 
book was to enable him to ‘close again with the Jesuits and by their means to be 
preferred to some degree of superior amongst us’. Pugh’s ‘railing against the chapter’ 
had only injured ‘those renowned persons that have been Deans and officers of it, 
amongst which his so much-advised Dr Leyburn was one’.1022 Gage again wrote bitterly 
in November 1660 that Pugh was ‘a fit squire for such a champion’, a reference to 
Leyburn. Indeed the posthumous publishing of Pugh’s Blacklo’s Cabal, documenting 
the Blackloists’ offences against the chapter, Rome, the regular clergy and Charles I, 
served Leyburn well. It also sought to re-establish Leyburn as the defender of English 
Catholics against ‘Mr Blacklo’s spirit (which is crept into this family)’.1023 
 
Examples of similar anti-Blackloist, pro-Jesuit sentiments can be seen in other 
printed material from this time, most notably in the pamphlet A letter from a gentleman 
to his friend in London published in 1660. The author, T.R, argued Blacklo’s work was 
against spiritual and temporal magistrates, making it ‘odious to all honest men’. The 
Blackloists should therefore be punished.1024 The author enthused that Jesuits were well 
respected by many men throughout the world, including princes, prelates, doctors and 
preachers.1025 Both the regular and secular clergy, the pamphlet stated, detested 
Blackloism.1026 
 
It was not just Blacklo’s assault on the doctrine of papal infallibility that angered 
the Jesuits. The Blackloists had also sought to oust the regulars from England through 
their negotiations with the Independents in 1647. Holden’s instructions to Sir Kenelm 
Digby in Blacklo’s Cabal outlined why the Blackloists championed the independence of 
English Catholic bishops from Rome. All regulars, Holden argued, ‘pretend to be 
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exempted by the pope from all ordinary episcopal power and jurisdiction and to be 
immediately subject to the pope, or the general of their order and of a foreign nation’. 
All priests, secular and regular, should therefore take an oath to prevent them from 
exercising any ‘ecclesiastical function, or any spiritual authority or jurisdiction’ but 
those ‘derived’ from these newly created bishops. The regulars would be unable to 
accept the oath as they depended on the papacy, a foreign power, and so would have to 
‘withdraw themselves out of the kingdom, as unfit members of the commonwealth’.1027 
In an aside to the letter Pugh wrote, ‘Is there no reason to suspect that this design did not 
die with Dr Holden; but live in that party? And that Mr Sergeant’s great design in his 
going for England, is the same’. 1028 The chapter’s attitude to toleration negotiations with 
the House of Lords committee and Holden’s posthumously published tracts supporting 
White’s doctrines and attacking the Jesuits in 1661 and 1662 respectively support 
Pugh’s interpretation.1029 
 
Leyburn seemed desperate to distance the chapter from Blackloism and so 
returned to London in 1660, after the Restoration, to undertake his own negotiations 
with the new regime. He reportedly met Clarendon to discuss the chapter’s campaign for 
a new bishop. Clarendon agreed with the chapter’s wishes, on the condition that 
whoever was chosen was loyal to the king.1030 Leyburn met with the chapter and asked 
them personally to declare against Blacklo’s doctrines. They refused. From this point 
neither Leyburn nor the chapter were willing to compromise. Leyburn returned to Douai 
and set out to thwart the chapter’s efforts at Rome. The position of vicar apostolic for the 
English chapter, which Rome favoured, would eradicate Blackloism from the chapter. 
Leyburn knew that the English chapter needed a leader, but he wanted one who would 
uphold the autonomy of the papacy. A vicar apostolic’s jurisdiction was, in effect, the 
exercise of the jurisdiction of the pope whereas a diocesan bishop’s jurisdiction came 
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directly from his office as a bishop. Therefore a bishop would have given the English 
Catholic clergy greater independence from papal jurisdiction. 
 
Gage reported back to the chapter in July 1660 that Leyburn had written a letter 
to the papacy stating that he ‘and the greater part of the clergy in England’ would be 
‘well satisfied and would think themselves happy’ if a vicar apostolic was granted. Only 
a few members (John Sergeant the secretary of the chapter was specifically mentioned) 
opposed it.1031 Gage complained that Leyburn’s letter had given the papacy the ‘most 
powerful means’ to award one to the chapter ‘but also [the surest means] of fixing it on 
his person [Leyburn]’.1032 The priest William Hargrave, alias Hart, was identified again 
as one of a group who alleged that Gage had been ‘only sent by a few, and not from the 
whole body’.1033 Hart, Gage warned, was ‘a person in no wise to be trusted with our 
affairs, however he be Dr Leyburn’s correspondent’.1034 Neither Leyburn nor the Jesuits 
would accept the independence from Rome implied by the chapter’s support of 
Blackloist principles. 
 
Leyburn had also angered the chapter by writing publicly to the queen mother, 
Henrietta Maria, about the perceived infiltration of the Blackloists into the chapter. In 
this letter Leyburn portrayed himself not just as her subject but also her servant, 
highlighting how long, and at which points, he had served her. Leyburn continued: 
Madame, for myself I am an apologer – only, but for our mother-house I am an 
intercessor, most humbly beseeching your sacred majesty to look on her with a 
gracious eye, to the encouragement of your Catholic subjects and the 
discouragement of our few wanton clergymen of this fanatic age, that endeavour 
to hurt her, since they cannot make her a plantation of their new notions.1035 
 
The majority of the English chapter however were uncompromising on their 
desire for a bishop from Rome. They would not settle for a vicar apostolic, even though 
their agent in Rome, Gage, informed them that this appointment could be secured. Gage 
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considered it would be a better to accept this opportunity since the chapter might 
otherwise forgo permanently the chance of having a superior. Worried that Gage’s 
attitude would encourage him to make concessions to the papacy, the chapter speedily 
withdrew him from Rome.  
 
In response to Gage’s withdrawal, the chapter increased their attacks on 
Leyburn.1036 The English chapter were not just against the idea of a vicar apostolic 
because they feared that the court of Rome would choose Leyburn for the role. They 
also worried that having a vicar apostolic would ensure their continual dependence on 
the papacy.1037 In retaliation for Leyburn’s meddling, the dean and the chapter published 
their response to him, entitled An Encyclical Epistle. In it, the authors addressed 
Leyburn’s accusations of schism and Blackloism and his letter to Rome campaigning for 
a vicar apostolic rather than a bishop. To receive extraordinary authority was, the 
chapter argued, against the ‘pleasure’ of the queen mother who had already stated that 
she would not accept such a position.1038 Establishing a vicar apostolic was also ‘against 
the will of the state: and so most dangerous for us to admit, subjecting us to 
praemunire’.1039 The pamphlet also attempted to show the falsehood of Leyburn’s 
‘wranglings, calumnies and passionate carriages’, particularly accusations of Blackloism 
against clergymen including Francis Gage.1040 No wonder that Gage approved of it 
although he also wished that the chapter’s grievances had not been made public.1041 The 
latter point had not been received very well by the papacy either. The papal secretary at 
Rome for the English clergy had expressed dismay at Leyburn’s ‘violent proceedings’ 
but was angry at both parties. Gage reported: 
he tells me that the Dr is a beast, and that we should rather have complained to 
the king of him as a disturber of the peace then to have fallen into equal 
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absurdity: and that we may blame ourselves if we neither receive favour from 
this state, nor this court, our dissentions being so obstructive to it1042 
Gage, however, saw this as an excuse. He warned a month later that the chapter should 
‘never expect a good issue of our business, from the voluntary motion of this court’ if 
the chapter’s interest (in this case, campaigning for a bishop) ran contrary to the 
papacy’s.1043 
 
A paper drafted by the English chapter stated their justifications for a bishop. 
They believed the clergy would be ‘grounded’ by a bishop and wanted the power and 
jurisdiction to be exercised ‘sede vacante’ by the dean or other superior after the 
bishop’s death.1044 It was proposed that the jurisdiction of the bishop would include 
Wales and other English dominions and that the bishop would have the power to ‘hear 
and determine all differences’ arising amongst the clergy. The clergy should be able to 
nominate candidates so that the English Catholic laity would be ‘freed from their 
imaginary fear of having an external court and tribunal placed over them’.1045 These 
arguments articulated the chapter’s vision of considerable independence from the pope. 
But distancing themselves from the papacy was also an astute political manoeuvre. It 
would allay the fears of the king and his Protestant subjects that the English Catholic 
community’s loyalty lay with a foreign power. At the same time the chapter understood 
that their business in Rome would be advantaged by support from Charles II. Gage 
wrote that he hoped the king ‘grow absolute and continue not disaffected towards our 
religion, we may under his protection prescribe unto this court what laws we please in 
order both to the power and person of our superior: but if the malignity of our times 
debar his majesty of the freedom of acting according to his inclinations … we may soon 
enough yield to the pleasure of this court’.1046 
 
This encapsulates the difficulties of the chapter. On the one hand it was 
important to free themselves from the shackles of Blackloism in order to achieve their 
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aims in Rome (Rome regarded Blacklo as ‘their mortallest enemy’).1047 On the other 
hand, however, there were still parts of Blackloist (or perhaps more accurately Gallican) 
doctrine which could serve the chapter well at the restoration, especially the opportunity 
for a declaration of allegiance to the temporal power, which dismissed the temporal 
power of the papacy. As early as December 1660 news circulated in Rome of new 
versions of the Elizabethan Oath of Supremacy and the Jacobean Oath of Allegiance 
which had been approved by Charles II.1048 Gage confirmed to the chapter that the 
Congregation had been ‘strangely alarmed’ by this news and consequently Cardinal 
Barberini had immediately demanded more information from the English rector. He had 
replied that he knew nothing about it.1049 Yet there certainly were some English 
Catholics willing to take an oath of allegiance in spite of papal condemnation. 
 
6.3. Catholic attempts to secure toleration after the Restoration. 
The English Catholic community saw the Restoration of Charles II as a new 
opportunity from which to take full advantage. As the Convention Parliament assembled 
in April 1660, prominent Catholics decided that they wanted to play a part in the future 
of the country. Ignoring the instruction that recusants should not sit in the House of 
Lords, six Catholic peers had taken their seats by 3rd May. Four Catholic peers, Lords 
Petre, Teynham, Morley and Earl Rivers voted for Charles II’s confirmation as king of 
England since the execution of Charles I in 1649.1050 By the end of May leading 
Catholic peers such as the Marquis of Winchester, Lord Arundell of Wardour, Lord 
Abergavenny, Viscount Montagu, Lord Stourton, Lord Brooke and the earls of 
Berkshire and Shrewsbury were all in the Upper House.1051 The number of Catholic 
peers meant that the Lords was more open to Catholic petitioning than the Commons 
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during the rein of Charles II.1052 The English Catholic community did not start actively 
petitioning the government for toleration or liberty of conscience until 1661, since they 
felt that that the Declaration of Breda had, in theory, shown the new King’s positive 
intentions. In addition, they enjoyed favour from Charles II. Charles personally opposed 
Richard Baxter’s attempt to enact specific clauses against English Roman Catholics.1053 
The one-time alliance between the community and Baxter during the Interregnum had 
been quickly curtailed once Baxter achieved such a strong position (in religious 
settlement terms – even though he had been excluded from the Worcester House 
Conference) that he no longer needed Catholics. The alliance had, of course, been born 
out of necessity rather than sympathy. The Catholics were desperate to counter Baxter’s 
arguments and a pamphlet was published in direct response. This portrayed English 
Catholics as loyal subjects, with the author willing to swear allegiance to the king by 
oath.1054 Further assertions of Catholic loyalty followed.1055 
 
In Charles’s mind the main focus in his three kingdoms after the Restoration was 
to find terms agreeable to the English Presbyterians. Although both Houses of 
Parliament consisted mostly of what one might now call ‘Anglicans’, it was the 
Presbyterians who posed the biggest threat to civil order.1056 Giavarina, the Venetian 
resident concluded that the king was ‘compelled to depend in large part on the 
Presbyterians’ and would go to great lengths to avoid offending them ‘seeing that they 
restored him to the throne.1057 Royal policy seemed to be to keep friends close but 
enemies even closer, hence the culmination of previous debates over a religious 
settlement at Worcester House in October 1660. The conference declared for a modified 
Anglican settlement, with concessions to the Presbyterians.  
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There was little opportunity for the Catholic community to play a part in these 
discussions. In January 1661 episcopacy had been almost completely restored within the 
Church of England. By spring of the same year the Anglican campaign for enforced 
conformity was in full swing. There were English Catholics who tried to show their 
support for the restored Anglican Church by advocating, to the detriment of the 
Presbyterians, that episcopacy was compatible with Catholic beliefs about the nature of 
church government.1058 This was potentially a good strategy, since it was the 
Presbyterians who the majority of the Convention Parliament wanted to punish. Some 
MPs were upset that Presbyterian ministers had been forced upon them. The papacy, 
however, refused to be swept along by hopes that the re-establishment of episcopacy 
would benefit English Catholics. On the news that a parliament was due to meet to 
discuss that re-establishment, Gage wrote in March 1661: 
you may imagine what construction of this court makes hereof; where there are 
not wanting subtle suggestions, to make them believe that the ground on which 
our Catholics build their hopes will in the end slip from under them, and they be 
reduced to as great an oppression as ever.1059 
 
In reviewing the actions of the English Catholics during the first year and a half 
of Charles II’s rule, there is a sense that the community was cautiously biding its time. 
Catholic pamphlets advocated toleration and described the loyalty shown during the civil 
war and Charles II’s exile. As has been discussed, the truth was far more complex than 
these pamphlets suggested, and they were greeted in Protestant quarters with everything 
from scepticism to contradiction. This reaction is unsurprising, especially in the case of 
Kenelm Digby, the epitome of the royalist-Janus-faced bogeyman, who petitioned the 
king against ‘Catholic disabilities’ in 1660.1060 Digby pleaded that the English Catholic 
community were loyal subjects, ‘that no power on earth can absolve us from our duty 
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and allegiance to our sovereign’.1061 Remarkably, considering his own friendship with 
Cromwell, Digby continued: 
And accordingly your majesties Catholic subjects have given good evidence of 
their fidelity during the late unhappy distractions and storms, that have clouded 
many of your boldest and most affectionate subjects, in the expressions of their 
duties to your sacred person and to your blessed father: And this, at such times, 
and in such circumstances, as they could not be suspected to do what they did for 
temporal interests.1062 
To tolerate the English Roman Catholic community would prove ‘highly advantageous’ 
to the new regime, as it would remove the Catholic community’s need to have ‘foreign 
dependences’. Without persecution there would be no need for the community to seek 
‘redress from abroad, in what rendereth us unhappy at home’.1063 Digby believed that the 
community could prove good subjects, providing good service to the king. 
 
There were signs during the first eighteen months of Charles II’s reign that anti-
Catholic persecution would end and Catholics would once again find themselves in a 
position to offer the services Digby suggested. Parliament passed a bill to restore the 
dukedom of Norfolk in 1660 and Thomas, Lord Brudenell, was made the first earl of 
Cardigan in April 1661, at the same time Hyde became earl of Clarendon.1064 The newly 
styled Clarendon gave positive signs of support for the chapter’s campaign for a bishop. 
The penal laws against recusants were not enforced. The Venetian ambassador in Spain 
reported that the king had expressed ‘the most friendly feelings’ towards his Catholic 
subjects.1065 Yet the king found himself confined by his ministers, 
and dare not express openly his own sentiments, or take independent action, and 
would risk his kingdom and his life if he should try to make fresh attempts. His 
majesty had confided to him [Ambassador Batterville] that he had no other 
support in England than the party of Catholics.1066 
 
Negotiations were also beginning to secure Charles’s marriage to the Portuguese 
Catholic princess, Catherine of Braganza. The reasons behind the choice of Charles’s 
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queen were three-fold. First and foremost was finance. Charles needed to address his 
inherited financial issues and the Portuguese were in dire need of foreign aid in their 
struggle against Spain. The Portuguese offered a dowry of around £350,000 as well as 
giving Charles Tangier and Bombay.1067 By marrying the Portuguese princess, Charles 
could give support to Portugal against Spain. Although England and Spain had 
negotiated a peace, no treaty had been signed and tensions between the two nations 
continued.1068 An added attraction was that France showed support for the marriage, as 
they also wanted to support Portugal in their revolt against Spain.1069 
 
It was also thought that after the Cavalier Parliament had settled the new king’s 
revenue, Charles II might not be such an enthusiast for the Anglican Church of England. 
There were rumours he had converted to the Church of Rome whilst in exile and would 
re-establish Catholicism as the national faith; an act was even passed in November 1661 
making it illegal to identify Charles as a papist.1070 It seems therefore that there was 
trepidation that the new king would abandon the Church of England once he had been 
granted his much-needed revenue.  
 
A memorandum found in the Catholic Belson family’s collection conveys this 
fear and proposes a solution. The memorandum’s author argues that the Church of 
England should not rely on the security of the first eighteen months of the 
Restoration.1071 At this time the king’s revenue was not yet settled and therefore his 
support for an Anglican settlement (bearing in mind the high proportion of Anglicans in 
the first session of the Cavalier Parliament) was obligatory ‘both by promise and 
interest’.1072 Once Charles’s revenue was settled, however, the king would become more 
willing to listen to men ‘ill-affected’ to the Church of England which then might ‘not be 
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able to promise herself a parliament that have more consideration for her than 
others’.1073 The memorandum continued: 
Further as it can not well be expected that any prince should punish people for 
being of his own religion, and connivance of any such dissenters naturally 
spreads to the rest, the laws for conformity must needs come to be disused, and 
in time perhaps repealed, it may be without regard to her… In a word it is not 
likely that under a prince of a different religion the condition of the Church of 
England should grow better by time; it may grow worse, and therefore I conceive 
it is her interest to do what she thinks fit, to do for her self, now while she is at 
the best. 
Three solutions were considered by the author; enact persecution against all dissenters 
and threaten the king with loss of revenue if he disagreed, indulge some dissenters but 
persecute others, or ‘indulge’ all. The first two choices were dismissed on the grounds 
that they were ‘impractical and ruinous’, as the king was unlikely to persecute those of 
his own religion and therefore would be likely to break from the Church of England 
when domestic politics allowed. Papists could not be tolerated on their own because of 
the risks to Church and State; with toleration papists might have become too numerous 
and powerful for the Church of England and for the state ‘it has been found by 
lamentable experience that fanatic Dissenters were too hard for the Church of England 
and the papists united together and strengthened by the king’s person. Things indeed are 
not in so bad a posture now as they were in 40s:’.1074 If, however, toleration included all 
dissenters, this would secure their support against any foreign invasion (an accusation 
aimed primarily at the French). As things stood, however, the author believed that the 
community could be ‘well hindered from a toleration. For tis likely the laws against 
them will be executed’. Yet the author still believed toleration should be offered to 
prevent a radical kind of popery or, as the memorandum put it ‘more popery here, than 
wise Catholics themselves would wish’.1075 
 
The thoughts expressed in this memorandum go some way to explain the Roman 
Catholic community’s lurch into action in 1661.1076 Three separate approaches had been 
made to king and parliament by that summer, petitioning for religious toleration by the 
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Catholic laity, the regulars and the chapter. Since the king’s revenue had not been 
settled, the Savoy House Conference on a religious settlement ended in deadlock, and in 
the absence of a uniformity bill which did not pass until May 1662, there seemed an 
opportunity for the community to petition for toleration whilst the two main religious 
parties were divided and before a new religious settlement was reached.  
 
Each approach addressed and dismissed the problem of the papal deposing 
power. The Benedictines and other members of the regular clergy petitioned Charles II 
for toleration. They made references to the condemnation by several Catholic 
universities of the pope’s claim to temporal power by divine right to prove their 
allegiance to their king.1077 The English Catholic laity also approached parliament and 
Charles for toleration. On 10th June 1661, following a debate concerning the oaths of 
supremacy and allegiance, a group of Catholic gentlemen – Henry Arundell, Francis 
Carrington, George Blount, William Courtenay and Samuel Tuke (knighted in March 
1664) – approached the House of Lords with a petition on behalf of the English 
Catholics.1078 The petition declared the community’s fidelity and allegiance to the 
Crown and hoped that on this basis the English Catholics would not be excluded from 
‘His majesty’s gracious intentions to all his subjects in general, in point of tender 
consciences’. The petitioners hoped to influence the wording of further oaths of fidelity 
and allegiance implemented by the new regime. After the petitioners had spoken, the 
debate was postponed and on sitting the next day the Lords declared that nothing yet had 
moved them to alter the proposed oath. Catholic petitions concerning the oath and a 
consequent debate would be held the following Monday. The English Catholic 
gentlemen finally had their say on 21st June. Samuel Tuke began by presenting two 
papers, one a list of the penal laws in force concerning religion, the other a paper 
outlining the community’s desires. This paper, conveying the community’s hope of 
toleration, was firmly rooted in the Declaration of Breda.1079 Tuke asked the Lords to 
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mediate so that English Catholics might receive the ‘Benefit’ of Charles II’s ‘gracious 
promise’, since the community thought itself innocent of any action rendering it 
‘incapable of this gracious and general indulgence’.1080 The Catholics were not 
approaching both the king and parliament to ‘justify our doctrine’ but to prove their 
fidelity and obedience to Charles II. The paper denied the papal disposing power and 
declared the English Catholic community ready ‘with our lives and fortunes’ to oppose 
the pope or any other foreign power, and more importantly in terms of removing the 
penal laws against them, ready to swear their allegiance to the king.1081 Tuke 
acknowledged, however, the continual problem of oath taking of the Catholic 
community – the wording. The petition stated: 
Now whether there be any reasonable ground to imagine, that contrary to an 
article of faith, and so sworn to be by us, we should espouse an opinion that is 
only problematical, to the prejudices of our duties, and contrary to our oath, is 
humbly offered to the Christian consideration of the honourable members of both 
houses. We do not know what inconveniences such a spiritual jurisdiction can 
create in the minds of those subjects, as to the lessoning of their obedience to 
temporal magistrate who are so justified against the irregular execution of it, and 
which in its own nature is so absolutely distinct from that jurisdiction which 
princes justly challenge over all their subjects.1082 
The petition stated that there would be no clash in the minds of the community; the soul 
belonged to God and what belonged to Caesar belonged to Caesar. 
 
Lord Arundell of Wardour was granted permission to present another paper to 
the Lords from the community.1083 Arundell outlined six ‘motives’ for Catholics to be 
included in any future freedom of religious conscience.1084 The first was that all the 
causes for Charles II’s predecessors’ penal laws against English Roman Catholics had 
been removed. Henry VIII, it was said, implemented these laws because he was ‘swayed 
by sinful passion’ and therefore needed ‘the defence or cloak’ of these laws whereas 
Charles had a ‘just and equal Christian temper’.1085 Elizabeth I had enacted penal laws 
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because she needed to ‘strengthen and secure’ her succession and rule, whereas Charles 
II’s succession was considered right and legitimate. The king’s Catholic subjects had 
‘endeavoured to defend that legitimacy during those late commotions, not only to a sale 
and sequestration of our estates, but deprivation also of our lives’.1086 King James had 
enacted further penal laws as a result of the Gunpowder Plot, which involved only a 
small minority of Catholics. Arundell declared that ‘the crime of a few Catholics [should 
not] be made the fault of all’.1087 Secondly, the paper repeated the similar declarations of 
Mary, Queen of Scots, and King James, stating that no blood should be shed purely on 
grounds of religion.1088 Thirdly it was asserted that the Roman Catholic religion taught 
‘to render as to God the things that are God’s, so to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s’ 
and that obedience to temporal magistrates and princes was the result of conscience not 
fear.1089 The fourth and fifth points related to the community’s fidelity, using the 
examples set during Elizabeth’s reign (against the attempted Spanish invasion) and 
Queen Mary’s (the Catholic community supported Mary’s cancelling of the ‘forged’ will 
of Henry VIII, and ‘deposing the usurping Queen Jane’).1090 The last reason for 
toleration, Arundell argued, was the community’s allegiance to Charles I and Charles II 
during the civil war and Interregnum. The peer argued: 
We have been ever constant to your just claim to the succession of this crown; 
not ebbing or flowing in our affections, (like some others), according to the 
vicissitudes of your good or evil fortune, but always resolute to live and die with 
your majesty: nor did your father’s or your majesty’s declared zeal to the 
Protestant religion, any way diminish the loyalty of our hearts or hinder the 
performance of our duties.1091 
This, as has been shown, was true only of some English Catholics. Critics were keen to 
prove otherwise, but some sort of collective amnesia did seem to grow out of the 
campaign for toleration after the Restoration. Rewriting Catholic participation in the 
civil wars and, in particular, their conduct during the Interregnum, was a necessary and 
obvious step in this campaign. This resulted in a long-lasting change in remembrance 
within the English Catholic community. This issue of loyalty and disloyalty was also the 
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crux of the Leyburn dispute, which was in full flow at this time. The interconnection 
between the two will be discussed below.  
 
 The Lords fell into a debate over Tuke’s and Arundell’s presentations but soon 
adjourned. Seven days later they ordered that a committee be formed to discuss the laws 
in place concerning priests ‘and such other laws as reach to blood’.1092 The committee 
was made up of Catholics, Anglicans and Presbyterians and held several meetings at the 
Duke of York’s lodgings. The chapter, or at least the dean, Humphrey Waring, seemed 
to have some input as the proposals agreed by the committee are included in the 
Archdiocese of Westminster’s Archives with the note ‘What Mr Waring (alias Ellis the 
Dean) judged proper to be tendered to parliament’.1093 When the committee first met on 
the 16th July 1661 they decided to propose a bill to repeal the statutes against seminary 
priests in England, against men going out of the realm and not taking the oath and giving 
bond, and against those who seduced others away from conformity, namely 5: Eliz 
cap:10; 27 Eliz: cap: 20; 10 Jacobi cap: 10; 3 Jacobi cap: 40.1094 The bill should give the 
grounds for these alterations and ‘remedies to preserve the Protestant religion from those 
inconveniences’ which might occur as a consequence of their repeal. The Jesuits, 
however, were to be excluded from any toleration. On their final meeting the committee 
recommended that the ‘writ de heretico comburendo’ and all existing clauses against 
priests should be removed, again excluding Jesuits. The clause in 5:Eliz:c:1 condemning 
the first refusal of the Oath of Allegiance as praemunire and the second refusal as 
treason should also be repealed, as should clauses against going out of the realm and 
seducing people away from conformity.1095 The bill also outlined proposals to monitor 
priests operating in the country. All priests were required to provide their names and 
addresses to one of the secretaries of state within twenty days after their arrival in the 
country. The king would approve the names, which would be passed on to the county 
courts and sheriffs. Any priest deemed ‘obnoxious’ would answer for his actions to the 
king. An oath of allegiance would be taken by all priests and Roman Catholics and 
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attention would be given in every diocese to ensure the children of Roman Catholics 
were catechised. Jesuits were again excluded from toleration and were not allowed to 
enter the country at all. This was to prove a major cause of the disunity in the Roman 
Catholic community.  
 
 The Committee’s proposals however were never presented to the Lords. 
Clarendon believed the reason was that the English Catholics were ‘never afterwards 
…solicitous of it’.1096 At the end of July 1661, however, the Venetian ambassadors 
extraordinary in England, Angelo Correr and Michiel Morosini, reported to the Doge 
and Senate that Clarendon had: 
not thought it well to discuss so great a project, possibly feeling that the moment 
is not opportune, or thinking by the delay to increase his authority. So, for the 
present, to ameliorate the lot of the Catholics, it is proposed that the exercise of 
their religion shall entail exile merely instead of death, and it is hoped that even 
the minor penalty may lack enforcement.1097 
The English Catholics could still hope for freedom of conscience from the new king.  
 
Two months after the meeting of the Lords Committee the chapter made their 
own separate approach to Charles II and were keen to declare their allegiance to him. 
After asking permission from the king, through the mediation of sieur d’Aubigny, the 
chapter held its first General Assembly under the new regime in September 1661. The 
king had been assured it would discuss only its own concerns and their episcopacy 
campaign. Charles II advised them not to ‘meddle’ or agree any extraordinary authority 
from the papacy, otherwise he would be unable to protect them from the full force of the 
recusancy laws.1098 The fourth session of the General Assembly held on 13th September 
discussed proposals that would govern the chapter’s loyalty to Charles II. The first 
proposal was that the chapter should renounce all foreign power, in particular the 
temporal and ecclesiastical power of the pope ‘in as much as he shall pretend to free us 
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from obedience to his majesty’.1099 The chapter agreed to do this by oath. The second 
proposal was that the chapter should represent their brethren’s ‘motives, grounds and 
circumstances which may endure them to agree with the rest of the Catholics in their 
comportment in that particular’. The chapter also agreed not to receive any bulls, breves 
or decrees from the pope without Charles II’s permission. Following the Assembly, the 
chapter made a formal declaration to the king affirming their allegiance to him and to the 
peace of the kingdom. They declared that they regarded Charles II as the lawful monarch 
and that the pope held no power to depose kings. They also stated that any man 
subscribing to the political power of the papacy could not act as a priest in the kingdom 
and (were the position granted by the court of Rome) would not hold the office of 
bishop.1100 The chapter’s declaration was in accordance with the efforts of other 
members of the community: denying papal power to secure toleration during the first 
session of the Cavalier Parliament. At the same time, members of the English Catholic 
community wrote and distributed papers denouncing the claims of papal power and 
declaring that all subjects must obey civil rule.1101  
 
As can be seen from the proposals set forth to the Lords by the committee on 
Catholic toleration, the chapter were keen to accept an alternative version to the existing 
Oath of Allegiance, even if it excluded the regular clergy. The convert Serenus Cressy 
published a pamphlet on this issue, arguing that the oaths of supremacy and allegiance, 
as they stood, could not ‘lawfully or sincerely be taken by any Christian’.1102 Cressy was 
keen to limit the power of the papacy but not for the king to lead entirely in spiritual 
matters. He tried to argue that there was no way Protestants could accept the wording of 
the original oath for the same reasons. Cressy wrote: 
what English Protestant will be willing to make even the negative recognition? 
For if there be no foreign power at all superior to the king in things or causes 
purely spiritual then neither is the pope a patriarch of the west… neither can a 
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lawful and free general council oblige English Protestants which yet they so 
often protest to submit to.1103 
Other members of the community, however, argued that the original versions of these 
oaths could be taken. Both Bristol and John Winter espoused this point at meetings of 
the faithful about toleration, but ultimately failed to convince many that they could 
submit to the oath.1104 In 1662 in a pamphlet, Winter argued that the oaths required of 
the Catholic community should ‘be cleared of doubtful expressions in them, which cause 
their scruples … or a new oath to be compiled in clear terms… [whereby English 
Catholics may] fully testify the allegiance and fidelity of faithful subjects and true 
patriots’.1105 Similar sentiments were expressed by an anonymous writer in a pamphlet 
specifically concerning the oath of supremacy. Dismissing Cressy’s objections as ‘so 
weak that they are even ridiculous’, the author complained that the English Catholic 
community were ‘deluded by sounds which cannot possibly be taken in the sense we are 
afraid of, and yet we are unwilling to understand them in any other’.1106 He believed it 
was madness to make the monarch the only supreme governor in purely spiritual cases, 
as it would give laymen power to allow other laymen to ordain, consecrate, absolve and 
administer sacraments. Therefore, he argued, in the oath the word spiritual ‘neither 
signifies nor involves the power purely spiritual (nor consequently prejudices faith)’.1107 
The author used the example of Mary, Tudor queen of Scots, to support his argument. 
As Mary was the supreme head of the Church in England, Scotland and Ireland, the 
supremacy and headship of the Church was owned by a Catholic queen. ‘Yet tis certain’ 
he continued, ‘neither of them (though the words on earth be added) sound a denying the 
popes power’.1108  
 
An oath would clearly have to be taken to gain official toleration, but agreeing 
the conditions and the impact concessions would have on the power of the papacy 
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caused problems. The regular clergy could not take an oath that denied the infallibility of 
the pope. On this, the Jesuits, in particular, refused to be moved. Of course there were 
great advantages for the English Catholic community in excluding the Jesuit clergy. 
Many Protestants regarded Jesuits as a perversion of an already unacceptable religious 
culture, more seditious and treasonable than any others because they depended on Rome. 
As has been seen, attacks were continually launched against them in print, not least by 
other members of the English Catholic community.1109 A pamphlet published in London 
in 1662 by Antoine Arnauld, for example, tackled the Jesuits’ adherence to papal 
deposing power. In The New heresy of the Jesuits, Arnauld argued the pope’s 
infallibility was not a point of faith and was accepted only by the Jesuits.1110 For this 
reason he held them responsible for the dislike of all Catholics by the Church of Rome’s 
enemies. The faithful were in danger, he wrote, ‘to be poisoned by opinion, that tends to 
change into idolatry the veneration which they owe to the sovereign pastor; where the 
Church is profaned by an impiety, that dishonours or exposes it to outrages of its 
enemies’.1111  
 
The removal of the Jesuits would give the secular clergy’s chapter a much 
greater degree of influence over the rest of the community. It would also quell distrust in 
the community and the clergy in particular. A sense of this comes from the example of 
the new queen of England, Catherine of Braganza. She caused much concern at the 
English court when she was still in Portugal because she chose a Jesuit as her confessor. 
Her mother, the queen of Portugal, joined forces with representatives from the English 
court to dissuade her from this choice, stating that it would provoke significant prejudice 
against her from her new subjects.1112  
 
The English chapter was also spurred on by proceedings in Ireland. After the 
Restoration, in the face of political unrest against Catholics in Ireland, the Irish priest 
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Peter Walsh worked with Richard Bellings to draw up an oath of allegiance, the Irish 
Remonstrance. This would, in theory, enable Irish Catholics to take part in the Irish 
Settlement. The Irish Remonstrance limited papal power. As with the Jacobean Oath of 
Allegiance, it had both supporters and critics within the local and European Catholic 
communities. When the Remonstrance was shown to Charles II he welcomed it, perhaps 
encouraged by the papacy’s refusal to grant Charles’s wish to make sieur d’Aubigny a 
Cardinal (of which more later).1113 Brussels and Rome however condemned the 
Remonstrance and, as political tension in Ireland increased, Charles II also withdrew his 
backing. Irish Catholic support for the Remonstrance subsequently collapsed and Walsh 
dismissed further versions of the oath offered from regular Irish clergy.1114 Initial Irish 
Catholic support for the Remonstrance struck a chord with the English secular clergy’s 
chapter, and they seemed keen to accept Walsh’s invitation to subscribe to the Irish 
Protestation or similar proposals, along with the Scottish and Welsh Catholic clergy.1115 
The chapter wrote to the Irish Bishop of Dromore, in Rome, ‘fully praising and 
approving’ of the Remonstrance. The letter also stated the chapter’s intention to ‘go 
along and join’ the Irish ‘in the like Protestations’.1116 The English chapter also included 
their own version of an oath of allegiance containing three propositions: that the pope 
had no power to depose the king; that the king was the supreme governor in ‘all causes 
as well as spiritual as temporal so far as they reflect on the civil state’; that no priest 
could or would be permitted to join the English mission unless they subscribed to the 
oath.1117 A pamphlet written by R. Caron, published in London in 1662, supported these 
propositions. Caron’s Loyalty asserted, and the late remonstrance or allegiance of the 
Irish Clergy and Laity, argued that loyalty and obedience to kings were consistent with 
Catholic teaching.1118 Neither the pope nor any other spiritual or temporal power could 
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depose kings or discharge subjects’ allegiances to them. Caron criticised those, including 
the papacy, who had spoken against the Irish clergy’s propositions: 
Surely it were a pity, that truth in the conjunctures of times, and circumstances 
should be concealed, or lie hidden to the dishonour of the Apostolic See, and of 
the Roman Catholic religion: and thereby give ground to continue a severe 
censure against the professors thereof. Neither ought any learned man to stifle 
such a truth, who dare be honest to his religion, and sovereign if the corruption of 
self-interest, and vain pretensions abroad, more than the zeal of religion, or the 
safety of his sovereign, and friends at home, will not give his judgement a stop, 
and thereby betray his duty to God and Caesar.1119 
The regulars would not subscribe to this oath and it caused much unrest and division 
within the English Catholic community as it had amongst the Irish. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the chapter remained tainted with accusations of Blackloism. 
During April and May 1661, in the run up to the chapter’s General Assembly, Gage 
reported that Rome still considered the chapter to be Blackloist.1120 Matters were not 
helped by Leyburn’s response to the chapters’ Encyclical Epistle. In Dr Leyburn’s 
Encyclical Answer sent to his Brethren of England, he defended himself against the 
chapter’s assaults.1121 He argued that White’s Obedience and Government ‘made us 
odious to all Princes and was as much against Cromwell (then kinging it)’, as against 
Charles II.1122 He also defended the authority of the pope.1123 The General Assembly 
was keen to distance itself from accusations of Blackloism. They issued a statement 
responding to Leyburn’s attacks renouncing ‘all novelties in doctrine belonging either to 
religion or government’.1124 The chapter acknowledged that Blacklo’s doctrines had 
been ‘prohibited and condemned’ already by the pope and therefore ‘out of duty and 
obedience’ to the pope prohibited ‘all our brethren and lay Catholics of the kingdom’ to 
read Blacklo’s ‘forbidden’ work. The clergy forcefully pronounced: 
we do from our hearts disclaim disavow and utterly renounce what ever is 
confined in the said Mr Thomas White’s book entitled the Grounds of Obedience 
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and Government, which is any way in the least offensive to his sacred Majesty 
our sovereign lord, or ill principled in order to this State and government.1125 
The chapter argued that after Smith (who they emphatically denied trying to remove) 
had died, the dean and secretary had been authorised by the chapter to act in their best 
interests. Leyburn’s accusation that they were ‘a pack of Blackloists’ was a cruel and 
false aspersion. They also wrote to Henrietta Maria to complain about Leyburn’s 
divisive attitude.1126 The Welsh clergy’s submission to the chapter in 1663 included a 
statement signed by twelve secular priests condemning White’s books.1127 A cynical 
interpretation of this denial is that the chapter was pacifying Rome in order to procure a 
bishop. Undoubtedly this played a part, but such an interpretation would require us to 
believe that the chapter either were Blackloists, or thought themselves such.  
 
Certainly, there were keen Blackloists in the chapter at this time, notably White 
himself, Henry Holden, Humphrey Waring (alias Ellis), the dean, and John Sergeant, the 
secretary, who wanted the English chapter to become more independent from the 
papacy. Sergeant’s animosity towards the papacy was clearly seen when he defended the 
authority of the chapter in 1667.1128 There were other members of the chapter, however, 
who wanted a bishop and agreed that the English clergy should be allowed to take an 
oath of allegiance, but did not want the sort of independence from Rome that the 
Blackloists desired. Priests such as Francis Gage, John Lassels and William Gasgoigne 
(alias Meynell or Mennell) were regarded as non-Blackloist in 1662/3.1129  
 
The distinction between those who were Blackloist and those who were not was 
an important but a complex one. The secular priest Henry Turberville is a good example. 
An archdeacon, known and liked by Leyburn, and well versed in controversial theology, 
Turberville was considered in 1662/3 to be most ‘infected with the dangerous teachings 
of White’ because he defended the taking of the Oath of Allegiance.1130 Yet he lived in 
the London home of the marquis of Winchester, John Paulet, who had been one of the 
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main negotiators with the Independents in 1647, along with Lord Brudenell and 
Monsieur Gilles Chaissy. This group had agreed to take an oath of allegiance but were 
criticised by the Blackloists because they were unwilling to agree to conditions 
decreasing English Catholics’ dependence on Rome. This distinction between 
Blackloists and the Hispanophiles (the Francophiles’ having aligned somewhat with the 
Hispanophiles’ in the 1660s)1131 was still prevalent after the Restoration.1132  
 
In real terms, the chapter was not looking for complete independence from Rome 
as White, Holden and Digby had been in the later 1640s and 1650s. The chapter was still 
petitioning the papacy for a bishop, rather than appointing one itself. The Gallican 
principles of limiting the papacy’s power were shared by other Catholic parties and had 
been discussed at great length in Europe. A letter written to John Poyntz protested about 
similar principles amongst the Irish clergy. The author wrote: 
Such as busy themselves 200 [Irish clergy] forwardly pressing our English 
likewise to subscribe their Irish Protestation against the pope’s powers. The 
world is grown so fickle that they find greater credit (even in the family where I 
live) to advance these principles then we oppose them.1133 
The proposals aimed at the regular clergy, in particular the enforced exile of Jesuits, 
were not Blackloist alone, but had formed part of Gregorio Panzani’s (the papal nuncio 
operating in Charles I’s court in the 1630s) plans for official toleration.1134 The chapter 
were desperate to silence Leyburn, moreover, because not only was he bringing the 
chapter into disrepute but he was also drawing attention to the existence of Blackloism 
and some Catholics’ disloyalty during the Interregnum. This accusation, prevalent in 
anti-Catholic Restoration pamphlets, was one that English Catholics would never 
entirely be able to shake off. 
 
In fact even Blacklo was keen to distance himself from his reputation. White 
wrote to Kenelm Digby in 1663 listing his criticisms of William Assheton’s Evangelium 
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Armatum which condemned White’s work, in particular, his Grounds of Obedience and 
Government.1135 White wrote that he had never been a supporter of Cromwell, nor had 
he been acquainted with his officers. Rather his Grounds of Obedience and Government 
was written to show the unlawfulness of Cromwell’s actions and what he regarded as 
reacting lawfully to the pressures of the time; ‘a safe retire is as great an action of a 
soldier as fighting in due circumstances’.1136 The chapter did not want to draw attention 
to the community or to be seen to rock the boat. A copy of an address to the Catholic 
clergy complaining of bribery at court and the lack of opportunity for Catholics to serve 
the crown stated that a previous pastoral letter had directed those who had not been 
given public employment in the new court to ‘bear their lots with modesty and patience, 
without murmuring or envy’.1137  
 
 Following the Lords’ committee and the chapter meeting, prominent Roman 
Catholics met several times at Arundel House to debate the proposals that were being 
offered to them, mainly to take the Jacobean Oath of Allegiance and to exile Jesuits and 
other Regulars. From accounts of these meetings, and in light of the debates within the 
Catholic clergy, these were issues upon which the community would never agree. The 
Oath had caused division from its first creation in 1606. This may even have been the 
main motivation behind its implementation.1138 The Jacobean regime was determined to 
‘exert an ideological stranglehold over the English Catholic community’ by making it 
confront ‘stark conundrums and choices’ concerning the relationship between spiritual 
and temporal power.1139 Debates over the oath and toleration after the restoration, as 
during the Jacobean and Caroline periods, were a way for different factions within the 
English Catholic community to claim leadership and therefore gain control.1140  
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 The proposals upset the laity as the committee had only made provisions for 
repealing the laws against priests rather than recusants generally. The landed laity would 
still be required to pay fines for their recusancy which would not secure their estates. If 
we believe Clarendon’s version of events, the proposals would also have secured more 
priests, the number of which, the laity thought ‘was more grievous to them than the 
scarcity’.1141 There is no reason to discount this argument when one considers the 
tension and resentment felt by the laity during periods when they thought the clergy 
were becoming too powerful, especially in the 1620s and the 1630s during the 
approbation controversy.1142  
 
 Conversely, the clergy were reported to be angered because the committee’s 
proposals would deprived them ‘of the honour of martyrdom’, (which one might take 
with a pinch of salt) and limit their numbers in England (which was more likely to be the 
case). Some members of the laity and the clergy were willing to denounce the papal 
disposing power, but a large section of the community were not.1143  
 
 The Jesuits would not agree to any of the meeting’s proposals. They refused to 
disclaim papal power, which apparently ‘scandalised’ the laity. They would not agree to 
their own exile, arguing that they were no different from other groups of regulars and the 
secular clergy. Indeed, the Jesuits were the largest group of regulars in the country and 
had many powerful supporters.1144 Pamphlets were printed in support of them. The 
anonymous pamphlet A letter concerning the Jesuits, stated that many Catholic bishops 
required Jesuit assistance on a daily basis, including ‘the wisest and holiest of 
Benedictine abbots’.1145 The pamphlet noted that a Congregation held by the order in 
1606 had commanded abstention from teaching students about the papal deposing 
power, and had stated that the wording of the oath of allegiance excluded all Catholics, 
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not just the Jesuits.1146 Yet, the author argued, the Jesuits were ‘good citizens’ and held 
principles that were consistent with loyalty to a monarchical government.1147 ‘There is 
no nation in Christendom’, the author wrote, with a ‘stricter eye upon the pope’s 
growing power than France, and yet the Jesuits are no where in greater esteem than 
there’.1148 
 
 These sentiments were echoed in ‘M. G’s’ pamphlet, An account of the Jesuits 
life and doctrine, when argued that the Jesuits had ‘been always faithful at home and 
dutiful abroad, as his majesty hath been graciously pleased to express’.1149 The Jesuits, 
the author asserted, had never sided with the king’s enemies. He used the examples of 
Henry Gage, John Smith and John Digby, all ‘penitents’ of the Jesuits, to support this. 
‘If they had rebellion in their hearts’, the author argued, ‘they would on these public 
revolutions have showed them at one time’.1150 
 
 The Benedictines were also numerous. Both factions were on good terms with 
part of the Catholic nobility.1151 Robert Pugh was esteemed in the community to the 
extent that in March 1651, although already dismissed by the Jesuits, Cardinal Barbarini 
instructed him to return to England because he was so well known and well thought of 
by the English Catholics.1152 George Leyburn too was held in high regard, especially by 
those within the Francophile faction.1153 He also had powerful supporters in the clergy, 
in particular Walter Montagu and sieur d’Aubigny, who thought the oath and the 
conditions for toleration unreasonable.1154 Montagu wrote in support of Leyburn 
suggesting that Leyburn had been provoked into publishing his Encyclical Answer in 
reaction to the chapter’s accusations in their Encyclical Epistle.1155 Although many of 
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the Catholic laity felt that they should accept whatever conditions were given to them 
regarding toleration, others felt that exiling the Jesuits and other regulars would be 
unjust and that agreeing to such terms would not portray the community, or its promises 
of fidelity and allegiance, in a positive light.1156  
 
 Amidst this lack of consensus, the meeting broke down. This disunity brought an 
end to any productive negotiations between representatives of the English Catholic 
community and the State. Without unity, the chapter’s hopes for a bishop and the 
English Catholics’ hopes for official toleration were crippled. As Francis Gage had 
lamented in July 1660, ‘In fine nothing but our discord ruins us’.1157 The community 
needed little outside help from their enemies to render them politically ineffective. 
 
Blame for the failure of the proposals was aimed squarely at Clarendon, who 
many English Catholics believed, was ultimately responsible for the divisions within the 
community. Clarendon had formed proposals with the knowledge that the clauses would 
provoke division. It was also believed, even by Charles, that Clarendon had suppressed 
the committee’s proposals to ensure they could not be enacted. Certainly the proposals 
never proceeded and, if implemented, would badly have disrupted Clarendon’s carefully 
balanced Anglican/Presbyterian settlement, yet the Commons disrupted Clarendon’s 
settlement anyway. But it has been shown that Clarendon was still in contact with the 
nuns and his approaches to Rome to secure a cardinal’s hat for d’Aubigny suggest that 
he felt that the English Catholics should be compensated for the help given to the court 
in exile.  
 
Bristol held Clarendon personally responsible for the proposal’s failure. There 
had been tension between the two men since Clarendon had persuaded the king to 
dismiss Bristol from his honorary post of high steward on account of the latter’s 
Catholicism. Clarendon had also lobbied successfully against Bristol’s attempt to 
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negotiate a marriage between Charles II and the daughter of one of Bristol’s Italian 
clients in Spain.1158 The subject of toleration for the English Catholic community 
inevitably fell victim to this rivalry and personal detestation. The ensuing fall-out 
between Bristol and Clarendon over the king’s ecclesiastical prerogative led to Bristol’s 
spectacular fall from grace, increased attacks on Clarendon in parliament and ensured 
the failure of Catholic attempts to secure a bishop after the Restoration. 
 
6.4. Clarendon and Bristol’s dispute. 
After the Cavalier Parliament agreed to adopt the revised Prayer Book for use in 
all religious services, the Act of Uniformity was finally passed in May 1662. It required 
all religious ministers to declare their agreement with the entirety of the new Prayer 
Book and to ensure its use in all Church of England services. Ministers omitting to do so 
would be ejected from the Church. This played only one part in what became known as 
the ‘Clarendon Code’, the religious settlement that would not tolerate dissenters. Other 
parts included the Corporation Act, requiring those refusing the Oath of Allegiance to be 
excluded from borough corporations and to take the Anglican sacraments, and the act 
against the Quakers in May 1662. Bristol was strongly against the Act of Uniformity, 
particularly since it flew in the face of the Declaration of Breda. The issue was much 
debated in parliament, specifically the extent of the king’s power over ecclesiastical law; 
did the king have the power to dispense with such a law?1159 Bristol argued that the king 
had much more autonomy to do this than Clarendon’s arguments allowed. Bishop John 
Cosin waded into the debate, arguing that the king held no power whatsoever to change 
or dispense with ecclesiastical law.  
 
One can see why Charles seemed determined to escape the coercive grip of the 
Anglicans after 1660/1 and why he began appealing to the English Catholics with a 
declaration in favour of indulgence in 1663. Purely out of one-upmanship Bristol 
changed his argument, agreeing with Cosin against Clarendon, although this completely 
contradicted his initial statements. Bristol then encouraged the English Catholic 
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community to join with other non-conformists to petition against the Act in pursuit of 
toleration. The replacement of Edward Nicholas, the secretary of state, with Henry 
Bennett, a man with his own quarrel with Clarendon (who had blocked Bennett’s 
advancement earlier in his career) provided much needed assistance to Bristol’s plan. A 
strong anti-Clarendon bloc formed, with influential members such as Bristol, Bennett, 
Thomas Clifford, Lord Thomas Strickland and the queen mother. This sought to put an 
end to Clarendon’s plans for a religious settlement and thus his power. The main focus 
for this bloc seemed to be to achieve toleration for the English Catholics, with many of 
the group Catholics or converting to Roman Catholicism.1160  
 
Bennett quickly became a favourite and increased his influence over Charles II. 
By September 1662 he had replaced Clarendon in mediating between the king and the 
queen.1161 By late December Bennett had helped Charles II to draw up the First 
Declaration of Indulgence, which sought to honour the promises made in the Declaration 
of Breda to favour liberty to tender consciences, provided they did not disturb the 
kingdom’s peace. In the second session of the Cavalier Parliament in February 1663 the 
Declaration was rejected, unsurprisingly since the parliament was made up mainly of 
Anglicans whose main focus was to not to give leeway to Presbyterian ministers, but 
who resisted toleration for English Catholics.1162 By April Charles had reluctantly 
accepted Parliament’s decision. Through Clarendon, he had attempted one last time to 
secure a degree of toleration for the English Catholics. Clarendon: 
expressed his majesty’s sense of obligation towards the Catholics, declaring that 
at the time of his exile they had displayed the most extraordinary charity towards 
him, so that he recognised in indebtedness to them for his life and consequently 
for his crown. He mentioned among others a convent of Benedictines in Flanders 
which had supplied him with considerable sums of money for his personal needs, 
and so his majesty wished to show corresponding gratitude.1163 
 Clarendon’s plea fell on deaf ears, however, as the Commons dismissed Charles’s 
indebtedness as a ‘personal obligation’ that should be repaid in a way that was not 
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‘repugnant to the state religion, the quiet of the country and the laws’ of the kingdom.1164 
Charles soon withdrew the Declaration of Indulgence. The fortunes of the English 
Catholic community now turned even further, as magistrates began to campaign for the 
collection of recusancy fines and plans were made to expel all Catholic priests.1165 
Worse, from a Catholic point of view, was still to come.  
 
By the end of 1662 there was much resentment against Clarendon. His political 
enemies, in particular Bristol, even planned to have him impeached. By the time the 
Cavalier Parliament sat in 1663, attacks against Clarendon had increased – from those, 
like Bristol, who wanted an alternative religious settlement that would benefit non-
conformists, and from MPs who held Clarendon responsible for the sale of Dunkirk back 
to the French (perceived by some as a worrying way for the king to bypass Parliament 
for revenue).1166 Bristol made an ill-advised agreement with the MP Sir Richard Temple 
to orchestrate the House of Commons in the king’s favour.1167 When news of this leaked 
the Commons were infuriated. Bristol was abandoned by all his allies and was, 
humiliatingly, made to protest his innocence to the House.  
 
In his Commons address Bristol argued that his religious allegiances did not 
interfere with his political ones.1168 On the 10th July he launched an attack on Clarendon, 
petitioning the Lords that the Lord Chancellor was guilty of treason, for ‘traitorously and 
maliciously’ alienating the king from his subjects by insinuating that Charles II was 
inclined to popery and to re-establish Roman Catholicism in England.1169 Bristol further 
accused Clarendon of soliciting a cardinalate for sieur d’Aubigny, kin of the king and 
the queen’s Almoner, with the help of Catholics and Jesuits, in exchange for the 
abolition of penal laws against Roman Catholicism in England and to acknowledge the 
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pope’s ‘Ecclesiastical sovereignty’ which was against the laws of the kingdom.1170 All 
this, Bristol argued, was an attempt to discredit the king. Charles II was furious, 
condemning Bristol on 4th August 1663 for being a papist or popish recusant and ordered 
that the recusancy laws should be enforced against him.1171 Digby would not recover his 
position of favour, d’Aubigny would never get to wear a cardinal’s hat and the English 
Catholics would neither achieve full toleration nor a bishop under Charles II, despite 
their continual protestations of loyalty to the king and the royal family.1172 
 
Bristol’s denunciation of Clarendon’s schemes for d’Aubigny had far-reaching 
consequences. The king was forced to deny all knowledge of any plan to make his 
cousin a cardinal and Bellings’ mission in Rome to achieve this was initially suspended. 
Perhaps the best chance to unite the divided Catholic clergy and community under the 
administration of one man was thereby ruined by Bristol’s vindictiveness. Ironically, he 
destroyed the one thing he had always sought to procure. 
 
6.5. Sieur d’Aubigny, and the English Catholics. 
Louis Stuart, sieur d’Aubigny, could have been the answer to the English 
Catholic community’s woes. A priest who was popular at court, politically astute and 
was generally liked by both seculars and regulars, who were keen to use him to gain 
access to Charles II, sieur d’Aubigny would have provided the best hope of creating a 
unified Catholic community and official toleration.1173 
 
D’Aubigny had advised Charles during his exile about his policy towards the 
English Catholics. As discussed in chapter four, Charles had written to d’Aubigny in 
1657, asking the priest’s advice on what action the court should take to advance the 
king’s cause and the Catholic religion at the same time.1174 Richard Bellings, the royalist 
Irish Catholic, had written back to Charles II on behalf of d’Aubigny with his 
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recommendations (including allowing the duke of Gloucester to convert to Roman 
Catholicism) and declarations of his allegiance to the king. The mere fact of these 
proposals was remarkable: as d’Aubigny, the king’s relative, had been approached by 
Charles to come up with ideas to further the English Catholics’ affairs. Clarendon, 
however, put an end to the proposals, informing Charles that they were unfit and 
unreasonable. He wrote, on behalf of the king, a letter refuting d’Aubigny’s and 
Bellings’s plans.1175 This sparked a degree of animosity in d’Aubigny towards Hyde, but 
failed to stop him playing a part in further attempts at reconciliation between Charles, 
the pope and the English Catholics.  
 
In February 1658 it was reported that sieur d’Aubigny was ‘very sincere’ in his 
desire to serve Charles and had endeavoured ‘by all ways possible to go to Rome’ but 
the exiled court had refused his help, no doubt a decision made by Hyde, considering his 
earlier reaction to d’Aubigny’s proposals.1176 It was thought that d’Aubigny had a good 
reputation in Rome and his presence there would advance the king’s business. Two 
years later, in April 1660, d’Aubigny demonstrated his political acumen during a 
meeting with Lord Jermyn concerning the king’s restoration. Foreseeing that the terms 
offered to the king would be drawn up by the Presbyterians, d’Aubigny and Jermyn still 
believed that the king should accept them.1177 In explaining his views to a disgruntled 
Henrietta Maria, who feared that the Presbyterians would enforce the terms they had 
attempted to impose on Charles I, d’Aubigny reassured her that it was better to accept 
the terms and have ‘a king crowned and in his own dominions’ and then make changes 
to them once in power, than to have an exiled prince who could do nothing. 
D’Aubigny’s support for this plan was so fervent that he wrote congratulating and 
encouraging Charles to negotiate and accept whatever terms were offered.1178 Eight days 
later d’Aubigny celebrated the ‘easy terms’ offered to the king. 
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D’Aubigny’s determination to assist the exiled king in the interests of the 
English Catholic community served him well. He accompanied the king back to England 
and took his place in the Stuart court. Towards the end of 1662 the king sent Bellings to 
Rome on a secret mission to procure d’Aubigny a cardinal’s hat, although the proposals 
were well known in Rome before Bellings left England.1179 In April 1662 Patrick Con, 
Cardinal Barbarini’s agent, wrote to William Leslie, the Scottish chapter agent in Rome, 
indicating that the proposals concerning d’Aubigny were regarded unfavourably by the 
papal court.1180 Not only had d’Aubigny previously been connected to the French 
Jansenists, but also Charles had not repealed the recusancy laws enforced against 
English Catholics as he had promised, although they had not been persecuted on the 
king’s return and d’Aubigny and other priests attended the queen at court wearing their 
clerical habits.1181  
 
On Bellings’s arrival in Rome the proposals were ‘coldly’ received.1182 As well 
as issues discussed above, Bellings had also brought proposals from the king for the 
possible reunion of the Church of England and the Church of Rome.1183 The proposals 
outlined a plan for the kingdom to make a final submission to the Church of Rome but 
only on the basis of essentially Gallican principles. Unsurprisingly Charles demanded a 
high degree of independence from papal jurisdiction and insisted that the infallibility of 
the pope was not to be discussed at any point either in services or controversialist 
tracts.1184 These proposals did not go down well. The decision over whether d’Aubigny 
should be granted a cardinal’s hat rested not with the Cardinal Protector of the English 
Catholic community but with the pope, then preoccupied with the somewhat aggressive 
manoeuvres of Louis XIV.1185 Added to this, the pope did not want to upset Spain by 
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making a Portuguese queen’s almoner a cardinal.1186 Bellings returned to England in 
1663 with little short of a refusal. 
 
D’Aubigny probably would have made a good head of the English Catholic 
community during the Restoration period. He did much to try to unite English Catholics 
after the chapter’s divisive behaviour. Patrick Con twice reported that d’Aubigny had 
met with the Jesuits in London. During the first meeting d’Aubigny promised the 
Scottish Jesuit priest George Paterson that he would help the Jesuits if they wanted him 
to. Following the inevitable fallout from the meetings of the chapter and Lords 
committee, and the meeting of prominent Catholics in 1661, d’Aubigny wrote to a friend 
informing him that he was working tirelessly to try ‘to save the good Jesuit fathers from 
a fierce and unexpected misfortune’.1187 Even Father Thomas Courtney worked behind 
the scenes in Rome with Bellings to encourage the papacy to respond favourably to the 
king’s request.1188 Courtney wrote to the Jesuit Assistant General encouraging him to 
support the proposal. 
 
Bristol’s denunciation of Clarendon and his revelation of the plan to make 
d’Aubigny a cardinal ended Charles’s campaign. The explosive potential of the strategy 
for d’Aubigny’s elevation as a cardinal if Charles’s protestant subjects became entirely 
aware of it cannot be overestimated. Charles was forced swiftly to denounce Bristol. His 
denial of such plans only further disadvantaged d’Aubigny’s proposed advancement. 
When the papacy’s list of new cardinals was distributed in the early months of 1664 
d’Aubigny’s name was not on it. Miraculously the papacy had a sudden change of heart 
a year later, following the death of Philip, King of Spain, and d’Aubigny was created 
vicar apostolic and cardinal in the autumn. Yet d’Aubigny died just a few hours before 
the cardinal’s hat would have been delivered to him. Charles II had missed the chance to 
separate the English Catholic community from papal jurisdiction and gain control over 
the community himself. The English Catholics had lost the opportunity to gain an 
established episcopal government to rule over and unite them.  
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This chapter has shown how the political circumstances of Charles II’s 
restoration heightened the antagonisms felt by the English Catholic clergy and the laity 
as they searched for toleration and gave assurances of allegiance to the temporal power. 
It has demonstrated the implications of these issues for Catholic beliefs about the pope’s 
power, spiritual or otherwise. Gallicanism and the emergence of Blackloism had 
muddied the waters. During the Interregnum the disunity amongst the English Catholic 
community had worked to their advantage; it meant that each faction made differing, 
successive and competitive approaches to a wide range of interested parties and left a 
variety of options open. Unintentionally the community procured different sets of allies. 
Restoration politics were different. The only effective ally the English Catholics could 
have was the king. Clarendon’s favour might have helped them achieve this. To become 
a politically successful religious party at the Restoration the English Catholics needed to 
be unified, with clear and fixed ideas of the terms for toleration to which they could 
agree. The Catholic community were keen to take an oath of allegiance to the king but 
were divided on the exact wording. The clergy in particular could not agree on its 
clauses, because ultimately they could not agree which section should have control over 
English Catholicism. Prospective clauses for the oath of allegiance became inextricably 
bound up with competing orders trying to banish or denounce each other from the 
mission. As a result the laity were drawn into the factional arguments.  
 
This chapter has also demonstrated the continuing political relevance of the 
English Roman Catholics within a European context. Charles sought to grant tolerance 
to his Roman Catholic subjects and then tried to take control of the community through 
the various oaths and the promotion of d’Aubigny to the cardinalate. When he dealt with 
English Catholics, Charles II was working within a European political framework. The 
English Catholics were still pawns in the power struggle between the temporal power of 






This thesis has worked the English Catholic community into established 
narratives of the English civil war, the Interregnum and the restoration of Charles II. I 
have moved away from confessionalised accounts of English Catholics during this 
period and have used Catholic generated sources alongside hostile and state produced 
material to contextualise the community’s actions within a wider national and 
international political framework. I have thereby challenged existing contemporary and 
historiographical concepts of English Catholicism which deploy an either/or 
‘royalist/neutralist’, dichotomy. English Catholics continued to be a serious political 
force throughout the 1650s, in a similar way that they had been in the 1620s and 1630s. 
Even before the outbreak of civil war, the Catholic clergy were attempting to negotiate 
the political issues that arose during the Long Parliament. English Catholic priests saw 
the opportunity to align themselves with the king against puritan criticism of the 
government of the Church. This behaviour was not stopped by the civil war, and the 
Interregnum provided a platform from which the English Catholic community attempted 
to exploit the unsettled nature of the post-1649 settlement.  
 
With a focus on the English Catholic clerical court around London, this thesis 
has shown that the issues that had dominated the community since the rise of a Catholic 
seminary-trained clergy during Elizabeth I’s reign – episcopacy, oath taking and 
negotiations for toleration with the State – remained contentious throughout the 1640s, 
1650s and the 1660s. The same pre-war Catholic interest groups remained active. Those 
who looked towards France and those who looked towards Spain (and the ecclesiastical 
authority of Rome) were joined by the emerging Blackloist faction. All these competed 
to impose their own visions for the future of the community upon their rivals. As had 
been true in the 1620s and 1630s, these groups took the opportunity of political flux to 
attempt to gain increased leverage over their co-religionist opponents. The execution of 
the king, for example, saw different responses from the English Catholic factions. The 
Francophiles largely stayed loyal to the Stuart court and to Richard Smith, bishop of 
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Chalcedon (both in exile). The Hispanophiles saw the king’s death as an opportunity to 
conduct negotiations (together with the papacy and Spain) with the new regime to gain 
not only official toleration but also control over the English Catholic community. The 
Blackloists also attempted to negotiate with the new regime but envisaged the 
community operating along predominantly Gallican lines, excluding both the Stuarts and 
the papacy. These desperate responses continued as the English Catholic community 
traced the twists and turns of national and international politics through the 1650s. 
Beyond this factionalism, it should be noted, the English Catholic clergy still managed 
to undertake their spiritual duties and responsibilities as they had done before the civil 
war. Rules and regulations for new priests on the mission were made, directives were 
issued for the distribution of financial aid and general assemblies and meetings were 
held. But the partisan politics of the Catholic community proved both an advantage and 
a fundamental obstacle to toleration. 
 
English Catholics were able to operate along these divisional lines because their 
cooperation, symbolic or otherwise – or that of their overseas supporters – was 
potentially useful to parties seeking to gain power within England. After the execution 
of Charles I, the division between the Independents and the Presbyterians on how the 
kingdom should be governed meant that Cromwell and the Independents had to look to 
the English Catholics, France and Spain to cement their dominance over national 
government. They also wanted to make sure that neither Catholic power would help the 
exiled Stuarts to restore the monarchy. The English Catholic community became a 
bargaining chip with which to launch negotiations and alliances. This required delicate 
manoeuvring, since Cromwell could not be seen to be too lenient towards English 
Catholics. Many still regarded them with great suspicion and he needed domestic 
support for the Protectorate. Cromwell’s responses to the English Catholics were varied: 
before parliaments were called there was an increase in persecution of Catholics, but at 
times of foreign policy manoeuvring English Catholics were integral to negotiations. 
Financially persecuting English Catholics also provided a relatively profitable option for 
an increasingly cash strapped regime. Cromwell’s attitude towards English Catholics 
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during the 1650s should be considered with less regard for twenty-first century notions 
of religious toleration and more for the Protector’s seventeenth century political needs. 
 
Similarly Charles II, whilst in exile, also attempted to use the English Catholic 
community as a means secure a series of understandings with foreign powers that might 
help restore him as king. Charles frequently proffered official toleration if he were 
restored to the throne, particularly to the English Catholics themselves, but also to the 
papacy and to Spain. Declarations of Stuart support for the English Catholics were not 
entirely believed, which is not surprising considering Charles’s concessions to the Scots 
in 1650, his refusal to sanction the conversion of his brother the Duke of Gloucester and 
his dismissal of sieur d’Aubigny’s proposals in 1657. Indeed, the papacy abandoned 
support for the Stuart cause once Ireland was lost to Cromwell in 1650 and Spain only 
negotiated a treaty with the exiled court in 1656 in response to the Anglo-French Treaty 
in 1655. Charles too had to negotiate the precarious line of supporting the English 
Catholics to garner European support without alienating his Protestant supporters. 
 
The actions, discussions and decisions of the factions of the English Catholic 
community were not random or panicked responses but deliberate attempts, at specific 
points, to try to take advantage of fleeting favourable circumstances after the defeat of 
Charles I. Certainly one can see that there were key moments between 1640 and 1662 
that might have brought the English Catholic campaign for a degree of official toleration 
to fruition. English Catholic negotiations with the Independents during the late summer 
and autumn of 1647 seemed an opportune time for such endeavours. When the Army 
itself questioned and debated not only the political rights of men but also the right to 
worship freely, the moment English Catholics had been waiting for seemed to have 
arrived. The Blackloists, in particular, thought this an ideal time to begin negotiations, as 
did other members of the clergy and the leading Catholic laity. Their proposals were 
peppered with printed Catholic tracts supporting religious toleration and oaths of 
obedience and loyalty to king and parliament.  
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But the favourable conditions changed rapidly. The papacy did not support any 
of the proposals (much to the fury of the Blackloists) and punished the clergy because 
they were worried about the ramifications for papal power. There was unrest in the army 
followed by Cromwell’s attempts to reassert the authority of the General Council and the 
king’s escape from Hampton Court and subsequent Engagement with the Scots. The 
moment was lost. Archival silence seems to indicate that English Catholics withdrew 
from the fray and waited to see how events would unfold. It was not really until after the 
execution of the king that English Catholic political agitation again began in earnest.  
 
The year 1655 also signified a possible turning point for the English Catholic 
community. The deaths of Pope Innocent X and Richard Smith, bishop of Chalcedon, in 
January and March, and the Anglo-French peace treaty in October, once again seemed to 
augur well. The clergy began campaigning for the establishment of a new bishop. 
However, circumstances did not offer quite the same potential for success in 1655 as 
they had in 1647. The abortive Penruddock’s rising in March 1655 was followed by the 
establishment of the rule of the Major-Generals and a period of increased persecution for 
English Catholics. Added to this, the papacy, egged on by those regulars who did not 
want to come under the jurisdiction of a bishop, would not support the campaign. Since 
each faction wanted to place their own applicant in position the clergy could not come to 
an agreement over a possible candidate in any case. This weakened their campaign 
considerably and would continue to do so after the Restoration. 
 
The negotiations in 1661 presented the English Catholics with arguably the 
strongest opportunity to achieve official toleration since the beginning of the Stuart reign 
in 1603. Nearly all the elements were there to bring about a long-awaited success. The 
new king was already well disposed towards the community, he had already signalled 
(so the Catholics thought) his intentions towards religious toleration in the Declaration 
of Breda. Catholic members of the House of Lords had also been able and willing to take 
their seats in May 1660 and were, for once, not the most hated members within 
parliament – the Presbyterians found themselves in that position. Proposals for toleration 
were presented to the Lords the following year. A committee was set up to discuss how, 
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and to what extent, toleration for English Catholics could be achieved. Further to this, 
the king even gave his permission for the secular clergy to hold their General Assembly. 
This agreed an oath of fidelity and obedience to the State that all Catholic clergy in 
England would have to take. But the unique position that the English Catholics now 
found themselves in was ruined by the community’s factional infighting. There was 
fierce disagreement over exactly what conditions English Catholics would accept. Some 
members of the secular clergy were willing to advocate banishing the Jesuits, securing a 
bishop and striking out from complete dependency on the papacy. Other secular clergy 
(such as Leyburn), along with members of the regular clergy and their many supporters 
within the laity, did not want independence from the papacy or a bishop. The Jesuits 
were outraged about plans to banish them from the English mission. These factional 
disputes were played out in full public view, complete with accusations of treachery, 
Blackloism and meddling. Thus the rival proposals, petitions and negotiation came to 
nothing. The failure to take advantage of the opportunity for official toleration during 
1661 was a costly mistake, especially when one takes into account the king’s plans for 
sieur d’Aubigny. 
 
At the heart of the divisions within the English Catholic was their inability as a 
community to find and assume an English Catholic identity; an identity which could be 
faithful to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church yet pledge unquestioning loyalty 
to their own country in the face of a foreign threat from a co-religionist power. These 
issues were also part of a much wider struggle: a struggle over allegiances partially 
defined by religion.1189 Although the English Catholics’ position was strengthened 
because they were members of an international Church, this was also what weakened 
them. Gallican ideology provided the answers for some, but raised fierce criticisms from 
others. The papacy was continually fighting against the erosion of its authority by either 
co-religionist or heretical rulers demanding independence or dominance over their own 
Catholic subjects. The English Catholics were caught up in this struggle and the papacy 
did little to help them in their predicament.  
 
                                                
1189 A argument that Gabriel Glickman makes strongly in his The English Catholic Community. 
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Recent historiography of James II’s reign and the English Catholic community 
during the first half of the eighteenth century has indicated that the factions within the 
community still existed and English Catholics continued to grapple with these same 
ideological problems. Obviously when James II ascended the throne on 6th February 
1685 English Roman Catholicism, its identity and its nature, became even more central 
to English domestic and foreign policy than they had before because of the new king’s 
Catholicism. Steven Pincus, in his study 1688 The First Modern Revolution, has shown 
that the English Catholic community were strongly divided over James II’s policies and 
style of government. James II adopted Gallican principles because such ideologies suited 
the new king’s desire for the centralisation of government and the autonomy of 
monarchical power.1190  
 
Pincus argues that James’s adoption of Gallican principles meant that his rule 
should not be understood in terms of a ‘merely Catholic regime’.1191 James’s 
Gallicanism seriously divided the Catholic community in the same way that Gallicanism 
had divided European Catholicism. It pitched English Catholic independence against 
pro-papal Catholic groups, who viewed dependence on the papacy as a non-negotiable 
part of the Catholic faith. There were those that supported James and benefited from his 
reign but many Catholics warned against James’s absolutist stance. They feared the 
consequences of his perceived abuse of power and his zealousness in re-establishing 
Roman Catholicism. There was also, until late 1687, no prospect of a Catholic heir to the 
throne so there was a real fear among Catholics of future reprisals.1192 In a speech made 
in November 1685, Lord Bellasis declared that he was strongly against James’ intention 
to keep Catholic officers in the Army because this went against established law. The 
Benedictine Cardinal Philip Howard advised the king to take ‘slow, calm and moderate 
courses’ in promoting Roman Catholicism.1193 Leading members of the community such 
as Sir William Goring, Lord Baltimore, the Marquis of Powis, the Catholic bishop John 
Leyburn, Robert Brudenell and John, Lord Bellasis were all critics of James’s 
                                                
1190 S. Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (New Haven and London, 2009). 
1191 Pincus, 1688, p.478. 
1192 This is clearly shown by John Miller in his Popery and Politics, p.223. 
1193 Pincus, 1688, pp.140-142. 
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government. The same Catholic family names appeared criticising James’s Gallicanism 
as had been against the Gallican ideology of the Blackloists in the 1650s and early 
1660s. Members of the English Catholic community also despised the prominent role the 
Jesuits were taking in James’s court.  
 
Opposition to his style of monarchy was based on the ideological debates held in 
the 1640s and 1650s concerning the rights of men, freedom of religion and limitation of 
constitutional and monarchical power.1194 Therefore, Pincus argues, James’s regime was 
not simply a Catholic regime but a modernising one, part of a European struggle that had 
been gathering momentum since the early seventeenth century. James’s enemy was not 
Protestantism but the over-reaching power of the papacy. Some sections of the English 
Catholic community disliked James’s rule because of its Gallicanism and its 
implications for doctrines of papal primacy, issues vital to their faith. They also, along 
with their Protestant counterparts, fought against James’s absolutism. English Catholics 
knew, from past experience, what happened when the king went against the Protestant 
majority and was seen to abuse the rights of his subjects. The seventeenth century was a 
time of political endeavour in terms of popular concepts of the rights and privileges of 
the people and the English Catholics were part of this. 
 
Gabriel Glickman, in his book The English Catholic Community, argues that 
even after the Glorious Revolution the English Catholic community still played a part in 
the national dialogue concerning loyalty, religion and politics.1195 After the Glorious 
Revolution, Glickman argues, English Catholicism did not fall silent, despite the penal 
laws. Nor did periodic exile for some Catholics, or the failure of the Jacobite cause, 
force the community to shrink into retreat. Glickman writes, 
Far from sending the community into atrophy, the fragility of political life after 
1688 opened up sweeping debates over recusant relationships with the temporal 
power, the chance of re-establishing a Catholic role in public affairs and the 
possibility of accommodation with Protestant compatriots.1196 
                                                
1194 Ibid. p.8. 
1195 Glickman, The English Catholic Community. 
1196 Ibid. p.13. 
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James’s ‘abdication’, or forced exile, at the end of 1688 therefore provided similar 
options for the English Catholic community to the defeat and execution of Charles I. The 
replacement of an old political regime with a new one made it possible to benefit from 
novel and uncertain times. Glickman also argues that the community was divided along 
European political and religious lines: those who supported the Spanish and Austrian 
monarchies, who backed James’s overthrow as a way to counter French dominance, and 
those who supported France and the exiled English monarch.1197 The pro-Spanish and 
Austrian factions attempted to compose oaths of allegiance to William and Anne along 
pro-Austrian lines in an attempt to capitalise on ‘diplomatic accord’ between Vienna and 
London.1198 This is very reminiscent of the pro-French and pro-Spanish factions’ 
attempts to utilize the negotiations between Cromwell, France and Spain during the 
1650s to secure toleration from the new regime. Glickman argues that Whig diplomats 
were keen to further these pro-Austrian ideals as a way to ‘eradicate points of 
contention’ between England and her allies. This again seems similar to Cromwell’s use 
of the English Catholics in his negotiations with Cardinal Mazarin thirty years 
previously. It can be no surprise that France was hostile to the formulation of these pro-
Austrian oaths.1199 
 
But to argue that there was some sort of ‘continuity’ of English Catholicism 
during this period would risk over-simplifying the politics of the community. The 
changing of political regimes, whether monarchical or republican, created opportunities 
for the community to take centre stage and make alliances with a range of interested 
parties. This examination of the post Restoration period demonstrates one of the most 
important conclusions of this thesis: the need to reintegrate research on the English 
Catholic community during the seventeenth century back into established interpretations 
of the period. Further research still needs to be undertaken to enable historians to gain 
richer insights into the English Catholic community during the mid seventeenth century 
and their ongoing involvement in national ideological debates over religion, politics and 
England’s place within the world order. For instance, there needs to be research to 
                                                




reconstruct the patronage networks of the English Catholic laity during this period, so 
we might discover how far the laity were involved in clerical controversy. How did 
English Catholics operate on a day-to-basis, what sort of dialogue did they hold with the 
State, and what were their connections with Catholics abroad? Similarly, more attention 
could be turned towards the Committee of Compounding papers to interrogate our 
understanding of official responses to the English Catholics – was there a pattern to the 
timing of the release of recusant estates from sequestration, for example? It would also 
be important to look at English Catholic material held in foreign archives, particularly in 
the archives of the Catholic colleges in France, Spain and Rome, to establish not only a 
fuller picture of clerical controversy concerning independence from the papacy, but also 
to trace patronage networks of both the clergy and laity to English Catholics abroad. 
This might also give us further insights into the politics of French and Spanish Catholics 
and the papacy. As has been shown in this thesis, Catholic sources can enrich our 
understanding of England’s domestic and foreign policies – foreign Catholic archival 
material would certainly add to extant narratives. There is still a long way to go to place 
English Catholics back fully into the historiography of the mid-seventeenth century.  
 
During the civil war, Interregnum and Restoration English Catholics, particularly 
the clergy, took on the role of both pawns and players in national and international 
political spheres. The deep domestic, and indeed foreign, divisions that were created in 
the aftermath of the civil war potentially provided an advantageous political 
environment for the English Catholic community. However, although English Catholics 
were able to fight on many different fronts during the seventeenth century, more 
importantly, and more damagingly, they fought each other. Ultimately, it was this 
inability to curtail their infighting, particularly at politically significant moments, that 
seriously limited the English Catholic community’s chances of obtaining the religious 
and political freedom enjoyed by their Protestant counterparts. The participation in and 
reactions of the English Catholic community to, the political upheavals of the 1640s and 
1650s should no longer be understood simply in terms of numerical explanations of 
royalism or neutralism. Rather, both ideologically and politically, the community were 
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too sophisticated to operate along the simplistic patterns of allegiance and resistance to 







Aug – John Goodman (sec.) arrested 1640 April – May – Short Parliament 
Aug – Bishops’ war begins 
Nov – Long Parliament; Strafford impeached 
Dec – House of Commons report of reprieved 
priests; Root and Branch petition presented to 
Parliament; Laud impeached 
July – William Ward (sec.) executed 
Sept – Edward Barlow (Ben.) executed 
Dec – 8 priests condemned 
1641 Feb- House of Commons debate Root and 
Branch petition 
May – Strafford executed 
Oct – Outbreak of Irish Rebellion 
Nov – House of Commons passes Grand 
Remonstrance 
Jan – Thomas Reynolds (sec.) & Edward Barlow  
(Ben.) executed 
April – John Lockwood (sec.), Edward Catterick 
(sec.) Edward Morgan (sec.) executed 
Aug – Hugh Green (sec.) executed 
Oct – Thomas Bullaker (Fran.) executed 
Dec – Thomas Holland (Jes.) executed 
1642 Feb – Bishop exclusion Act 
March – Militia Ordinance 
Aug – Charles raises royal standard 
Oct – Edgehill; General Assembly at 
Kilkenny 
April – Henry Heath (Fran.) executed 
Dec – Arthur Bell (Fran.) executed 
1643 Feb – April – Treaty of Oxford 
July – Westminster Assembly 
Sept – Newbury; Ormond concludes peace 
with Irish Confederate Catholics; Parliament 
signs Solemn League and Covenant 
Sept – John Duckett (sec.) & Ralph Corby (Jes.)  
executed 
1644 March – Cheriton 
June – Cropredy Bridge 
July – Marston Moor 
Nov - Newbury 
Feb – Henry Morse (Jes.) executed 
Aug – Brian Cansfield (Jes.) executed 
John Goodman dies in prison 
1645 Jan – Creation of the New Model Army 
June – Naseby 
July – Longport 
Sept – Bristol falls to the Parliamentarians 
Oct – Rinuccini arrives in Ireland 
June – Philip Powell (Ben.) executed 
Aug – Edward Bamber (sec.), John Woodcock 
(Fran.) and Thomas Whitaker (sec.) executed. 
Catholic petition asking for the repeal of penal 
laws drawn up but not presented 
1646 March – Ormond signs peace with 
Confederates 
May – Charles surrenders to the Scots at 
Newark 
June – Oxford surrenders 
Oct – Parliament abolishes episcopacy 
Late summer – Three Propositions presented to 
the Army, followed by the Catholic laity’s own 
proposals. 
Sep – Catholic petition presented to Parliament 
Oct – Blackloist attempt to close deal with the 
Independents. 
1647 May – Houses vote to disband Amy 
July – rioters invade Commons, Independents 
flee 
July – Aug – Army’s Heads of the Proposals 
Aug – Army reinstate Independents 
Oct – Nov – Putney debates 
Nov – Charles I escapes 
Dec – Charles concludes engagement with 
the Scots and rejects the Four Bills 
 1648 Jan – Vote of No Address 
March – June – Risings 
July – Aug – Second civil war 
Nov – Remonstrance of the Army presented 
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to Parliament; Declaration of the Army 
Dec – Pride’s Purge 
Jan – Hispanophile priests reported for trying to 
break from Richard Smith’s authority 
1649 Jan – Rump assumes power; the trial and 
execution of Charles I  
July – Rumours of negotiations between Spain 
and the Pope, and the Independents 
1650 Jan – Engagement Act 
May – Charles II approaches Rome 
July – Rome refuses to help Charles 
Sept – Rump passes Toleration Act 
May – Peter Wright (Jes.) executed 1651  
June – Catholic petition presented to Parliament 1652 Feb – Rump’s Humble Proposals 
Catholic marriage act 
March – Chapter meeting held without 
permission of Bsp Chalcedon 
1653 April – Rump dissolved 
Dec – Instrument of Government; Oliver 
Cromwell becomes Lord Protector 
June – John Southworth (sec.) executed 1654 Sept – Jan 1655 – First Protectorate 
Parliament 
Dec – Western Design launched 
Jan – Pope Innocent X dies 
March – Bsp Smith dies 
English Catholic petitioning at Rome for a 
bishop begins 
Publication of Blacklo’s Grounds of Obedience 
and Government 
1655 March – Penruddock’s Rising 
Aug – Rule of the Major Generals 
Oct – Anglo-French Treaty 
Feb – Congregation of Propaganda in Rome 
reject Chapter’s demands for a bishop 
1656 Sept – June 1657 – First session of second 
Protectorate Parliament  
May – Blacklo agrees to submit writings to holy 
sea; Blacklo/Leyburn controversy temporarily 
silenced; Catholic General Assembly held 
1657 Jan – Major Generals abandoned 
March – Anglo-French Treaty (offensive 
alliance) 
May – Cromwell formally declines kingship 
July – Cardinal de Retz attempts to gain Charles 
II support from Rome 
1658 March – Anglo-French alliance renewed 
Sept – Death of Oliver Cromwell; Richard 
Cromwell becomes Lord Protector 
June – Chapter campaign in Rome for bishop but 
Charles II rumoured to have told the Papacy to 
refuse their pleas in case it endangers his 
possible Restoration 
Aug – Papacy censure Blacklo’s writing 
1659 Jan – April – Third Protectorate Parliament 
May – Rump reinstated and demands Richard 
Cromwell’s resignation 
July – Aug – Booth’s Rising 
Oct – Army dissolves Rump; Monck 
demands its reinstatement 
Dec – Monck begins his march south 
April – May – Catholic peers take their seats in 
the House of Lords 
July – Leyburn campaigns for a Vicar Apostolic 
in Rome 
Chapter publish their Encyclical Epistle 
1660 Feb – Monck reinstates purged members of 
the Rump 
April – Declaration of Breda 
May – Charles II becomes King of Great 
Britain 
Aug – Act of Free and General Pardon, 
Indemnity and Oblivion 
Oct – Worchester House Conference 
April – Brudenell made 1st earl of Cardigan 
June – Catholic Peers approach House of Lords 
for toleration 
July – Committee meet to discuss a bill for 
toleration 
Sept – General Assembly held. 
1661 April – July – Savoy House Conference 
May – First session of Cavalier Parliament 
July – Militia Act 
Nov – Act passed making it illegal to accuse 
Charles II of Catholicism 
Dec – Corporation Act 
Walsh publishes his Remonstrance and is 
supported by the English Chapter 
1662 May – Act of Uniformity 





English Catholic clerical sources 
 
 
The English Catholic clerical sources used in this research were taken from Main 
Series A and the Old Brotherhood sources held in the Archdiocese of Westminster 
Archives and manuscripts incorporated in the Anglia collection held in the Society of 
Jesus, British Province in Mayfair, London.  
 
Archdiocese of Westminster Archives 
The Main Series A archives held in Westminster were selected and bound into 
volumes in the nineteenth century. There are forty-nine in all, covering the period 1501-
1792. Further boxed files from Series A cover the period 1799-1850. Volumes A 30 to 
A32, covering the years 1641 to 1667, have less material then earlier volumes. Volume 
A 30 (1641 to 1654) consists of 202 manuscripts; A 31, covering the period 1655 to 
1659 is made up of 123 manuscripts; and A 32 includes 161 manuscripts from 1660 to 
1667. As stated in the introduction, the contents of these volumes are mostly clerical 
correspondence between the chapter, their agent in Rome and contacts within the 
Catholic colleges on the continent. These manuscripts are predominately concerned with 
the organisation and hierarchical structure of the English chapter and theoretical issues, 
both of which influenced the way the chapter and parts of the English Catholic 
community interacted with the State.  
 
The Brotherhood volumes are also held in the archives of the Archdiocese of 
Westminster. These too contain collected and bound correspondence of the English 
clergy, their agents in Rome and the Catholic colleges on the continent. Book One 
contains 190 manuscripts; Book Two has 210 manuscripts; Book Three, 267; and Book 
Four, 159 documents. Only Book One, Part Two and Book Two, Parts One and Two, 
were used during the research for this thesis which include material covering the late 
sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries. Within these particular volumes material is 
 274 
divided into headed subject sections, such as ‘Reasons for having a Bishop’ and ‘Papers 
in defence of the chapter’. Particular attention was focused on the sections that included 
correspondence to the Bishop of Chalcedon from priests Leyburn, Muscot and Gage, 
and the official correspondence of the chapter (to the Sede Vacante and reports of 
Assembly meetings) in conjunction with the private correspondence of John Sergeant, 
John Holland and Francis Gage. Book Two, Part Two also contains material directly 
linked with the Oath of Supremacy and Allegiance which included a declaration of 
allegiance to Charles II in 1662 and a profession of allegiance of Roman Catholics.  
 
The manuscripts included in Series A and the Old Brotherhood volumes only 
include clerical (mostly secular) material and there is little reference to the English 
Catholic laity. Information can be gathered to give some indication as to national politics 
and the papacy’s attitudes towards significant events (for example, the restoration of 
Charles II) but mostly these comments are fleeting. However, once these clerical issues, 
discussions and arguments are placed in a wider context, further conclusions can be 
drawn. This material could also, if used as a springboard, tell us more about the set up 
and running of the English chapter on a day-to-day basis. In particular, there is much 
more to learn about Catholic districts, chapter meetings, and how frequently Catholic 
secular priests were able to administer to their patrons. One does have to be careful, 
however, when using these manuscripts, as much of the content of the material is 
conditioned by the factional disputes of the clergy. The opinions attributed to clerics 
should not therefore be taken at face value. Similarly the correspondence between the 
English secular clergy and the colleges abroad should also be treated cautiously as it was 
to these colleges and Rome that the clergy looked for financial support throughout the 
English Catholic mission. 
 
The Society of Jesus, British Province Archive, Mayfair 
The Anglia manuscripts transferred from Stonyhurst College in Lancashire to the 
Society of Jesus Archives, Mayfair, are kept in seven bound volumes which chart the 
early history of the Province. For the purposes of this thesis only Volumes Five, Six and 
Seven were used. Volume Five contains 120 separate manuscripts dated from June 1641 
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to September 1694; Volume Six includes 131 letters, relations and report covering the 
period 1136-1697. These Anglia volumes mostly consist of correspondence amongst the 
Jesuit clergy on the mission in Britain, their contacts residing in the Catholic colleges 
abroad, the Jesuit General and the papacy. This correspondence mainly deals with 
clerical issues such as the set-up, finance and success of the Jesuit mission in England, 
but there is also material that provides contemporary commentary on national politics. 
For instance, along with news reports from England covering the 1640s, 1650s and 
1660s there are also accounts of priests’ executions before the civil war, proposals to 
petition Charles I for toleration, a decree of the Protector’s definition of treason, 
narratives of the dissolution of the Barebones parliament, a letter from Henrietta Maria 
to a newly instated General and a copy of papers delivered to James II after Charles II’s 
death.  
 
Most of the material included in these volumes however, is in either Latin or 
Italian. It was therefore not as widely used it might have been throughout the thesis 
although it is highly unlikely that any material thereby obtained would fundamentally 
alter the conclusions of this work. It would be particularly interesting to use Anglia A to 
see exactly what the Jesuits thought was going on within national politics, particularly 
during the coming of the Protectorate. It would also be of value to see how they felt, in 
their own words, about the concessions some Catholics were willing to make during the 
allegiance negotiations in 1662. It would also be intriguing to discover the links the 
Jesuit priests had to the community – how popular were they, for example, and in which 





Archives of the Archdiocese of Westminster 
Series A: 
Vols. xxx; xxxi; xxxii.  
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